can make this an advertisement for iPhone. Or Android? Okay, the גמרא here in קידושין דף מ״ב עמוד ב׳, here's the whole סוגיא of שליחות. We're still in the middle of the סוגיא of שליחות. Here the גמרא comes with this ענין of אין שליח לדבר עבירה. That even though you can make a שליח to do something good for you, like you have to be מקדש an אשה, you can make a שליח, and if the שליח does it, it's as if you did it. And she's מקודשת to you, and by a גט, and many other, by תרומה we learned, if you have to take off תרומה from your your wheat, you can make a שליח and takes it off as if you took it off. But if it comes to an עבירה, you can't make a שליח. למשל, if a person sends somebody to steal, ראובן sends שמעון to steal and שמעון steals because of that, who's חייב? שמעון, the גנב. He can't say, \"Well, I'm a שליח, so יש שליח,\" שליחו של אדם כמותו, as if he did it. But then the גמרא says that there are two exceptions. At the end of this גמרא there are three exceptions. That there are two exceptions to the rule, or maybe three exceptions to the rule, but that's not נוגע here. The bottom line is here, one of the exceptions is שליחות יד. What's שליחות יד? By a שומר, if you give something to watch somebody to watch, so if he's a שומר חנם, he watches for no pay, then he's פטור for everything. If an

אונס happens to it, then you're פטור, אודאי. Even גנבה ואבדה, if it gets stolen or lost, you're also פטור. A שומר שכר is חייב for אונס, but he's פטור for גנבה ואבדה. But there is a דין that if you're שולח יד, then you're always חייב for everything, even for אונס. שולח יד means if you used it. If the person who's the שומר used it, and not that he broke it, he used it. The fact that he used it itself is a חידוש. So if you used it, and you put it away, and later if something happened to it, you are חייב. That's, and the פסוק says that. The פסוק says, אם לא שלח ידו במלאכת רעהו. If you did not שליח שולח יד, that means you put your hand on it, you didn't use it, then ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים, then if you claim it got stolen let's say, or something happened, you have to go to בית דין, you swear, and then you're פטור. But if you were שולח יד, העלפט מיר שמעתתא, you can say that you did גנבה ואבדה, אונס, you're always חייב. ובנוגע שליחות יד the גמרא says, that's an exception to the rule, יש שליח לדבר עבירה. That if a person is a שומר, and he sends a שליח to be שולח יד, to use the object, it's as if he used it. Like a bicycle. Yeah. So if you yourself use it, אודאי, that's what the פסוק says. So the גמרא says there's a דין of יש שליח לדבר עבירה. It's not an עבירה when you do it? You're not allowed to, it's גנבה, you're not allowed to... Sure, if you're a שומר you can't use it, you're not allowed to use it. עבירה. Yes, if I'm borrowing or renting? Huh? It's like I'm borrowing or renting here though. No, borrow you borrow to use, renting you rent to use. Only by a שומר. Okay, let's yes, פרעגט די גמרא, yes. Now, so the גמרא brings where do we find this whole thing of שליחות יד, where does it say that שליחות יד you're חייב, the משלח, the owner, the one that send the guy is חייב even though it's an עבירה and אין שליח לדבר עבירה? Here's an exception. The גמרא quotes a ברייתא. דתניא, it says in a ברייתא like this: right before the פסוק of שליחות יד, the פסוק says על כל דבר פשע. על כל דבר פשע means on any, anything that's happened bad here, anything wrong has happened. So it says like this, since the פסוק uses the word על כל דבר פשע, בית שמאי אומרים, so בית שמאי says, לחייב על המחשבה כמעשה. Comes to tell you that you're חייב for שליחות יד even if he had a מחשבה. If a guy had in mind to use it, even though he didn't use it, he's חייב as if he was used it, כמעשה. Now

someone says, how do you know? How can you control your mind? No, you could control if you want. You could control, maybe he holds in mind, maybe I should use it, but if you decide, you make a decision, that's it, I'm going to use it, and the bottom line is you for some reason you didn't use it, you're חייב. Aye, who could know what you thought? Himself. Yeah, you're a פרומער ייד, you thought to use it, later you what happened, \"Oh, I did something wrong,\" so you go to the רב and ask him, \"Am I חייב or not?\" So בית שמאי says you're חייב. And the לשון of the גמרא is, you have to keep in the word words here, לחייב על המחשבה כמעשה. That's what the פסוק, and since the פסוק על כל דבר פשע, anything. ובית הלל אומרים, אינו חייב עד שישלח בו יד. You're not חייב until you actually do it. שנאמר, it says, אם לא שלח ידו. הפסוק says, when are you פטור? אם לא שלח ידו, which means when are you חייב? Only if שלח ידו, that means you actually use it. אמרו בית שמאי לבית הלל, בית שמאי says to בית הלל, והלא נאמר על כל דבר פשע. How could you tell me that it's only if שלח ידו if he did a מעשה? So what happens to the Doesn't the פסוק say על כל דבר פשע? אמרו להם בית הלל לבית שמאי, so בית הלל answered to בית שמאי, והלא נאמר אם לא שלח ידו במלאכת רעהו. So טאקע you have על כל דבר פשע, but I have the פסוק אם לא שלח ידו, which means... So אמרו בית שמאי לבית הלל, so בית שמאי turned to בית הלל, so אם כן על כל דבר פשע למה לי? Okay, so you're claiming that you דרש the פסוק where it says לא שלח ידו, it means a מעשה. So what were What are you going to do with the פסוק על כל דבר פשע, which comes to add that even if it wasn't regular שליחות יד you're still חייב, and you're telling me that it doesn't mean מחשבה? So the answer, I'll tell you what, so בית הלל answers, I'll tell you what the word על כל דבר פשע adds. שיכול, because otherwise I would think, אין לי אלא הוא. When are you חייב for שליחות יד? If you yourself did it. עבדו ושלוחו מניין? And how do you know if you asked your עבד to be שליח יד for you, or you asked a שליח to be שליח יד for you, how do you know you're also חייב? תלמוד לומר על כל דבר פשע. That's what we learn out from על כל דבר פשע. So בית שמאי learns out from the words על כל דבר פשע לחייב על המחשבה כמעשה, that you're חייב for מחשבה, thinking of being שליח יד, you're חייב. And בית הלל says they learn out from על כל דבר פשע that, they say מחשבה is not חייב, but על כל דבר פשע comes to add that שליחות works. That if you send a שליח to do שליחות יד, you are חייב. So from the words שלא שלח ידו is משמע you have to do it, על כל דבר פשע both agree adds something extra. So בית שמאי says it comes to add extra מחשבה כמעשה, and בית הלל says it comes to add extra שליחות. And that's what the גמרא brings in the משנה. Where does בית שמאי learn שליחות from? No, so בית שמאי disagrees. בית שמאי holds by שליחות there is no שליחות. It's an עבירה, אין שליח לדבר עבירה. So בית שמאי טאקע says there's no שליחות there, and בית הלל says... So what we said before that there are a few exceptions to the rule, that yes there is a שליח לדבר עבירה, and one of them is שליחות יד, only according to בית הלל. Good. But we פסק like בית הלל always. It's no problem. This was This is what the גמרא says. Comes רש״י, and רש״י says like this: לחייב על המחשבה, as בית שמאי says, so רש״י adds the words או על הדיבור. Or if you thought to be שליח יד, or if you said. And רש״י טייטשט, explains it, שאם אמר או חשב לשלוח יד בפקדון, if you said, or even if you just thought to be שליח יד in the פקדון, in the object, הרי הוא ברשותו מאותה שעה ואילך, להתחייב בכל אונסין שיארע בו. Right? From that moment, you are חייב all and everything, אפילו שומר חנם, even if it's a שומר חנם. שלא היה חייב עד עכשיו אלא בפשיעה, שומר חנם normally it's not for this, you'd be פטור for everything. The only thing a שומר חנם is חייב, פשיעה, if you're negligent. And now, because he did שליחות יד, so בית שמאי, because even if he thought or said, so therefore from now on you are חייב for אונסין. It's a lot of רש״י for what seemed to be very straightforward to... So

that's how far we're going to go. Comes the ב״ח here, הגהות הב״ח here on the words in רש״י לחייב על המחשבה או על הדיבור. The ב״ח says, נכתב בצדו, like it's commenting, ובבבא מציעא סוף דף מ״ג פירש רש״י דוקא אמר, ועיין שם בתוספות. That in בבא מציעא רש״י is different. רש״י says when it says מחשבה, that בית שמאי says לחייב מחשבה, it doesn't mean thought, it means דיבור דוקא. And let's look at רש״י inside. רש״י on דף מ״ג עמוד ב׳ in פרק המפקיד, רש״י says here This is a משנה. This גמרא we just brought is a ברייתא. The ברייתא is brought there too, דף מ״ג מ״ד עמוד א׳, but this ברייתא is on the משנה. I'll read you the משנה: החושב לשלוח יד בפקדון. Someone just thought to do שליחות יד in an object that he's watching. בית שמאי אומרים חייב, ובית הלל אומרים אינו חייב עד שישלח בו יד, שנאמר אם לא שלח ידו במלאכת רעהו. Look at רש״י: החושב לשלוח יד, אמר בפני שני עדים, if he says in front of two people, אטול פקדון זה של פלוני לעצמי, I'm going to take this פקדון, חייב באונסו מיום והלאה, היינו חייב באחריות. So רש״י makes it very clear that even though it says the word מחשבה, it means דיבור. תוספות here says, החושב לשלוח יד, אך מחשבה הא בדיבור. דיבור. That's what he says here. And he says more. He agrees with רש״י? Yeah. But it's a סתירה to רש״י in in קידושין. And here the ב״ח over here says, when רש״י says החושב, so רש״י says אמר, so the ב״ח over there says: ובקידושין סוף דף מ״ב פירש רש״י דלאו דוקא אמר, אלא חשב. So he said it's פֿאַרקערט. So what the ב״ח is trying to point out is that we have a contradiction between the two רש״יs. Over there רש״י says in in קידושין, in our גמרא, we're learning קידושין, רש״י says בית שמאי holds מחשבה means... אפילו מחשבה, and in רש״י in בבא מציעא it says it means דיבור. It's דוקא. Why the קצות is bringing out what the ב״ח brought out? He gets רש״י. תוספות doesn't usually ask סתירות in רש״י from one גמרא to the other. Does it? He asks a קשיא on רש״י on the spot usually. So he would ask the קשיא, you said it here, it doesn't say. No, here he agrees with רש״י. I'm saying, but you said it over there, you You go into that now? You're just tired and תוספות, not that, the other ראשונים, אחרונים, yeah, תוספות is different. Okay, so we have the שאלה. So, בפשטות, before we get even to understand why, but one thing obviously is clear, that for some reasons רש״י has a ראיה or feels that the סוגיא in the גמרא in קידושין holds that it means even מחשבה. The סוגיא in בבא מציעא, the way we learned the גמרא there, it means דוקא דיבור. So we have to figure out what would be the סוגיא here and what would be there, why is that different. Okay. To get to this, let's go to something else. In the רשימות, you all know that after ג' תמוז we found dumps of מחברות and things of the רבי's חידושים, all kinds of things which was not known before, and they're called the רבי's רשימות. So in the

רשימות he has all kinds of things. One of the things there, he explains there is a משנה in the end of of משניות, of the books, and there is a מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל there. The מחלוקת is: חלת דבש, מאימתי מטמאה משום משקה? When you have honey in a beehive, when does the honey become the level of משקה, of liquid, to become טמא? Because we know that there are different דינים in טומאה of food, of מאכל, and different דינים in food in in in in things which are liquid, all kinds of different levels of טומאות. So the שאלה is at what point does it become liquid? And actually in the רשימה the רבי goes into explaining a whole thing that first, for sure, דבש is called food. He'll bring פסוקים and גמרות, דבש is called food, but then we know later on it's called משקה. At what point, time did that change? That's the שאלה that the משנה asks. Comes בית שמאי and בית שמאי says according to one גירסא: משיחרר, when the owner of the beehive has in mind to break it open and take out the honey. At that moment it becomes called משקה. Is the גירסא חרר or מחשבה? חרר, the word? No, okay. And בית הלל אומרים: משיְרסק. בית הלל said, \"No, when you actually break it open. That's when it starts being a משקה.\" Comes the תפארת ישראל there, that's what the רבי brings, תפארת ישראל, and he says when בית שמאי says משיחרר, when you think, it's definitely דיבור. Means for sure דיבור. If you look in the ברטנורא, the רב on on משניות, he says clearly it means מחשבה. So obviously the תפארת ישראל is arguing against the ברטנורא. He's trying to say it means So the רבי goes on a whole אריכות to say, \"I don't see where the תפארת ישראל gets it's a פשטות that it means דיבור.\" And he brings quite a few places where it says the word מחשבה and it means מחשבה. The לשון over there is also יחרר, think, just like מחשבה. And he brings, למשל, he brings a place of קדשים and טומאה and תרומה. To make something קדשים, so it says clearly במחשבה you can make קדשים. You can make if you look at food at the the the grain, and you think that this should be תרומה, it becomes תרומה. So we see הרהור לאו כדיבור דמי. No, you can't. Why not? הרהור is not He's asking פארקערט, that if you have to have דיבור, הרהור is not enough. You're saying פארקערט. If it says הרהור, do you need דיבור? You earlier said that there מחשבה means דיבור. No. When he was explaining Well, תפארת ישראל the רבי brings, that the תפארת ישראל says that when it says there יחרר, when it says בית שמאי holds when is it משיחרר, it means דיבור. The תפארת ישראל says that. The ברטנורא says that it means מחשבה. Comes the רבי and he says, \"I don't see the תפארת ישראל where he got this from. That it means, that it means דוקא דיבור.\" And he brings, I, לכאורה, על פי שכל you can understand where he got it. He doesn't imagine that thinking should do anything. But the רבי brings ראיות that we find many places where it says that something happens if you think and it דוקא means מחשבה, it doesn't mean דיבור. So how does תפארת ישראל get So he brings by making קדשים. You don't have to say, \"This is קדשים,\" if you just think it's. By תרומה, he brings by by פיגול, by קרבנות, when you have a bad thought by קרבנות, it becomes פסול, you don't have to say it, מחשבה is enough. By מועד לקבל טומאה, he brings all kinds of places where it says the word מחשבה. So many places that means clearly מחשבה, and many places there is a מחלוקת, there's a שאלה whether it means מחשבה or דיבור. But he says definitely you can't come with a פשטות and say for sure it has to mean דיבור. How he says? So he says, אזלה פשיטותא דתפארת ישראל. Says, \"I don't see where תפארת ישראל gets this from.\" And he argues and he, yeah, he פרעגט אפ תפארת ישראל. My שאלה is, out of all the places that the רבי brings that it says מחשבה and he wants to prove that it could mean מחשבה, why doesn't he bring this? רש״י in קידושין. It says here that בית שמאי says מחשבה, that if you think by שליחות יד, it's called it's good enough, חייב. And רש״י says it means מחשבה. So he could have brought this רש״י, too. Here we see that בית שמאי says מחשבה that it means מחשבה. איי, it's not a פשט because רש״י in בבא מציעא says it means דיבור, good, so just like he brings other places, which is in certain places we have a שקלא וטריא which is he could have brought this, too, say here, here we have מחשבה. טאקע in one place רש״י says דיבור, but another says מחשבה, and מחשבה, a סימן if it's not a פשוט מחשבה. But there is also not like בית שמאי? But over there, it's all בית שמאי, it's all בית שמאי! So I

think אדרבא, it would fit better, because if you bring this, it's exactly the same מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל like over there. Just like over there by the דבש, what he's talking about, בית שמאי says מחשבה, and בית הלל says מעשה, so the same thing here, ממש the same בית שמאי ובית הלל. And here רש״י says clearly in קידושין that מחשבה means So you should have brought it. It's better than all. Look here! Here it says a clear ראיה and you're telling me for פשט that it means דיבור? Where do you get this And the רבי doesn't bring this גמרא in קידושין. So I wonder why. So one way I would say like this, it's not what I'm trying to get to with a... But, I have a second פשט to say, but one of the things you can say is like this. That by the דבש what you're doing with your מחשבה or whatever we're trying to accomplish there is to make a change in the status of the object. First it's the status of מאכל, food, now we're changing it to the status of משקה, and the שאלה is what has the כח of changing it to status? All the places that the רבי brings are all cases where there's a change in status. The case change the status from something that's טהור to become טמא, a קרבן that's כשר to become פיגול, by תרומה from חולין to become תרומה, from, all these cases. This, no change. That's, there's a דין פשוט there. שליחות יד, you're not supposed to take, שליחות יד. And there's a דין, if you did שליחות יד, you're חייב. But we're not looking to change. So maybe, there's no ראיה from here. Here maybe when you're not causing any change, so maybe טאקע here מחשבה is good. What he's trying to say is the תפארת ישראל, that when there is a change being done, you're changing from מאכל to משקה, maybe then we do it. So the רבי brings, I find in many places where we're making a change and it's still... So he doesn't bring this for that reason. That's I think that could be could be the right פשט. But what I want to say, but if I stick to that פשט, then I have no המשך for the שיעור. This is a פשט I need to say a different פשט that then will fit into the המשך of the שיעור. You know, I told you once what רב איסר זלמן מלצר said once by a שיעור. He said a פשט in the רמב״ם, in the middle of the שיעור, and a בחור asked him, \"What's the ראיה and what's the הכרח that that's the פשט?\" So he says, \"I have a הכרח.\" So he assumed that probably he didn't want to get involved, because it's the middle of the ענין. After the שיעור, finally everyone left, he walks up to him, \"Now privately, could you tell me what was the הכרח that that's the פשט in the רמב״ם?\" \"No, I had a הכרח.\" \"What was your הכרח?\" \"I had to say a שיעור.\" So anyway, so, but there's another פשט you could say here, why he doesn't bring it, and and it's נוגע to how we learn פשט in the גמרא. So let's go back to the מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל. What I'm going to try to say is that there are two ways we can learn what the תוכן of the מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל is. One way will fit to the גמרא in בבא מציעא, and one way will fit to the גמרא in קידושין. And the result of the two ways will be whether it means דיבור also or not, and then we'll understand why the רבי doesn't bring it, if what I'm going to say is true. I don't know, take it or leave it. The לשון of בית שמאי is a strange לשון. And it says like this, it starts with a ברייתא over here, על כל דבר פשע, it says by שליחות יד, על כל דבר פשע. בית שמאי אומרים לחייב על המחשבה כמעשה, that you're חייב for מחשבה like מעשה. It's a strange לשון. It should have said, לחייב על המחשבה. Why does he have to say לחייב על המחשבה כמעשה? You should say פשוט, you're חייב for מחשבה too. לחייב על המחשבה. He's trying to say something. You're חייב for מחשבה like מעשה. Which is like מעשה? What? You're חייב. When you're חייב, you're חייב for מעשה, you're חייב for מחשבה. He's trying to tell us something. So I want to say what he's trying to say is like this. בית הלל says you have to be במעשה. Where do they get it from? Because it says לא ישלח ידו, which it means מעשה. What does בית שמאי do with the לא ישלח ידו? The גמרא didn't go The גמרא asks בית הלל בית שמאי asks בית הלל, \"You, בית הלל, you're saying from לא ישלח it means מעשה, what are you going to do with על כל דבר פשע? What do you do with that פסוק?\" But it doesn't say that בית שמאי turned around to בית הלל, I mean בית הלל turned around to בית שמאי, and said to בית שמאי, \"But you're telling מחשבה is good, but it says לא ישלח ידו, it means מעשה!\" So the גמרא doesn't go into that. The גמרא doesn't say, why didn't that? So I'll tell you why. בית שמאי agrees it has to be a מעשה. בית שמאי agrees, לא ישלח ידו needs a מעשה, like בית הלל, no problem. The חידוש of the תורה is that in this case, מחשבה is מעשה. See, you can learn two ways. You can learn that the תורה is מחדש with our על כל דבר פשע that you don't need מעשה. You might think you need מעשה, but you don't need מעשה. זאגט בית שמאי, נישט אזוי. בית שמאי, but you need מעשה, but the תורה is מחדש if you did a

מחשבה, the תורה said that's called מעשה. It's a חידוש of the תורה that מחשבה כמעשה, not חייב על המחשבה, חייב על מחשבה מחשבה. And it's נוגע לגבי things when you if you're doing it, and you're doing an איסור, is it an איסור שבמעשה or an איסור שבמחשבה? It's נוגע לגבי עונשין לגבי this is called an איסור. So according to this פשט, מחשבה כמעשה. So בית שמאי learns that the words אם לא שלח ידו, it טאקע means מעשה. על כל דבר פשע comes to tell you, you טאקע need מעשה, but the תורה is מחדש a חידוש that this is called מעשה. But really you need מעשה here. Comes בית הלל, בית הלל says, \"Well, that's too big of a חידוש for me. That the תורה is מחדש מחשבה כמעשה. So I think the easier חידוש that the תורה is telling you on על כל דבר פשע is that שליחות is שייך.\" And בית הלל feels that that's a smaller חידוש. Why? Because the concept of שליחות, we know anyway. אלא מאי? In this case, we would assume there isn't. And why would we assume there isn't? Cuz אין שליח לדבר עבירה. But the fact that the תורה is מחדש that there's שליחות is not that it's an outlandish thing, because שליחות is not It's בעצם it's a חידוש, but there's a חידוש of שליחות anyway. And the first reference to מחשבה כמעשה is here by this? In this ענין, yeah. In כלל? No, מחשבה you can find in other places, like קדשים and תרומה, like we said before, but the word מחשבה כמעשה is only here, מחשבה כמעשה. So it

comes out like this: that the מחלוקת between בית שמאי and בית הלל is very narrow. They both agree you have to have מעשה, and that's from ושלח ידו. Then you have the פסוק in על כל דבר פשע, what does that teach us? That's the מחלוקת. בית שמאי says it teaches us מחשבה is מעשה, מחשבה as a גדר of מעשה, and בית הלל says it comes to teach שליחות. And what does בית שמאי hold about שליח? בית שמאי They don't have a פסוק for this, there's no There's no שליחות here. That's why בית שמאי is knows there's no שליחות. By By שליחות יד, there's no שליחות, like every עבירה. Like every cuz an עבירה. And בית הלל says על כל דבר פשע, but they learn על כל דבר פשע a bigger חידוש, that מחשבה כמעשה. But right away when we learn this פשט in the מחלוקת, we have an answer why in the רשימות he doesn't bring it. Because over there, we're talking about things that don't need מעשה. The תורה says it doesn't need מעשה, but מחשבה is enough. So the שאלה is when it says מחשבה is enough, does that mean דיבור or מחשבה itself? Here, when the תורה says מחשבה כמעשה, I'll tell you. The

פשט is if the תורה is telling you a חידוש, such a big חידוש that מחשבה כמעשה, then why would you think דיבור is better? דיבור is also a big חידוש. If the תורה says it has to be If the תורה would say you don't need מעשה, so you could say, \"So what do you need? Maybe דיבור.\" But דיבור has to have עדים. This is without עדים. You don't need עדים here. By דיבור? No, yeah, דיבור if if you hold דיבור has to have עדים, but we're saying here by חלות, does it need דיבור or מחשבה? If we're going to say this is a logical thing, then it has to be it makes sense to say that מחשבה is not enough, you need דיבור. If the תורה is telling you a חידוש that מחשבה כמעשה, that and the לשון is מחשבה, or the לשון of the משנה, החושב לשלוח יד, then might as well say that means כפשוטו, it's מחשבה. The only time you have to say it doesn't mean If the לשון is מחשבה, why do you think it means דיבור? Cuz logically it makes no sense, מחשבה. But if we're saying anyway it's a big חידוש, because if we wouldn't say מחשבה כמעשה, if we say the תורה tells you that you're חייב for מחשבה also, so you could think maybe it's not מחשבה, maybe it's דיבור. But if it's telling you that באמת it's מעשה, מחשבה כמעשה, so it's a חידוש, so if it's a חידוש and it's a גזירת הכתוב, and the לשון is מחשבה, why would you think it's דיבור? So according to this, it it's it פשוט it means מחשבה. And that's how רש״י learns, like us in קידושין, מסכת, that this is the פשט in the מחלוקת בית שמאי and בית הלל, וממילא it means מחשבה also, there's no reason not to. The רבי can't bring it over there, because over there, we're not talking about things which need מעשה. Over there, we're talking about דבש. Does it say this needs מעשה? The שאלה is at what point does that דבש become משקה instead of a מאכל? It says מחשבה, but it's not like a חידוש מחשבה כמעשה, so there you could say על פי שכל, מחשבה is a little far, could mean דיבור. And the רבי so the

רבי brings ראיות from other places where she also doesn't need מעשה. Doesn't say you need a מעשה by תרומה, doesn't say you need a מעשה by קדשים. So he brings, we see that in places where you don't need מעשה, and it says מחשבה, it טאקע means מחשבה. So what makes you say over there it means דיבור? But from this גמרא he can't bring, cuz this גמרא is a different דין בכלל. It's a חידוש that מחשבה כמעשה, that's a different דין. But that's one way to learn the מחלוקת. And if, again, if you learn the מחלוקת this way, so what will be the result? That בית שמאי says מחשבה, there's no reason to say it means דיבור. And if it says מחשבה, it means מחשבה. Why would you think it means דיבור? Because it's a חידוש anyway, מחשבה כמעשה, so it might mean מחשבה. But then there's another way we could learn, and the other way would be even, to a certain degree, a lesser חידוש. Another way is already a פֿאַרדרייטע way to learn the פשט, but the חידוש will be a שוואַכערע חידוש. And the פשט is like this: You distinguish דיבור and מעשה? Huh? I mean מחשבה. But כמעשה מחשבה, דיבור it's the same. It's דיבור and מעשה. Saying not! Saying this מחשבה could be מחשבה, not דיבור. With דיבור, אה ודאי. Now you're saying דיבור and מעשה. You're you're interchanging דיבור and מעשה as if דיבור is מעשה. No. No? Okay. The חידוש over here is that I mean, the חידוש over here is that the תורה says that your מחשבה is מעשה. So if the תורה, מחשבה is מעשה, so it makes no sense. So they don't think about דיבור. So it makes So why דיבור? Because there's no שכל here, there's no logic, it's זה גזירת הכתוב. זה גזירת הכתוב! זה גזירת הכתוב! מחשבה is מחשבה. When it's not a גזירת הכתוב, when it's not telling you what you're doing is like מחשבה is like מעשה, by other places it doesn't say מחשבה is like מעשה, it says מחשבה is good enough. So then we can think מחשבה is good enough, maybe it means דיבור, because it's not it's not that such a big חידוש. Why, it's not a קל וחומר with דיבור? דיבור is surely good enough. No, surely אה ודאי it's good. In this case too. In this case also, that's what רש\"י says: אם אמר איכפת, אמר אה ודאי. There's no question אמר is good, but the שאלה is מחשבה also good. First of all, you can't have אמר without מחשבה. There's no way you can talk without מחשבה. Yeah. There are some people, there are some people that talk without thinking, but usually not. If you think about eating a cake and you don't eat you're still hungry. Basically. Exactly! That's why it's a big חידוש. But then there's another way, and the other way is already a פארדרייטע way to learn פשט in this, in פשט in בית שמאי and בית הלל. You can learn like this: This is ב' הגדרים. What is the basis בכלל of the מחלוקת of בית שמאי ובית הלל? בית שמאי says if you think it's already enough to be חייב, and בית הלל says not. כח ופועל? So we know that is the famous way of learning the מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל, which רב יוסף ענגיל learns and and הרב זעוין, and the רבי has on it an אריכות, that in many, many מחלוקות in ש\"ס they all follow the same line: בית שמאי says you follow בכח, and בית הלל says you follow בפועל. בית שמאי says, למשל, the the classical example always is חנוכה: בית שמאי says the first day you light eight candles, then 7, 6, 5, and בית הלל says פארקערט. And the גמרא says why? בית שמאי says כנגד ימים הנכנסים, how many days are coming? Eight days are coming. The second day, how many days are coming? Seven, that's how you go. בית הלל says כנגד ימים היוצאים, that passed. So you explain בית שמאי says you follow בכח, whatever is potential. The first day potentially there are eight days, the second day, seven days. And בית הלל is בפועל, whatever is בפועל. Many other more מחלוקת'ן like that: ראש השנה לאילנות, what else is the the classical, but there's 25, 30 examples. Honey is one of them. Uh? And the honey. And the honey is also And the honey is one of those. But they want to bring, so they have said that רב יוסף ענגיל says that this מחלוקת is based on the same thing: בית שמאי says מחשבה is enough to be חייב, it's בכח, not בפועל yet, he didn't do it yet. בית הלל says when are you חייב? He does בפועל. That's what רב יוסף ענגיל says in בית האוצר. The רבי brings a ראיה from ירושלמי that that's not the פשט here. That that's not. And he says so then the question is, what's the logic, not talking about the פסוקים, what's the logic of בית שמאי that if you do מחשבה it's already enough to be חייב? So the

רבי brings the ראגאטשאווער. Where the ראגאטשאווער says so a different ווארט: He says when you think to use it, what you're doing is, you are like taking away your שמירה, you're saying that I'm not watching it anymore. ממילא till now when the object was laying here, since you put it down here and I'm the שומר, the part, the the land which, the place which it's laying on belongs to him. Belongs to that guy, because that's you you מקנה him the place. The moment I decided that I'm not going to watch it, I'm going to take it, my מחשבה change that that area becomes mine. So it's not that you took this object, you weren't שליח יד, but you pulled the the rug under it. You changed the רשות. In order for you to watch it, it's in his רשות. The moment you decided that this is going to be my רשות, so it's as if you changed the רשויות, and ממילא that's why it's called שליחות יד. So in מציאות, it's called משיכה צורית he calls it. It's משיכה צורית. צורית means it's a theoretical משיכה. There is a משיכה בפועל, and then there is an ענין, in theory, in abstract thinking you did a משיכה. It's as if you changed, because you decided to take it, you're not watching anymore, if not watching you're you're taking away the רשות from him, ממילא it's not in his רשות anymore, so then you were שליח יד. That's the side, that's what בית שמאי holds, that's why, he brings the ראגאטשאווער, that's why he says מחשבה is enough. So I'm asking a שאלה: So

why did בית הלל argue? What's the סברא of בית הלל? Doesn't explain it. He just says that's what בית שמאי holds. But when we know בית שמאי's סברא, we have to think what's בית הלל's סברא. It doesn't say. בפועל, he didn't move it yet. What we're saying, this is also בפועל. That's the, it's not the case of בפועל, here the רבי says it's not, it's בפועל, but not בפועל physical, but it's something that happened! Something happened! So בפועל, so בית הלל should agree. Again, the ט\"ז writes this is a case בפועל. If it's בפועל, בית הלל should agree. Why do בית הלל argue? He doesn't go into it. He doesn't say. You can say that the הלכה is what? The כולל, theoretically you're right, it did change, but הלכה doesn't change theoretically. הלכה is it's still, it didn't change the גדר. But it's בפועל! It's בפועל in a theoretical sense. So you're saying טובא כח. It's still It's not טובא כח, it's just that because a lot of times we say things change, but the הלכה doesn't travel or vice versa. That's what I was trying to say. That הלכה doesn't travel. Meaning, you're saying at the end of the day, the מציאות did did change, you mean But that doesn't change the הלכה. It changes the Okay. דאס האב איך געזאגט. דאס האב איך געזאגט, דאס האב איך געזאגט, נו. No, no, no. I don't, I'm not בקי. I want to say the different פשט, which is like deeper to understand not just, okay, what you're saying is, I disagree that this is called a פועל. Not giving a סברא behind it because when the Torah, it didn't go away, it's it's I mean, it's not wrong. Yeah, but it When you watch I want to say what the מחלוקת בית שמאי. When you watch something for somebody else, you're thinking about them. Thinking that you have to protect it for them. As soon as you have this מחשבה, you're not thinking about them anymore, you're thinking about yourself. Okay. So that that I think that's what part of what you're saying. No, so you're changing the בעלים, right? Changing that That would be now, that's still מחשבה. I didn't do anything, but if he says because when you thought, you're making this place, which is his, not his anymore. So you're taking away the place, you're actually taking away the place. I want to say like this: What בית שמאי holds is when they דרש'ן the פסוק the חייב על המחשבה כמעשה, this is what it means. This is a מחשבה'דיקע type of of שליחות יד. מחשבה כמעשה means that normally when the פסוק ושלח שלח ידו, it would mean כפשוטו. Comes the פסוק and tells you that the חידוש is that not like I said before that מחשבה is good, comes to tell you that משיחת צורית is good. When it says מחשבה כמעשה, it doesn't tell you a חידוש that מחשבה is like מעשה. Again, it tells you that you have, what we call, if you think in your mind, a thing which does a מחשבה'דיקע type of job, the תורה says you're חייב. So where does בית שמאי get this idea that מחשבה צורית would be enough? From this פסוק, על כל דבר פשע. That's what he means. Not like we said before, על כל דבר פשע means מחשבה כמעשה, that the רבונו של עולם, מעשה מחשבה. The תורה tells you, they say, that you don't have to do the מעשה בפועל, the מחשבה that accomplishes like the מעשה, which is מחשבה, that's good enough to be חייב. The only problem we have with this is, and I'm not going to get into אריכות because a lot of פרטים here, how can my מחשבה affect somebody else's thing? We have a כלל, אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו. You cannot make somebody else's thing אסור. And it only talks about things which is נוגע למחשבה, because it doesn't mean במעשה. במעשה, I could make someone else's אסור. If I take your milk and your meat, and I mix it together, it's not going to be אסור? Because אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו, it's an absolute nonsense. Assur! Only those things which my מחשבה has to have an השפעה, then it says it doesn't תפוס. And then all the cases are like that. פיגול. Huh? פיגול is קרבנות, no? The כהן's thought But that's not אינו שלו. He's the בעל הבית of the קרבן for that. At that time, when he makes the קרבן, it's like he's the בעל הבית. But if I come over to your thing Most of the גמרא's example, if I come over and I take your זקף לבינה, I took your rock and I put it down and I bow down to it, it doesn't become אסור. Ain rock. אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו. Why? What's the פשט like why not? So it says because my מחשבה can have can have no effect on your thing. On my thing it could have an effect, why? Because there is a קשר, there is a connection between me and this is mine, so my מחשבה could work. Or even your thing, if I do something to it, I move it over, it worked, I did it. But it's your thing, I didn't touch it, I didn't do anything, I'm sitting here and thinking something, this is yours, what kind of connection does it have? In this case, the connection is always you. You're the one who is holding it as their thing. But that we're not saying we're saying that the that the place is affected. The place is affected because of my מחשבה of holding it as yours. I'm not that I'm holding it. I took it, it became, I was מקנה you the place. So in order to take away Right, so you're מקנה it, so you gave it away, so now it's, but it's his now! changed it But it's his, you have to affect his. You know when it works? If you have דיבור. In this case, מחשבה will not work. מחשבה cannot do anything to somebody else's things. If the פשט is the word מחשבה here means that the תורה is מחדש that my mind could change your רשות because of the משיחת צורית, so it says clearly, only if my my מחשבה, if I have דיבור to the מחשבה, that's called מחשבתו ניכרת, מחשבה which is not ניכר, which you cannot tell doesn't work, doesn't affect, that's clear. That's what it says, the אחיעזר, רב חיים עוזר in שאלות ותשובות אחיעזר says this. But if you have דיבור, it does work. So if you learn like this the פשט, so it comes out like this. What does בית שמאי say? בית שמאי comes and says על כל דבר פשע לחייב על מחשבה כמעשה, the תורה teaches you that even though it says לשלוח יד, it means מעשה, the תורה tells you that here you have a מחשבה which is like מעשה, it's מחשבה משיכת צורית. And that's what they learn off על כל דבר פשע, not only במעשה. But then רש״י learns, רש״י says that that's what בית שמאי means, and it's because the תורה teaches you that your מחשבה has an effect on that place which is the other guy's, so רש״י says it must be דיבור, because מחשבה itself can't work. If you learn like I had before the other פשט that מחשבה כמעשה means פשוט חידוש of מחשבה, so מחשבה makes no sense, דיבור makes no sense, so it has to have מחשבה, it means מחשבה. But here we're saying a logic that the תורה is trying to tell you that this משיכת צורית is a logical thing. But the תורה has to tell you, because on our own we would never think that this is good enough. Comes the תורה and tells you that it does, so רש״י says, \"But if you're going to say that's the ווארט, you have to have דיבור, you have to have should touch.\" Comes בית הלל and בית הלל says, \"I agree with you that there is a משיכת צורית, but I have the same problem you had. Your problem was\", like רש״י says, \"that מחשבה can't have an effect. So on בית שמאי, רש״י figured out the answer דיבור. בית הלל, בית הלל says I have a different thing. I agree it's משיכת צורית, but משיכת צורית is only where מחשבה does work, so you know what the פשט is? If I, my דיבור itself will still not, still not be enough, because דיבור didn't touch it, didn't do anything. If my דיבור makes somebody else do it, then it works.\" That means if I said, but not it's not a דין שליחות, it sounds like שליחות, not a real דין שליחות. What is it? It's a דין that if my דיבור caused somebody else to do a מעשה, that מעשה is considered a המשך to my דיבור. And ממילא, it's as if I did it. And this is not שליחות, I'll tell you where it's fine such a thing. You find this thing is a דין actually in בבא מציעא. חוטמו בכיס it said לאו, לא תחסום שור בדישו. You're not allowed to muzzle up the animal while... So the

גמרא says what happens if you muzzled it, but not physically, בדיבור? The בהמה was working and you scream, every time the בהמה wanted to eat something you started screaming, so you didn't let it eat. So the whole time you didn't let it eat, are you חייב or not? So רב ששת says you're חייב. פרעגט the גמרא, if רב ששת says you're חייב, חייב מלקות, it's a לאו, לאו שאין בו מעשה! There's no מעשה there. You didn't do anything. You're only חייב on a לאו מלקות if it's יש בו מעשה, it has no מעשה. So the גמרא answers, because דיבוריה קא עביד מעשה, because your דיבור made a מעשה, the בהמה מעשה, so it's considered that your דיבור is a מעשה. And this is not שליחות, we're talking about a בהמה over there, not a שליח, but if your דיבור caused the בהמה to do a מעשה, so that's the continuation of your דיבור, it's considered to be. But that's only said by a בהמה. By a human being not. But because we have a פסוק על כל דבר פשע, so בית שמאי says, you could learn like this, שמאי says על כל דבר פשע tells you that there is the משיכת צורית that you did, but it's not enough because it's missing the connection, so if you ask somebody else to do it, and that becomes המשך to your מעשה, so then the משיכת צורית will work. That's, בית הלל says. So לפי זה, we have a new פשט in the מחלוקת בית שמאי ובית הלל, that בית שמאי says it's משיכת צורית, and what answers the problem of the fact that my מחשבה cannot work is דיבור. And בית הלל says, \"You know what, when it works? If your, your דיבור will cause him, your, you'll cause it to happen.\" But לפי זה, it's not real שליחות. If it's not real שליחות, because this is called שליחות בשם המושאל, it's על דרך the גמרא, the same גמרא I said before with when a guy puts down the rock and he bows down to it, אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו, it doesn't work. So the גמרא there says, but if the other guy put the, the owner put the rock on, or the owner put the rock down and then someone else

bowed down to it, then the owner, then it does become עבודה זרה. And the גמרא says why? שליחותיה דידיה קא עביד, because he's my שליח to do it. So the מפרשים ask, what do you mean a שליח? עבודה זרה, אין שליח לדבר עבירה! So the גמרא says, so the answer, it doesn't mean שליחות, it's a שם המושאל, it's like a What's called שם המושאל? A borrowed term. It's not a real שליחות. What it means is like this: in order for something to become עבודה זרה, you have to have כוונה and מעשה, you have to have כוונה to עבודה זרה, you have to do. So what happens is if he had the proper כוונה, proper I mean כוונה of עבודה זרה, and through his כוונה someone else did it, it goes back to him that his, what he did contains, the מעשה goes back to him. And the גמרא calls that שליחות. So I want to say like this, that the גמרא in בבא מציעא could mean that, when the גמרא בבא מציעא brings the same ברייתא, and it says בית שמאי says we learn out from here מחשבה כמעשה, it means that משיכת צורית, and it has to be דיבור like רש״י says. Comes בית הלל and says, \"No, what does על כל דבר פשע teach you? שליחות.\" I'm saying the גמרא there לאו דוקא means real שליחות. It means this. It means like בית שמאי, like you בית שמאי say that it means משיכת צרורות, but we have the problem, but how does it affect? You told somebody else, but that person is doing a מעשה because of me. So I'm חייב אלס כאילו we call it שליחות, I'm חייב because I did it. So that's why you can learn that you can learn that פשט. You can't learn that פשט in the גמרא in קידושין. Because in the גמרא in קידושין it says clearly that this is a real דין שליחות. The גמרא brings this in a real דין שליחות. It's an עבירה. What sense? If it's no sense of שליחות. I mean you put the rocks on, you put... No, that's not שליחות. אין שליח לדבר עבירה. So, but in in

קידושין, where the גמרא refers to, you can't learn this פשט. So how do we learn פשט in the גמרא in קידושין? If you can't learn that way, then we have to learn the first way. What's the first way? That what does בית שמאי mean? The חידוש of מחשבה כמעשה. And what does בית הלל mean? שליחות, מנלן שליחות. If we learn the first way that מחשבה כמעשה, then you don't say it means דוקא דיבור, like we said before, therefore it can be ממש מחשבה. But in בבא מציעא, where we don't have to learn it doesn't say it's a regular דין שליחות, there we can learn the other way. And if you learn the other way in the מחלוקת between בית שמאי and בית הלל, then בית שמאי could take it has to mean דיבור. And this is the difference between two גמראs. But the חידוש is much bigger in קידושין. So, but yeah, but we have no choice, because the גמרא says שליחות. The גמרא says שליחות, רש״י says, again, I'm saying, here we don't need to say the חידוש. If you don't need to say the חידוש, so obviously that's how we're going to learn. So רש״י says let's learn the גמרא, like I'm saying, let's learn it means דיבור. Why does it mean דיבור? Because the דיבור causes the משיכת צרורות, that's מחשבה כמעשה. It's not a חידוש מחשבה כמעשה, it's משיכת צרורות like a מעשה, but you have to בית שמאי holds דיבור. בית הלל says no, it's not that. When does the משיכת צרורות work? If you ask somebody else to do it, and that we call like שליחות. That's how we learn over there. And when it comes to קידושין, so רש״י says here I can't learn like that, because here the גמרא says this is exception to the דין of שליחות, שליח לדבר עבירה, is a real דין שליחות, so you have to learn בית שמאי means בית הלל means real שליחות. So we learn the first way. That what? That בית שמאי says מחשבה כמעשה, a חידוש of תורה מחשבה. And בית הלל says no, the חידוש is שליחות. But if you learn that the חידוש is מחשבה, and it's a גזירת הכתוב, who says you have to say דיבור? And it says מחשבה, so it's מחשבה. So therefore here רש״י learns מחשבה means חושב, here רש״י learns it means דיבור, because here he learns the other way so it has to be דיבור. Here רש״י learns that it can be מחשבה, and it's בפירוש מחשבה, only מחשבה. But that's why in the in the רשימות he can't bring it. That's why in the רשימות when he talks about דהני, and he said it means דיבור, and the רבי said, I want to prove to you that it doesn't have to mean דיבור, he can't bring this גמרא. Because if you're going to bring this גמרא in here, here's a different ווארט. Here it's מחשבה כמעשה! It doesn't say anywhere by דהני the מחשבה כמעשה! If it doesn't say מחשבה כמעשה, then it could be, maybe it means דיבור. But if you tell me a חידוש, גזירת הכתוב מחשבה כמעשה, here it's פשוט מחשבה. So therefore he can't bring this in over there, that's why he only brings the other places and not this. Unbelievable. רב... רב knows, knows. בבא מציעא the the end of the דיבור is מעשה, not by him, but it causes a מעשה to be done. Ah, the שליח מעשה, that's a דין שליחות, it's not my מעשה. No, but it's a מעשה here. Yes, fine, good! What we're trying to say that the in the way in בבא מציעא it's the מעשה of the משלח. דהני To break it, yeah, yeah. But here there's no מעשה at all! In מחשבה Where? In קידושין. In קידושין according to בית שמאי, it's מחשבה. There's no מעשה here. But there is דיבור. Because the other way other ways it won't have an effect in the place. People wanted to build that, but... That would be both. So we שפראך noch off the גמרא. Can you say, he puts the rocks down and he had in mind, a כוונה that the guy should stumble, we call that שליחות? גמרא calls it שליחות, but it can't be real שליחות. Not real שליחות. אין שליח לדבר עבירה. How can you be שליח לדבר עבירה? It's not שליח לדבר עבירה, you're חייב ב... לפני עור. Why שליח? Because Why you're why you're חייב לפני עור, but not for, you're not the שליח? Cause you caused somebody else to do an עבירה, you're not שליח. You asked him to do it. If it would be שליחות, it would be not it wouldn't work. And and would it be בכוונה? לפני עור is always not necessarily בכוונה, or it's When you say לפני עור, I don't have in mind necessarily to cause somebody else to stumble. So it's בשוגג, so is it בשוגג? Does he חייב on that? Can you עבירה בשוגג? Yes, he's חייב. You know if they have the kitchen here? Yeah. How

How do I put milk between eating? Oh, you don't want it? Why not? We put it on meat heaters. There's just no Just use one side where there's no פליישיג, push away everything if there's anything. Should I Should I leave a note, it's מילכיג or something? You can if you want, maybe you should, but because you shouldn't mix it up. שבת is going to be פליישיג. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, so put put a Put a note. Write down, it's for שבת morning, eat it so it melts nice, huh? No. If I put it in שבת, I see this. Oh, these are these are to These have to be warm, everything, so it's cooked, but it's... יום טוב they can, they're just gonna warm it. Is that מילכיג? Yes, it was already wrapped like that. Wait, we have a מילכיג oven? Hm? Do we have a מילכיג oven? Well, somebody's gonna come to turn the oven on on יום טוב. That's what יוסי told me. Turn on on יום טוב? No, he's gonna leave it before, right? They're gonna have it on first. Yeah.