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FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

Free Choice

Reconciling hashgachah peratis with bechirah chofshis, and why this power belongs to a Yid alone.

Part of Fundamental Concepts · 58:38

Bechirah chofshis, free choice, sits alongside the principle that Hashem controls and recreates the world every moment — a tension resolved by limiting free choice to matters of good and bad while everything else runs by hashgachah peratis. The shiur works through why Hashem built in this choice at all (so reward should be earned, not nehama d'chisufa, and so a person can rise to be a mashpia rather than only a mekabel), then pushes into the deeper Chassidic point that bechirah draws on a koach beyond nature, capable of holding two opposites — one act can be simultaneously a person's free choice and another person's hashgachah peratis — a power that, the sources say, belongs to a Yid's neshamah alone. An extended audience Q&A works through how Hashem's foreknowledge of the future can coexist with real choice, illustrated by the story of Rabbi Yonasan Eybeschutz and the king's gates, and closes with the Rambam's puzzle of how a whole community's fate can be foretold while each individual still chooses freely.

Audio Transcript
The Puzzle of Bechirah: Free Choice Within a World of Hashgachah Peratis

So the subject tonight is bechirah chofshit, free choice. It's one of the hardest subjects in Chassidus to discuss, but I'll try just to bring out a few points, obviously not to get into the depths of it, because there's a lot to it, but just to touch upon certain points. I'll start off by saying that we know that one of the principles of Yiddishkeit, the Jewish religion, is that everything is beh hashgachah pratit, that everything is by divine providence, and therefore we know that everything that happens is controlled by Hashem, controlled by God. Even though there were different opinions concerning hashgachah pratit at different times, but number one, everyone agreed that concerning a Jew, there is hashgachah pratit, so everything that happens to a Jew is definitely by divine providence. But we know that the Baal Shem Tov said that not only things that happen to a Jew is actually controlled directly by Hashem and Hashem makes it happen, but everything that happens in the world, to anybody, to anything, even to a simple leaf that falls down of a off a tree, the Baal Shem Tov said it's beh hashgachah pratit. So that, on one hand, a special principle that everything happens by divine providence, Hashem makes it happen, and nothing happens by itself. And this is understood logically, too, because since Hashem is everything and all over, so there can't be anything without Him. We know Hashem recreates the world every second. We know as it says in davenen every morning we say, המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בךאשית, השם renews the creation every day, but really it's not every day, it's tamid, it's constantly. And since Hashem recreates the world constantly, so obviously everything happens from Hashem. So on one hand we say that everything happens from Hashem, nothing happens by itself. There's nobody that could interfere and change Hashem's plans. And at the same time we say that one of the basic principles in Yiddishkeit is that there is bechirah chofshit, there is free choice. And these two things seem to contradict. When we say free choice, which means that Hashem gave it over to the person to decide what he should do, and it's up to him. He gets the he has a free choice whether to choose this or to choose that. So, on one hand we say that Hashem makes everything happen, and on the other hand we say that there is free choice. And the classical answer that is given to this question, even though there are deeper answers in Chassidus and in other sefarim, but the classical answer is that it depends what we are dealing with. When it comes to doing tov o ra, good or bad, when it comes to decide whether to do something which is considered good or do something that's considered bad, there we have free choice, and Hashem does not push us, there is free choice. When it comes to other things, things which are not connected to good or bad, there there is no free choice, and we are guided by Hashem. Hashem makes everything happen. Now, when we say when it comes to good or bad there is free choice, which means it's up to us to choose, and Hashem does not make it happen, it's not because He cannot make it happen. Chas veshalom to say that. We said before Hashem is the creator, Hashem controls the world, Hashem recreates the world every second, so it's not that Hashem cannot force us to do something when it comes to good or bad. He could if He wants to! But for some reason, and maybe a reason that we'll explain later, but even if we don't understand why, the fact is that Hashem decided that when it comes to doing good or bad, He will not interfere, and He will leave it up to us to choose. Those things which are not connected to good or bad, those things Hashem makes happen. For instance, there is a pasuk that says, מהשם מ׊עדי גב׹ כוננו, which means that steps of man are guided by Hashem. So therefore, when a person walks outside and he's able to turn right or turn left, and he's going for a walk, and the right or left are both equal, there's nothing good about going right or going left, they both are the same thing, none of it has anything to do with an aveirah or with a mitzvah, they're both the same, so there we say when a person decides to turn right is because Hashem made him turn right. On the other hand, if turning right will be connected, chas veshalom, to an aveirah, turning right will mean He's going to go to a place which he shouldn't go to. And he has a choice: should I turn right and then I will go to a place where I shouldn't, or should I turn left and then I will not go there? Here it's free choice, because it's connected to being good or bad, here there is free choice. But when it's something that's not connected to good or bad, here there is no free choice, here Hashem decides and pushes and makes the person do it. In other words, let's make it clear, Hashem gave us guidelines of what is concerning good or bad. And Hashem tells us: I want you to do what I consider good, and I don't want you to do what I consider bad. Not only that, Hashem says that if you do what I consider good, you will be rewarded. If you do what I consider bad, you will be punished. But Hashem does not force us to choose which way. In other words, Hashem will allow us to choose bad if I want to. He will later punish, chas v'shalom, a person for choosing to do bad. He will reward a person if he chooses to do good. But he will not force the person to turn either way. He says, if it's connected to good or bad, I'm leaving it up to you to decide. Even though I'm telling you, Hashem says, I know what I want you to do, and you better do the right thing, but if you're going to pick up your hand and do something, chas v'shalom, that's bad, I'm not going to stop you. I'm not going to hold your hand back and not allow you to do it. Hashem will allow you to do it if you want to do it. But he will punish you later, but he will not stop you. He will give the person the free choice. The pasuk, the Pirkei Avot says, הךשות נתונה, השם gives the permission, which means the right, the ability for a person to choose. But this is only when it comes to things which are good or bad. So first Hashem gave us the guidelines, what is considered good and what is considered bad, and then he gave us the free choice to choose whether we will do it or not. Now I want to make it clear: good or bad is something that was given to us by Hashem. Good or bad is not something that could be made up by human beings, because in truth, good or bad is relative. There are things which by one person could be considered good, another person will consider this bad. And certain things one person will consider it bad, another person will consider it good. We can't leave it up to people to decide what is good and what is bad. We know that, for instance, there are certain things which are considered right in society, it's accepted to be right, and there are certain things accepted to be wrong. But it's not absolute, it's not really true. Just to use an example: to live an, chas v'shalom, an immoral life is considered in society as something that's bad, it's negative. On the other hand, there are other people that say, why is it bad? As long as I don't hurt anybody, who cares the way I live? That's not bad, that's good. Then you could have other people that will say that even if I hurt somebody, but as long as it's good for me, it's considered good! And there are people, we know that, could hurt somebody because as long as it's good for them, and you could go on and on and on. So good or bad is not absolute. There is nothing that's clear-cut, that this is good and this is bad. The only thing that's clear-cut, good and bad, is what the Torah says. Since the Torah was given by Hashem, and Hashem is the real, absolute truth, He is the real emet, there's a pasuk that says, and we don't even need the pasuk, it's obvious, but there's a pasuk that says: השם אלקים אמת. Hashem is the real, real truth, הוא אלקים חיים, and he's a true, live God. So the Torah, which comes from Hashem, that is true. And when the Torah says this is right and this is wrong, this is absolutely true. So we know that this is good, and this is bad. In the time before the חטא ×¢×¥ הדעת, before Adam Harishon sinned by eating from the tree, this was very obvious, and there was no desire, even, to do something bad. But now, in our eyes, not always what is really good is something that we really want to do, because we have a body, we have our desires and ta'avot, and not always do we do the right thing. And not always do we even know what is right and what is wrong on our own. In the time of Adam Harishon, the way the world was created, on his own, a person knew what is good and what is bad, meaning, in real truth, good and bad. See, some people think the opposite. It says in Chumash that after he ate from the tree, that's when he became יודעי טוב וךע, that's when he started knowing what is good and what is bad. That's why it's called ×¢×¥ הדעת טוב וךע, it's the tree of knowledge of good and bad. But before that, he didn't know what is good and bad. But in truth, it's the opposite. What he realized after he ate from the tree is physical good and bad, that what's good for the body is considered good and what's bad for the body for the physical, that's called bad. But before that, he knew what is good and bad, or bad, in truth, the real good and the real bad. But after חטא ×¢×¥ הדעת, after he sinned, this is not seen, and therefore now it's up to people to decide what is good or what is bad, and not always do they decide the right thing. And therefore, the only way to know what is good and what is bad is from the Torah. So getting back to the point, when we talk about something that is good or bad according to the Torah, when it comes to a person to decide whether to do something good or chas v'shalom not to do good, or to do something bad, or not to do what's bad, that Hashem left up to the person to decide. And Hashem does not push the person to do it. He leaves him decide whether he wants to do it or not. Not that he tells him, \"It doesn't matter if you do whichever way.\" He tells him clearly, \"It does matter, and I don't want you to do what's bad, and I do want you to do what's good, but I will not push you, you have your own choice.\" Things which are not connected to good or bad, as I said before, there Hashem says, \"I control, and I will make it happen.\"

Why Hashem Gave Us Free Choice: Avoiding "Bread of Shame" and Becoming a Mashpia

Now before we go on to this explain it, let's understand why is it that Hashem gave us free choice? Why did Hashem want that we should have free choice? Since He is the Creator, He created us with everything that's connected to us, the whole world He created and He recreates us, He's everything, so why wouldn't He control it? Why does He want that we should have free choice? Now the simple answer is, if we don't have free choice, then we cannot get rewarded for what we do, because then we're like robots. Whatever we do is because we're programmed to do it, Hashem makes us do it, so a person cannot get reward for what he does. Now, in truth, Hashem, if He wants, could give us reward anyway. Who could stop Hashem? So Hashem could control us, push us to do good let's say, and then reward us for it. The only thing is that's not really called reward. That's what we would call, the Zohar refers to this as נהמא דכיסו׀א. נהמא דכיסו׀א in Yiddish means בושה ב׹ויט, bread of embarrassment. A person who doesn't work for something and he gets it is embarrassed. When you give something to somebody and he didn't work for it, he didn't earn it, he didn't deserve it, then he feels embarrassed to take it. When a person takes tzedakah, he feels embarrassed. Hashem, because He is the תכלית הטוב, the absolute good, so He wants to do what is the best for us. The best for us is to get a reward that we deserved. If there wouldn't be free choice, then we don't deserve it. So even though Hashem could give us everything, He could give us all the rewards, He could give us everything, but Hashem knows that if He will give us whatever He gives us based on Him, not on our work, because we didn't choose, and as long as we have no choice, then there is no effort involved, because we're pushed to do it, if there is no effort because we didn't weren't able to choose, then the reward He will give us will be an embarrassment for us and we will not really enjoy it. The Gemara says, ׹ושה אדם בקב שלו יותך מתשעה קבין של חבי׹ו. A person would rather have one קב, one measurement, but he worked for it, he would rather have that than nine times as much, but it's somebody else gave it to him. Even though he'll have much more, but a person the nature of a person is that he enjoys something that he put in effort and then he earns it, he deserves it, much more than getting a lot, but without working. And therefore, if we wouldn't have free choice, then there is no work. If there is no work, then Hashem, even if He will give us everything, we will not have the real enjoyment, we will not really feel that we got it. The only question that's asked on this, who created this nature that a person does not enjoy if he didn't work for it, he doesn't deserve it? See, the whole thing is based on saying Hashem wants to be real good to us, so He wants to give us the maximum and the best, and the best is according to the nature of a human being that we only enjoy if we work for it. And therefore Hashem says, \"Work for it, and I'll give you, then you'll really deserve it.\" Who made this nature that we only enjoy something if we work for it? And if not, we call it נהמא דכיסו׀א, embarrassed bread? Hashem made that nature, He created us. So Hashem could have created us with a different nature that we should not have this embarrassment, and therefore, we would enjoy the reward even if we didn't put in effort, even if we didn't work for it, and then we would have had everything. So why did Hashem make us work for it, make us have free choice, and therefore we work for it in order to get the reward, in order to feel good? Make us feel good, change the nature, or lechatchilah make the nature that we should feel good without working for it. Now, there's another point here. When Hashem created the world, He created that everything should work to reach a higher level than it really is originally. And I explained that a few weeks ago in one of the shiurim, that we know in general the world is divided into four categories: דומם, שומח, חי, מדב׹. The unmovable objects, the plant life, the animal life, and the human race. And the תכלית, the goal of each one of these four is to reach a higher level. The דומם, the ground, which is the lowest level of all, its goal is to cause plants to grow. So what happens? When it makes things grow, it leaves the lowest level and becomes part of growth, so it elevated itself. The שומח, the plant that grows, is eaten by animals. What happens when the grass and the things that grow are eaten by animals? It becomes part of the animal. So שומח becomes part of חי, it reaches a higher level. When an animal eats, when a human being eats an animal, you shachat the בהמה and you eat the meat, so now that meat, which used to be חי, which used to be part of animal, the animal world, animal kingdom, becomes part of the human being. So it's elevated to a higher level. Where does a human being go? A human being is the highest level of creation. It's the מובח׹, it's the choicest part of creation. Now, since everything has to reach a higher level, where does the human being go? He can't go anywhere higher because he can't become something else, so he's the highest, and we know that everything is supposed to reach a higher level. The answer is, since the human being is the highest level of creation, so what's the next step? To leave the framework, to go beyond creation, and to go higher than that. Now what's the level higher than creation? The Creator! In other words, the goal of a human being is to go away from being a creature, part of creation, but to become, so to speak, like the Creator. Now how can a human being become like the Creator? The major difference between the creation and the Creator is that being that the creation was created, everything it has, it received from the Creator. Using the terms the way in חסידות we explain it, the creation is called the מקבל, the receiver. The Creator is the מש׀יע, He's the one that gave, He's the one that made it. There is no real מש׀יע in the world, because everything in the world receives what it has from the Creator. So you might be מש׀יע to somebody else, but really you are not a real מש׀יע, you didn't make it happen, someone made it for you, Hashem made it for you. A human being has to reach the level, k'vayachol, so to speak, of the Creator, which means he has to become a מש׀יע, which means there is something that he has to do, and when he does it, then he left the level of creation where he is the highest level of, and he entered the level of Creator. What is, where do we see, in which way does it manifest itself that he should become the מש׀יע? That is through free choice. When you have free choice, that means that you are the one that did it. See, if everything we do we would be pushed by Hashem to do it, that means that what we do we are מקבל, we are receiving it, someone, Hashem gives it to us. There's nothing on our own that we do. But the fact that we were given this power of choice, and the reason I did something was because I, myself, chose to do it, then I'm not in that area, in that aspect, I'm not a מקבל, a receiver, but I am a mashpia, which means I'm doing something on my own, which is similar to Hashem who is the mashpia, He is the Creator, He makes things happen. That's why when it comes to free choice, the Rambam quotes the pasuk: ׮הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו׮. Hashem said, the human being will become one like, one like us, and it referred to the power of choice, the fact that we have free choice, because in that way we are similar, kivayachol, obviously, it's only so to speak, but similar to the Eibershter, to Hashem who is the Creator. That's the pshat, it says in the Midrash, that ׮מה הקדוש ב׹וך הוא בו׹א עולמות׎, just like Hashem creates worlds, ׎אף בני ישךאל בו׹אי עולמות׎, something like that, also Yidden can create. What do we mean we create worlds? What it means is when we do something out of our own free choice, and Hashem left it to us, and again, not because He couldn't change, He couldn't control us, but He said, ׎I want you to do it on your own.׎ So you did it on your own, so you are now בו׹א עולמות, you're doing whatever you're doing, you're doing on your own. And that's the reason, one of the reasons given why Hashem wanted us to have free choice, so we should work, and when we work, we reach the step that's higher than us, like everything else is supposed to reach a step that's higher. And this is the idea of free choice, because through that we work and we gain plus the other reason that when we work on it, we deserve it, and therefore when we get the reward, it is תכלית הטוב, it is real good, because we enjoy it. Now Hashem could have changed that nature, so I gave the other reason, but this is also true, that now we don't have נהמא דכיסו׀א, we don't have the busha bread, the embarrassed bread, but we have we deserve it and we feel good.

Two Opposites at Once: Bechirah as a Power Beyond Nature

But in truth, we have to go a step further, that when it comes to free choice, there must be something deeper than just as I explained, that a person has free choice, Hashem gave him the power of choice. This power of choice that a Yid has is such a deep power that is completely beyond any natural power that we could imagine, and I'll explain why. This is something that is completely beyond creation, beyond anything. Hashem put into us a special power, and it has to be that way, and I'll explain why. You heard before that when it comes to doing טוב או ךע, good or bad, that's where we have free choice. When it comes to doing other things, or let's say when things happen to us, that's not free choice. When we do something, we choose to do, and even that is only if it's a something good or bad. If it's something has nothing to do with good or bad, I take a pencil and I could write an א, or I could write a ב, and they're both just as holy, and both just there's no חילול שבת involved. Let's say on Shabbos, if I chas veshalom take a pencil and think to write, and the person chooses yes or no, that's choice, because writing is an aveirah, not writing is right, so that's free choice. But in middle of a mitzvah, a person takes a pencil and writes an א or a ב, and they're just just as holy, just as good, there's nothing wrong, that's not free choice. So free choice is only when it comes to good or bad. Now sometimes we have one act which contains both: it is good or bad, and at the same time it is not a question of good or bad, or it's a question of something happening to somebody else. Let's give an example: A person, Reuven, will walk over to Shimon and he will give him a slap. Now, how do we look at this? Reuven had free choice, definitely, because to hit somebody is wrong, and when it comes to do something which might be right or wrong, there's free choice. So Hashem didn't make it happen. He on his own chose to do this. Fine. Now let's look at Shimon, who got the slap. By him it wasn't free choice. So why did he get it? Because Hashem wanted him to get it. Hashem made him get it. So the slap that Reuven gave Shimon, on one hand, we say it was chosen by Reuven. If Reuven would have chosen not to do it, he wouldn't slap him, because Hashem didn't make him do it. At the same time, we say Shimon, who got the slap, by him, it's hashgachah peratit. Hashem made it happen, because to him, why did he get a slap? So it's one act, which on one hand is free choice because a human being did it, and it's a question of bad, being bad, doing something bad, and at the same time, what happened to the other person, it's not free choice, it's hashgachah peratit. So here in Tanya, the Alter Rebbe in Igeret HaKodesh explains that, yes, you have to look at it from both sides: The one that did it chose, and therefore Hashem will punish him. He deserves all the punishments. If it's a case where the beit din, the court down here, has to punish him, they have to punish him. They can't say, \"Well, how can we punish him? After all, everything is hashgachah peratit.\" It's not! He chose to do it, and for choosing to do bad, beit din will punish. And at the same time, Shimon, who got the slap, the Alter Rebbe says, has no right to be angry at Reuven, because it's not Reuven that did it. To him, it's Hashem who did it. He quotes a pasuk. It says when David Hamelech was running away from Avshalom, and on the way Shimi ben Gera cursed him, קללה נמך׊ת, so he said not to do anything to him, and he said, \"You know why? Because השם אמך לו קלל. Hashem said to him that he should curse.\" So first of all, what does that mean, Hashem said to him to curse? And where do we find that Hashem spoke to Shimi ben Gera and spoke to him and told him, \"Curse David Hamelech\"? So he says he didn't mean Hashem spoke to him, but the fact that he cursed, which means David Hamelech got cursed, that wasn't David Hamelech's choice. So to him, it came as hashgachah peratit from Hashem. So how did Shimi ben Gera do it? Hashgachah peratit, Hashem made him do it. So David Hamelech said Hashem made him do it. Shimi ben Gera himself, he chose to do bad. And the Alter Rebbe says they're both true. So he deserves to be punished, and he should not be angry. The only question one might ask, in that case, if someone does you a favor, why don't you look at it the same way? I don't have to thank him? I don't have to appreciate it? Because after all, came from Hashem. He chose to be good. True, he chose, so Hashem will give him all kinds of rewards. But me, if Hashem wouldn't want, it wouldn't happen. To me, it's hashgachah peratit. So I have to thank Hashem for it, right? But I have to thank him? And the truth is when Avraham Avinu fed all these passersby and they wanted to thank him, he said, \"Don't thank me, thank Hashem,\" which is true, everything comes from Hashem. So in that case, why appreciate? And we know that in Torah, the middah of appreciation, to appreciate when someone does you a favor, is very, very important. We have a mitzvah that the whole basis of the mitzvah, the whole mitzvah is appreciation, the mitzvah of ביכו׹ים. ׀ךשת כי תבוא, ביכו׹ים is you have to bring the new fruit and thank Hashem for giving us the land, and it says in all the ס׀ךים that the meaning behind the mitzvah of ביכו׹ים is appreciation, to show appreciation to Hashem, and you have to show appreciation to another human being. But why should we show appreciation? The answer is because when someone does something good, it's upon everybody to thank him for it. Everybody should thank the person for doing good. Now, if everybody has to thank him for doing good, imagine the one that was the כלי to whom he did the good certainly has to thank him. That's why we do have to appreciate it, because after all, he was the vessel through whom Hashem gave me that favor, so I have to thank him, too. There's a לשון in the Gemara, the Gemara says, חמ׹א למ׹יה וטיבותא לשקייה, that when someone is a messenger to bring you the wine, you have to thank the person who sent it to you, true, but you have to thank the messenger also. So we have to thank the person and appreciate what he did because a messenger. When it comes to doing something bad, then the only ones that are able to punish a person for doing something bad is only the בית דין. And therefore no one could do anything to him, including the person who it happened to, while doing good, everyone has to be thankful, certainly the one it was done to. But anyway, here it comes out that you have an act, and this act has two parts to it. And the Alter Rebbe explains even more, that if this person would not have chosen to hit him, he would have gotten hit anyway. ה׹בה שלוחים למקום. Hashem has a lot of messengers, a lot of ways. So Hashem would have found some other way he should have gotten hurt if he wouldn't have chosen. So the one that got hurt has no reason to be angry at him because to him it's hashgachah peratit. To the one that chose, to him it's bechirah chofshit, to him it's free choice. But there are sometimes when you can't even divide it in two ways. Sometimes you have one act that the same act in one has both points to it. It is a act that's connected to good and or bad and at the same time it's hashgachah peratit. Let's say when a person chooses to turn right, he walks outside and he chooses to turn right, and this is hashgachah peratit because there was nothing good or bad about turning right or left. And then when he turns, he sees something which brings him about to do bad. Now, had he not turned here, this wouldn't have happened. So here we have a case, and there are a lot of similar cases where we have one act which contains both. It is at one point it is good, or chas v'shalom bad, and at the same time there are other things involved which are not good nor bad. In other words, I want to make it clear that every act has so many other things that come out of it, that every act that's connected to good or bad has points that are not are stam, not good or bad. Everything that you do stam could have an effect on other things which are connected to good or bad. And what we're saying is that aspect of it that is connected to good or bad, that aspect you chose. The other aspect of the same thing of the same one thing that you did, that's not connected to good or bad, that was done by Hashem. Now, how do the two things fit? So Hashem made you do it. If Hashem made you do it, then you didn't have choice. If you had free choice, then Hashem didn't make you do it. But we know that there is a certain things here that affect somebody else. Let's say you go out, you do something and it affects somebody else. It's hard even to find examples, but everything is interwound. The answer is we can't understand it, which means this power of bechirah that we have is a כח which comes this is an a power that was given to us by Hashem, and Hashem is what we call נמנע הנמנעות. As far as Hashem is concerned, there is no such thing as opposites that contradict. Hashem is beyond contradiction. It's the famous teshuvah of the Rashba where the Rashba writes that Hashem is the expression נמנע הנמנעות means he is impossible of impossibilities, because there's some people who wrote to the Rashba saying, can Hashem so great, He could do anything, but not opposites. Like they give an example, Hashem if He wants could make an elephant go through the hole of a needle. And they said, you know how? He could do anything. He'll make the elephant very small, He'll push him through, He'll make the hole very big. But to have a small hole with a big elephant and push it through, it's impossible, that's an opposite, that's a contradiction. So they said, they thought that can't happen, even from Hashem. Or example they give: ׹וכב ואינו ׹וכב, that someone should be riding and not riding a horse at the same time. They said sure Hashem could do it. They make two of you, one of you riding, one of you not riding. But the same one should do, yeah, not, that can't be, it's impossible. So the Rashba answered him, it's not true. Hashem is נמנע הנמנעות, חק הבו׹א. There is a nature of נמנע of impossibility by the by the Creator, by Hashem. And he answered him it's not true, and he brought them proof from the א׹ון that was in the בית, it's קדשי קדשים and took up, whatever, but Hashem is not limited with anything, could be two opposites. So from Hashem's point of view, there is a possibility that when we do one thing, on one hand it is free choice, on the other hand, it is Hashem making it happen, and both true, and the two things come together. So we will get rewarded for what we chose because of this free choice, and we put in our effort, and we reached the level of מש׀יע, so to speak, like I said before, which is similar כביכול to the Creator, and at the same time, there in the same act, it was done by Hashem. Why the two things don't fit? That comes from the Eibershter. And that's another reason why the Rambam says that when Hashem gave us free choice, that's when the pasuk says, הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו. A person is like Hashem, has this special כח השם put in. And because of that, since the power of bechirah is a power that contains two opposites, which could only come from Hashem Himself, this power is by Yidden only. By goyim, we don't find they should have real bechirah. It's hard to explain, but I'll just state to the facts that it says in the sefarim. A goy has bechirah, he has choice, but he does not have bechirah chofshis, he does not have free choice. Exactly what that means is hard to explain, I hate to admit I don't understand it myself, but that's what it says, that a goy does not have bechirah chofshis. He does have choice, because if a goy wouldn't have choice at all, then there would be no such thing as punishment or reward to the goyim, and we find full in the Torah concerning the goyim, that Hashem says I will punish them or I will reward them, so obviously they do have a certain level of choice. But bechirah chofshis, the real free choice they don't have. Why? Because the real, real concept of choice is something that is beyond creation, something that contains two opposites, which is directly from Hashem, that could only be by a Yid. Because a Yid has within himself a חלק אלוקה ממעל ממש, part of Hashem. And because we have that neshamah which is part of Hashem, so we have that power of Hashem of combining two opposites. But a goy who does not have that neshama does not have a kli, doesn't have the vessel, he's not able to contain such a power that is made up of two opposites, which cannot be part of the creation of the world. As far as the nature of the world is concerned, this is impossible, and therefore can't be. So in a human being, who does not have that neshama which is a חלק a part of Hashem, cannot have this power which is נמנע הנמנעות, which contains two opposites. But a Yid, who does have it, is able to have free choice. So it comes out like this: when it comes to hashgacha, which is Hashem's controlling everything, and bechira, free choice, so generally speaking, the difference is between good and bad and other things, and even that, sometimes, many times they're connected, but we divide it: that part is from free choice, that part is not. But that's all concerning hashgacha, what we call hashgacha pratit, Hashem controlling everything together with bechira.

Can Hashem's Foreknowledge and Our Free Choice Coexist?

But then there's another thing that the Rambam talks about, that's not hashgacha and bechira, but yediah and bechira. Hashem knows everything that's going to happen. If Hashem knows what I'm going to do, then how could I have free choice? How can we say I have free choice? Hashem knows! Hashem knows that I'm going to now drink the water or not drink it. So, I can't do differently. If He knows what's going to happen, I can't do differently. And the Rambam asked that question. And on this the Rambam also answers, לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם, our machshavot, our thoughts can't grasp Hashem's thought, we don't know, it's something that's beyond understanding. But other commentaries on this comment that for that you don't have to come on to that answer. There is a logical explanation how yediah and bechira, how Hashem's knowing the future and our choosing fit together. And the answer is very simple: Hashem knows what we're going to choose. Hashem knows that we are going to choose, we have the free choice, and Hashem knows the future. Imagine if you have a human being tzadik, who's a יודע עתידות, who knows the future. And he sits in his room and knows that this and this person will do so and so. Does that in any way, form, or shape have an effect on his choice, to say that he couldn't choose? What he knows is what he's going to choose. What is the contradiction to free choice? Force is a contradiction to free choice, if you force someone to do something. Knowledge is not a contradiction to free choice. You know what he is going to choose, just like we, simple people, know what the person chose after he chose. We know what he chose. So, here you have a person who is able to put himself after he's you know, still before, but he puts himself in the level of after. He is beyond time, and therefore could see what the guy chose. But it doesn't affect him. If you'd force a guy to do something, it'd affect him. But the fact that he chose, he had free choice. Now, I'll tell the story over again even though I told it a hundred times with Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz, who answered the king with the famous story. It's a famous story and I said this in the shiurim here more than once, so I'll repeat it again, that Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz was once asked by the king this question: If Hashem knows the future, Hashem knows what you're going to choose, what you're going to do, so how is there free choice? So he said to him, I'll tell you what. I think I told the story in the shul here just a while ago. He told him, I'll tell you what, I know what you are going to do. I am not Hashem, but I know. And he gave him an example. He says, in a few weeks, you're supposed to travel to a certain city, and there are two gates to enter that city, a big one and a small one. You have a choice. You can go through the big one, you can go through the small, whichever one you want. I am telling you, I know now which gate you're going to go through. And you'll tell me later if you had free choice or you were pushed into it. And Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz wrote down on a piece of paper what he feels, which gate he's going to go through. They made they sealed it, they locked it up in the king's treasury, and no one was allowed to touch it. A few weeks came, and the king was proceeding to that city. Came to the city, they imagined that the king would enter the big gate. After all, the king. So they decorated it, and everyone was ready. Comes to the gate, he tells everyone to stop. So they all stopped, and he starts thinking to himself, you see, Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz probably was sure I would go through the big gate. Where else would a king go? I'll teach him a lesson, I'll show him. He made everybody say let's go to the other side of the city, we'll go to the small gate. Came to the small gate, they were about to enter, he says, stop! Stop! Thinks, he says, well, Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz was as smart as I am, for sure he thought that I'm going to outsmart him and go to the small one. I'll show him! I'll go to the big one. He made the whole group go back again. They came back to the big one and they stopped, and they were standing there, and he stopped again and he thought, I'm sure he was so smart, he figured out that I'm going to do it, so he's He made everyone go back to the small one and he made the big one. He went himself meshuga and made everyone meshuga, and he's thinking in his mind, you bet I have free choice, I can't make up my mind. And he's thinking and thinking what to do. And finally he thought of something. He said, you know what? He called over some people and he said, break through the wall, make a new gate. They right away got to work, they broke through a place in the wall. Now he said, now I got him. He always used to outsmart me, this this rabbi. I'll show him, I got him. They went through this wall, in the new gate, and he came and he stopped. He said, now go bring that sealed letter. They brought the sealed letter, they opened it up. All Rabbi Yonatan Eibeshitz did was he wrote a quote from the Gemara. The Gemara says, אמך מלכא, מלך ׀וךץ גד׹. The Gemara says a king could break through a wall. That's what the Gemara says. And when he called him, Rabbi Yonatan Eibeshitz said, nu, tell me, did you have free choice? Did my knowledge beforehand force you to do what you did? He says, you bet not! I couldn't decide, I know I had free choice. So he said, you see, I knew. Now how he knew, I don't know, whether he knew because he had ׹וח הקודש, was a tzadik, or he knew because he was so smart. He was such a great psychologist, he understood what's going to happen the end, whichever, I don't care. The fact was he knew, and it didn't affect him. Didn't affect him, why? Because he knew what he's going to choose. The same thing with Hashem. Hashem knows what we're going to choose. But it does say in sefarim that when does the knowledge of Hashem not affect the free choice? If Hashem doesn't say it. If we ever find Hashem said this and this is going to happen, then that is affecting the choice, because that's closer, that's already as if pushing it, because speaking words are closer to the world, that's already pushing it. Nevertheless, the Rambam asks the question: If when Hashem says something it pushes it, how come we find that in Chumash Hashem said that there will be a nation that is going to make the Jews work hard? So obviously He said that there will be people who will make them work hard. So that takes away their free choice. So why will Hashem punish the Egyptians for doing it when it takes away their free choice? Or more, there's a pasuk, and this is concerning the goyim, but even by goyim he said there is bechirah, but concerning this the Rambam answers that He didn't mention a name. He said there will be a nation. ג׹ יהיה זךעך באךץ לא להם, they will be strangers in a land that's not theirs. But there's another pasuk, a pasuk in Chumash, in האזינו, where Moshe Rabbeinu said that the end will be, the future will be, that this nation is going to follow and worship idols. So that takes away free choice, they have to do it, because He said it. So the Rambam answers an interesting answer. He says when does not Hashem say beforehand and we have free choice, that's concerning the individuals. But when it comes to the group, Hashem could say. In other words, Hashem could say and there is השגחה ׀ךטית, not only knowledge, Hashem will make it happen that in a group of 100 people, 50 He says will be tzadikim and 50 will be resha'im. And Hashem will make it happen. Each individual has free choice. And the mefarshim ask a kashya on this Rambam: logically, that makes no sense. If every individual has free choice, so look at every single one individually. Mr. A has free choice, maybe he'll be a tzadik, let's say he'll choose to be a tzadik. Mr. B will choose to be a tzadik, and maybe Mr. C could choose, and maybe Mr. number 50 will choose, and Mr. number 51 also has free choice, he could he could also choose. Because every individual every individual has free choice, so maybe they're going to choose all to be tzadikim. So how could we say Hashem could say that there will be 50 שדיקים and 50 ךשעים? And the commentaries, some argue on the Rambam, they say it can't be and they give different answers. But the Rebbe once said, I remember this, he said that the explanation is hard he didn't explain it. He just said that nowadays we have something that's very similar to this. He says, this is he wrote it in a letter also this is the basis of the calculations of all insurance companies. An insurance company has clients and they pay premiums. What's their cheshbon? They might pay out If each each person we don't know what'll happen. One person pay person pays $1,000 a year for an insurance, he might claim a million dollars this year. He might! Now, number one might claim a million dollars, number two might claim a million dollars, number three each one separately, you don't know what'll happen. What happens if they all claim a million dollars? You're going to pay out a million $100 million and you only got in from each one $1,000, you're going to lose your lose the money. Nevertheless, they know they're not going to lose. Why? Because as a whole, they know that what's going to happen is out of the 1,000 customers they have, they'll have to pay out to 10 people a million, to five people a half a million, whatever, and they'll make money at the end. So here we see that in the long as a whole, as a group, you see here that the group is that they know what's going to be. And each individual has choice. The Rebbe once said this is the basis of the idea of statistics. He's I remember what he said, these words, that till today they don't have an explanation for statistics. But it's a fact. The statistics show that this weekend there will be 20 200 people, chas v'shalom, will get killed in accidents of the holiday weekend, and they're usually right, about. Now, each person could not get hurt. Each person there is free choice, will it or won't it. Could be more than 200, could be 100. If each person could yes, so each person is a 50/50 chance, so there is a chance for everybody to happen, chance for nobody to happen. Why is it always that it works out? So because they have no explanation for it, but that's a fact. And the Rebbe said what they just found out, this whole concept of statistics they just found out 70 years ago, 50 years ago, the Rambam already wrote it. He said, close to 1,000 years ago, 800 years ago, that for the klal, Hashem could say, and nevertheless, each one has free choice. Now, exactly to explain it, the logical explanation, I don't know, but this is a fact. So to sum all this up is that for the klal, the Rambam learns, for the people as a whole, there is Hashem could say what's going to happen. Individuals all have free choice. And the free choice is no contradiction to Hashem's ידיעה, Hashem knowing. And is a contradiction to hashgachah, to the fact that Hashem makes everything happen, but we don't care if it's a contradiction, because this is something that Hashem said, \"You could have free choice and get all the rewards, benefits of free choice, and at the same time, there is hashgachah peratit and how it fits, נמנע הנמנעות, Hashem could do it.\" And this is only a koach a Yid has. And with this כח הבחי׹ה, we are Yidden. In other words, in what aspect does it express itself the fact that we have a neshamah? It's in the idea of bechirah chofshis, that we all have free choice. And the good part is that if we do choose the right thing to do, then we takeh get a real reward. And we know that the end will be, the Torah promises that everybody is going to choose the right thing. That's the fact, cuz Hashem knows the future, and since we're all going to choose the right thing, the Rambam ׀סקנ'ס, taken from all the sources, that when we all do the right thing, we all do teshuvah, then the Oibershter will bring us Mashiach, and we hope it's going to be bimheirah v'yameinu. Amen.

Audience Questions: Klal vs. Individual, Statistics, and the Etzem HaNeshama

You say, wait, free choice is forced? Right, if I force you, then you don't have free choice. In your first example, when you're choosing between two apples that are exactly the same, it's the same it's the same fruit, and now, what I don't understand is, good and evil, we have reasons to choose, logical, rational reasons. Like say, \"Well, I'm going to do good because because,\" or \"I'm going to do bad,\" and knowing even the consequences, which but that seems like a contradiction, and I tried in this shiur tonight to avoid discussing that point, even though that's a major point when we discuss bechirah. Well, what was the question? We didn't hear it. It's a major I'll I'll explain it. That's a major point in the whole idea of bechirah the way Chassidus explains it, but it's very, very tough to explain, but I'll try. Okay, I'll say the question. We learn in Chassidus and we spoke about it many times, that the real meaning of free choice is when you have two equal things. Free choice means there is nothing pushing you. Nothing doesn't mean only from the outside, there's nobody holding your hand and pressing you to do it. Nothing pushing you means no reason pushing you. And therefore, we always use the example when you have an apple and an orange, and you happen to like an apple and you take the apple, that's not free choice. Your liking to an apple pushed you to take an apple. That's not free choice. We could use the term choice בשם המושאל. How would you say in English b'shem hamushal? In a borrowed term. But that's not really the free free choice, even though it's you chose it. I would use the term you picked one, but you didn't choose, because there was something that pushed you. When there is something that you see, something logically is good for you and something else is bad for you, and you choose the good one, then there's the seichel behind it that pushed you to do it. Free choice would be when you have two apples, and they're both the same, they look alike, they taste alike, and they weigh alike, everything the same, and you put your hand and you take one. That's called free choice. Not your seichel pushed you, there's nothing better about this than this. No, but that that would be the real form of choice. So here, we're talking about free choice, and free choice is only between good and bad, and you can't say that they're both equal. Usually, free choice is when they're both equal. And in this case, it's the opposite. It's only when the two things are different that we use the term free choice. Somebody didn't hear it. Well, I'm not going to repeat it. So, it's a very hard subject. I'll just give the the point behind this. As far as the neshamah is concerned, the neshamah is connected to Hashem in such a way that good or bad will not tear it away from Hashem. And therefore, looking at it from the etzem of the neshamah, nothing will happen if you do good or you do bad. And therefore, from the etzem of the neshamah aspect of it, you could just as well do bad and it won't affect you, even though in the גילויים we call it it will affect. So when we say that free choice is a koach from the etzem of the neshamah, I'm not explaining, I'm just saying it, then that means that from the way the etzem looks at it, since you're connected anyway, nothing could change it, so doing bad is not going to be worse than doing good, and doing good will not be better, so to speak, than doing bad, because as far as the etzem. As far as גילויים, if you do good you're connected to Hashem, if not you cut yourself off, true. But the concept of choice comes from the etzem of the neshamah. Plus there's another point, and this with that I'll finish. This needs a lot of explanation, but I'll just say it. The etzem of the neshamah wants to be close to Hashem. There are two wa- want, not only to be close, wants that its closeness to Hashem should be expressed, should be in a revealed way. There are two ways a person could reveal, reveal his connection to Hashem. Know what the two ways are? And they both reveal it in the same way: doing good and doing bad. How? Give an example: if you see two boys playing, doing some mischief, and you see a person come over and give one a patsh, what will it show you? This one is his father. Why didn't he patsh the other one? This one is his father, that's why this one he patsh't his son. You By doing something bad and get your father angry, you reveal the fact that he's your father. There are some children who look for attention. This is just psychological. Children look for attention. And if they see that by behaving they don't get their proper attention, know what they'll do? They'll misbehave. They'll misbehave, why? Because they love their parents, and they want their parents to show their love to them, so they'll misbehave. Now their parent will come over and scream at him, \"Ha! Baruch Hashem! Now my parent shows he's my parent!\" So when you look at it deeper, doing good reveals your connection, reveals, doing bad, getting Hashem angry also reveals the connection. So from that aspect, sometimes it could be, could choose each way. It needs a lot more explanation, but this is just general points. Yes. What a kleyne mentsh would like you said, shows free choice, ober everybody a shaliach and will of Hashem, he doesn't want to do, ober er is a shaliach No. That's what we're saying. Legabei the person who got it, you're only a shaliach, but legabei yourself, you had free choice. And if you choose not to do it, you wouldn't do it. Ai, it's a contradiction? Good! That's what we said that we can't explain it because there is a contradiction here. That situations that you can't explain? No, no, no, no. A person in a case where takeh a person was forced to do something, then it's a, oh, that's a different, then takeh he didn't choose. Let's say a person doesn't choose and somebody else comes and takes his hand and pushes his hand to punch somebody. in a way that you can't help it. Sometimes you think you can't help it, you've just got to use more koach, more strength, but sometimes you takeh can't help it, then takeh it's not your fault, then it's not free choice. Oh, then you takeh didn't choose, because someone else, ina kanami, that's true, yes. In the case of Reuven slapping Shimon, Yeah. for Shimon you said that Shimon shouldn't feel shouldn't feel anger towards Reuven because that's why, that was hashgachah peratit. But on the other hand, Reuven should not should has had the right not to feel guilt, to have charatah that that that he hit Shimon? No, we just Because השגחה ׀ךטית, it was predetermined. No, free choice, right! He chose, he has to feel guilty. See, Shimon can't He has to feel guilty, he has to do teshuvah. Not only he has to do teshuvah, he has to pay the guy for doing something. Why? Because he chose to do it. Shimon cannot be angry at him because Shimon has to say, \"It happened to me, whatever happens to me is from Hashem.\" And Reuven has to feel guilty, not only feel guilty, he has to be punished, he has to pay whatever that he deserves. Even though even though despite the free choice, despite the bechirah chofshit? Not despite, because of bechirah chofshit. Why did you say that he was a he was like a keli of that? That's as far as Shimon is supposed to see. Shimon is supposed to look at it that he's a shaliach from Hashem, and Reuven knows that he chose. He chose because he had a be'reirah, he had a bechirah not to do it. Sure it's a I I Well, I said it's difficult, it's a very difficult subject, but it's a nimna hanimna'ot, it's nimna hanimna'ot, which in natural part of the world can't happen. It's because Hashem gave us that special power. One more one more question, please. Excuse me, I have my rules of derech eretz. Anyway, yes. Ai ai ai, this requires a whole new discussion. There's a Mishnah in Pirkei Avot that says we were conceived against our will, and we live against our will, and we die against our will. So where does bechirah chofshit come in? You have no bechirah chofshit whether to be born or not. You don't have bechirah chofshit to be born. But when you live, you have bechirah chofshit. No. Bechirah chofshit what to do, how to behave. Yeah, unless a person, chas veshalom, committed suicide, then that's a... but normally a person doesn't have a choice to live or to not to live, to be born, not to be born. But what to do, how to behave, when it comes to matters of good or bad, which most of our things are connected to good or bad, some things are mitzvot and aveirot, some things are not official mitzvot or aveirot, but still, something that's right and wrong. So it's all connected to good or bad. We use the term good or bad, which we mean anything positive or negative, so that is all free choice. Isn't that a contradiction in itself that you were created created against your will? That's not a contradiction. You're No, you're created without against your will or not... Hashem didn't ask for your haskamah, and while you're here, He says you have free choice how to behave. Like the Baal Shem Tov says on the ׀סוק, מהשם מ׊עדי גב׹ כוננו, that the steps of man are guided by Hashem. Then he says like this: where to go, not free choice, wherever you land up, that's Hashem. What to do there, that's free choice, to do good or to do, chas veshalom, bad, to spread Yiddishkeit or, chas veshalom, the opposite, that's your free choice, that's, but where to go, that's Hashem. So we have here also: Hashem put you here, that's Hashem. What to do here, that's free choice. Yes, you were going to ask something? Oh, yeah, you wanted to comment on that, yeah. So Reuven went over to Shimon and slapped him, it was Hashem's will that Shimon Yeah. should be slapped. So then Reuven was actually doing good? As far as Shimon is concerned, he's doing good, that's why Dovid Hamelech said, when Shimi ben Geira cursed him, he said, \"Hashem told him to curse. I'm very happy he did, he did Hashem's will.\" And Shimi ben Geira had to be punished. He told Shlomo Hamelech to punish him, because he chose! Why did he choose to be the shaliach? Hashem could have found somebody else. He chose, he didn't have to. two apples that are identical, you can pick either one. So when Hashem says to you, \"Listen, if you pick this apple, I'm going to give you a million dollars, and if you pick this apple, I'm going to slap you.\" So isn't taking away our, I mean, isn't by giving us reward for mitzvot... Yeah, but we said that giving getting a slap is a is an expression of Hashem's love. You already used that. You see, I didn't want to get into this subject. I did this He just brought this out, I even bring this up the whole time, because that's a very hard aspect of the whole thing. But this is the pshat anyway. Yes. I was going to say, as soon as Hashem told us what's good and what's bad, what we should do and what we shouldn't do, that precluded the whole idea of free choice, no? Because how can you be, you know, that's also the point. Right, but the example you gave of Rav Yehonasan Eybeschutz. As soon as he told the king that he wrote down what he's going to do, he affected the king's choice. All right, the king could have done something else. He gave him, didn't, didn't affect it. He made it, he gave him free choice. Till then he wouldn't have had choice, he would have gone to the big one. Because he told him, now he got free choice. Since we are a product of our heredity and our conditioning all through life making up our character, how much free choice do we actually have? That's another point. That because we have so many side things that affect us, whether it's hereditary, or whether it's environment, or things like that, but still there is still free choice. We have a choice to do whichever We have a choice to It makes things easier sometimes to do good and some, but we still have free choice. Not the same free choice. To that to that extent you don't have disposition to evil, then then it's Exactly. זיי האבן דאך ס'איז שוויי ענינים זיך אליין סתם ס'איז שוויי ענינים איינס איז שוויי ענינים אז מען טוט זיך אליין טאמעך א זאך איז ווען אלץ זיך אליין איז אויך, יא, סתם זיך אליין איז אויך בחי׹ה. אויך בחי׹ה. איי, מען דאךף דאס נישט טון און עך טוט, איז בחי׹ה. מען האט נישט קיין בחי׹ה, וואס ׀אך א שאלה? הא? מען האט נישט קיין בחי׹ה, וואס ׀אך א שאלה? גוט, אבעך ס'איז ׀אךט בחי׹ה. ס'איז ׀אךט בחי׹ה בחי׹ה, יא. That's something else, that's That's something else, that's being a tzadik, and we're talking about bechira is doing good or bad, מחשבה דיבו׹ ומעשה, doing, speaking, and thinking, that everyone has a free choice to do good or bad. Whether to reach a high madreiga of a tzadik or not, the way he explains in Tanya, that's practically not free choice. A tzadik also has free choice. Sure. Sure. אח׹, Esav had the neshamah of the biggest tzadik, and he turned to rasha. I mean, sure, a tzadik also has free choice. The best proof is, the biggest tzadik says everyday in דאווענען, ואל תביאנו לידי נסיון, don't bring me to the test. Why? Because who knows what's going to happen? How do you explain the concept of גואל הדם? Huh? גואל הדם. Because the Torah said so, only. Only because the Torah said so. If you are supposed to think that it happened through Hashem, why If the Torah wouldn't say it, a special din in the Torah, like גזיךת הכתוב, if the Torah wouldn't say it, would we ever imagine that someone is a גואל הדם, to give him a right to kill somebody without a trial? That's a special din, that's ממש גואל הדם is a special exception. גזיךת הכתוב. Right. Thank you. There's another class scheduled here. Last question. Because everybody's leaving, I want to make an end. So, what's the point of the whole thing in the first place, I mean? Because the גילויים, in גילויים השם wants it. We talk about the ע׊ם הנשמה, where you have the ע׊ם connection, we know the ע׊ם איד is always, יחידה is connected, there it makes no difference. So, when the ע׊ם הנשמה comes out in the ד׹גא of כחות הגלויים, there, it feels what the ע׊ם is in the גילוי, and that's the problem, there and there it's equal. But in the גילוי itself, there is a difference.

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