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SHEMOT

Rabbi Schapiro on the Parshah: Mishpatim

Why Does the Torah Insist on Explaining the Laws That Are Already Obvious?

Part of Shemot · 17:24

Mishpatim are the one category of mitzvah a person could have figured out alone โ€” yet the Torah singles them out for a command to teach them thoroughly, and to keep their judgment inside the Jewish courts. A look at why the most "logical" laws are actually the ones most at risk of being kept for the wrong reason.

Audio Transcript
Two Meanings of โ€œLifneihemโ€ โ€” and Why It's Tied to Mishpatim

Parashat Mishpatim starts with the words \"ื•ืืœื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื\". These are the Mishpatim, these are the laws that you should put in front of them. And we find in the Gemara in two different places the explanation in the word ืœืคื ื™ื”ื. ืœืคื ื™ื”ื means in front of them. So therefore, the Gemara says in ื’ื™ื˜ื™ืŸ ื“ืฃ ืคืดื— ืขืžื•ื“ ื‘ืณ, also brought down in Rashi on the pasuk, that it means ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, we should only bring the Mishpatim in front of them, meaning in front of Jewish judges, ื•ืœื ืœืคื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื™ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื, and not to bring it in front of goyim. Which means that whenever there is a dispute between Jews, you have to bring the dispute in front of Jewish judges that will pasken according to the Torah. And you're not allowed to bring it in front of non-Jewish judges, even when they're going to pasken the same din the same way the Torah paskens. Even if ื“ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื›ื“ื™ื ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, their din is the same din as the yidden will pasken according to the Torah, nevertheless, you're not allowed to bring it to a goyishe court. You have to bring it in front of a beit din of Yisrael, in front of the Jewish judges. Then there is another pshat in ืœืคื ื™ื”ื that the Gemara says in ืขื™ืจื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ื“ืฃ ื ืดื“ ืขืžื•ื“ ื‘ืณ, that the word ืœืคื ื™ื”ื means that when you learn with a talmid, you have to learn in a way ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื, to show him a face. The word ืœืคื ื™ื”ื means to their face. You have to show the face to the talmid, meaning that you have to explain him the reason that's behind the halachah so he will understand it completely. You shouldn't just tell him \"This is the halachah and now go find yourself the reason if you want to, but I don't have to explain it to you.\" So the Gemara says that the pasuk teaches us ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื, you have to show him a face, you have to explain it to him and tell him to make sure that this inyan is not only known by him, but also understood by him, and it's clear in his mind. But we have to understand: why is it that the Torah tells us this davka by Mishpatim? Since this parashah deals mainly with Mishpatim, and as the pasuk says \"ื•ืืœื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื\", and as the parshah is called ืคืจืฉืช ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, it seems as if this that the Torah is telling us in the word ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื fits especially to ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. But the question is: why does it fit to ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ื‘ื“ื•ื•ืงื? We know that there are three categories of mitzvot. Certain mitzvot are called ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, certain mitzvot are called ืขื“ื•ืช or mitzvot, and certain mitzvot are called ื—ื•ืงื™ื. The difference is: ื—ื•ืงื™ื are such mitzvot that have no explanation ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื›ืœ. We only do it because Hashem wants us to do it, as the Chazal say: \"ื—ื•ืงื” ื—ืงืงืชื™, ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ื’ื–ืจืชื™\", I made a ื—ื•ืงื”, I made a ื’ื–ื™ืจื”, a decree, \"ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืจืฉื•ืช ืœื”ืจื”ืจ ืื—ืจื™ื”\", you have no right to think about it. So this is one category of mitzvot, things that we don't have an explanation. For instance, the mitzvah of ืคืจื” ืื“ื•ืžื” is called a ื—ื•ืงื”, the mitzvah of shatnez is called a ื—ื•ืงื”, etc., etc. Then we have mitzvot which are called ืขื“ื•ืช. That refers to such mitzvot that do have a reason, they do have a logical explanation. The truth is that if the Torah wouldn't tell us to do it, we on our own would not do it, but nevertheless, when the Torah did tell us to do it, we understand why the Torah wants us to do it. For instance, the mitzvah of eating matzah on Pesach. If the Torah wouldn't command us to eat matzot on Pesach, we on our own would not eat matzot on Pesach. But now that the Torah did tell us to eat matzot on Pesach, we understand why: this is supposed to be a zecher to the Yidden when they left Mitzrayim, and their dough couldn't become chametz and they had to eat matzah, so we, too, eat matzah. So there is a logical explanation to the mitzvah, even though if the Torah wouldn't tell us to do it, we would not have done it. Then you have the third category of mitzvot, those are called ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. Those are mitzvot that the person with his own sechel would understand himself that you have to do it. As the Gemara says in Eruvin ื“ืฃ ืงืณ ืขืžื•ื“ ื‘ืณ: \"ืืœืžืœื ืœื ื ื™ืชื ื” ืชื•ืจื”\", if the Torah chas v'shalom would not have been given, \"ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืœืžื“ื™ืŸ ืฆื ื™ืขื•ืช ืžื—ืชื•ืœ ื•ื’ื–ืœ ืžื ืžืœื”\", we would have learned out to act tzniusdik from a cat, and we would have learned out not to steal from an ant. Which means that these are things that even if the Torah wouldn't tell us to do it, we on our own would do it, because these are things which are understood al pi sechel. Now here we see that the Torah talks about ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, and here the Torah tells us \"ื•ืืœื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื\", the Torah is telling us this lesson that it has to be ืœืคื ื™ื”ื specifically by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. Concerning the first peshat that the Gemara says in Gittin in the peshat of ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, that it means that you have to go ืœืคื ื™ื”ื to Jewish judges and not ืœืคื ื™ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื™ ื›ื•ื›ื‘ื™ื, not to the goyishe courts, according to that peshat, we understand why the Torah specifically tells us this din concerning ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. Because concerning ื—ื•ืงื™ื, And even concerning ืขื“ื•ืช, there probably would have never been a thought in anyone's mind that you're able to go to goyishe judges to bring your dispute. Because these are things that the goyim have no idea about, they don't keep it, this is something that is only a Torah concept, and therefore the Torah doesn't have to tell us that when it comes to these things you don't ask the goyishe court, but you have to ask Jewish judges. It is only by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, since these are things that al pi seichel a person would keep, and therefore the goyim also have a connection to it, and in these things there is a possibility that the goyishe court will pasken the same way as the Jewish court. Here the Torah has to tell us that nevertheless you have to bring it only ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, in front of Jewish judges, and you're not allowed to bring it to the goyishe court. But according to the other ืคืฉื˜ื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, as the Gemara says in Eruvin that it means ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื, that you have to make sure that you explain it to him properly and he grasps the whole thing, l'choirah this din, this lesson would be more important to be told by ืขื“ื•ืช, and certainly by ื—ื•ืงื™ื, more than by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. Because it has to tell us that even though the seichel does not force us to keep the ืขื“ื•ืช, certainly the ื—ื•ืงื™ื because it has no explanation ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื›ืœ, nevertheless when you teach it, you have to teach it in the form of ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, to make sure that he grasps the whole idea and he gets what he's able, what he's supposed to do, etc., etc. By ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, being that these are mitzvot that even the ืฉื›ืœ ืื ื•ืฉื™, the human logic understands it, so here it is much simpler to explain it, and we assume a person would do it anyway. So where is it more important that the Torah should tell us that you have to explain it as much as possible, and make sure he grasps it from all sides, etc., etc., ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื, it's more important by ืขื“ื•ืช and by ื—ื•ืงื™ื rather than by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. So the question is, when the Torah gives us this lesson, why does the Torah tell it to us by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื and not by ื—ื•ืงื™ื or by ืขื“ื•ืช?

Can You Even Explain a Chok?

But before we get to answer this question, it is important first to explain, what does it mean that when it comes to the mitzvot of ื—ื•ืงื™ื, you also have to have ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื, to show him a face, to explain it to him? L'choirah, since ื—ื•ืงื™ื are such mitzvot that have no explanation, then it's impossible for a person to explain it. So then maybe we don't need ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื by ื—ื•ืงื™ื? And maybe this is the reason why the Torah does not mention the inyan of ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœื• ืคื ื™ื concerning the mitzvot of ื—ื•ืงื™ื. But the truth is, it is not like that. Even though ื—ื•ืงื™ื are such mitzvot that have no explanation, and therefore when you fulfill, you keep the mitzvot which are in the category of chukim, you only do it because this is the ืจืฆื•ืŸ ื”ืขืœื™ื•ืŸ, this is what the Oibershter, what Hashem wants, nevertheless, it is self-understood that the fulfillment of this mitzvah also has to penetrate into the whole person. When a person does a mitzvah, any mitzvah, even though he only fulfills it with one part of his body, nevertheless we know ื›ืœ ืขืฆืžื•ืชื™ ืชืืžืจื ื”, the whole body has to get involved in keeping the mitzvah, every part of the body, every part of the person has to be involved in the mitzvah. And usually, how is it? When a person, for instance, puts on tefillin, so the physical act of putting on tefillin is done by his hand, nevertheless, when his heart has the feeling to the mitzvah, then his heart is also involved in the mitzvah. When his seichel, his brain understands the mitzvah and understands why he have to do the mitzvah, then his seichel is also involved in doing the mitzvah. And since he likes to do it, so then his ื›ื— ื”ืจืฆื•ืŸ, his willpower is involved, and since he enjoys it, his ื›ื— ื”ืชืขื ื•ื’ is involved, his power of pleasure is involved, so the whole person, all his kochot, so to speak, all his attributes, all his powers are involved in doing the mitzvah. When it comes to the mitzvah of chukim, lichorah here you can only fulfill it with your hand, but to say that your heart is involved, lichorah you can't because he has no feeling to it, certainly with your seichel you can't get involved because you don't understand it. But it's hard to say that the mitzvot of chukim, when you fulfill those mitzvot, we can't accomplish the inyan of having every part of ourselves involved in the mitzvah. By mishpatim you're able to involve every koach, every ability you have in the mitzvah, but when it comes to chukim, that there are certain kochot in the person that have to stay away from the mitzvah and can't get involved in doing the mitzvah, it is very hard to say that. Therefore, what we have to say is that even when it comes to the mitzvah of chukim, the person's feeling and even the person's brain could get involved in doing it. How is it? If the person understands with his seichel that even though this has no explanation, nevertheless he understands that you have to fulfill it because Hashem wants you to do it, then his seichel is also involved, and then he gets a feeling that he feels that you have to do the mitzvah. So even though you can't understand the explanation to this specific mitzvah, why you have to do it so and so, in which way, etc., etc., but nevertheless your seichel could force you, which means you could under- stand even with your seichel, with your logic, that you have to fulfill the mitzvah because Hashem told you to do so. Because when you fulfill the mitzvah of chukim, it is not because you understand the reason for the mitzvah. The truth is we could go a step further. It's also not because you understand that probably there is a very good reason for it. Just like when a child does what his parents want him to do, even if he doesn't understand it, but he understand that definitely there must be a logical explanation which is too deep for me to understand. In the same way, when it comes to chukim, we could do it because we understand with our seichel that there must be a very, very deep reason, such a deep reason that we with our seichel can't understand it. That is not so. This is not the real way you're supposed to fulfill the chukim. You're supposed to fulfill the chukim not because you feel there is a reason for it, even if you feel there is no reason for it, but just because this is the ืจืฆื•ืŸ ื”ืขืœื™ื•ืŸ, this is what Hashem wants. Because if you fulfill it because you feel that there is a very good reason for it, then you're not doing it beyond reason, because of Hashem's ratzon, you're doing it because of the reason. But because you feel there is such a deep reason that you can't understand it, so you're doing it because of that deep reason. In truth, we have to do it just because Hashem wants, not even thinking about a reason at all. And the lashon Chazal where this is: ื—ื•ืงื” ื—ืงืงืชื™, ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ื’ื–ืจืชื™, ืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืจืฉื•ืช ืœื”ืจื”ืจ ืื—ืจื™ื”. You don't even have permission to think about it. Lichorah the Chazal should have said, ื—ื•ืงื” ื—ืงืงืชื™, ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ื’ื–ืจืชื™, I made the law, I made the decree, ืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืจืฉื•ืช ืฉืœื ืœืงื™ื™ืžื•, you have no permission not to do it, whether you understand or not, you must do it. The Chazal say ืื™ืŸ ืœืš ืจืฉื•ืช ืœื”ืจื”ืจ ืื—ืจื™ื•. You have no permission to think about it, which means that this doesn't need a reason at all. Not even to think that there must be a very good reason. So why do we fulfill the chukim? Just because Hashem wants us to do it. But nevertheless, it is supposed to penetrate into every koach of the person, even into his brain, and his brain should understand that you have to fulfill these mitzvot because Hashem wants you to do it, whether they have a reason or not. So Lichorah, by chukim is also a possibility of ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืคื ื™ื to explain it to the talmid, and there it's more important to tell us that we have to do it rather than mishpatim. Because by mishpatim, since it has an explanation, it's self-understood that you'll explain the, give the reason to the talmid. But by chukim, to tell, to make sure that the Rav who's going to teach the talmid will give him the reason why he should have to fulfill the chukim even though there is no reason to it, that's something that if the Torah wouldn't tell us, maybe we wouldn't do it. So Lichorah it would be more important that the Torah should teach us this din of ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, which means ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืคื ื™ื by chukim, and even by ืขื“ื•ืช, rather than by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื. So why does the Torah teach us that davka by ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื?

The Real Answer: Doing Mishpatim as Torah, Not as Logic

But the answer to this will be understood first by explaining why is it that if the goyim pasken the same din as the Yidden pasken, why shouldn't we go to the goyim, why do we have to go to the Yidden? The answer is, because even though they might pasken the same way, but in essence there is a big difference. When they pasken it, it's ืฉื›ืœ ืื ื•ืฉื™, it's human ืฉื›ืœ, human logic. When a ื“ื™ื™ืŸ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, a Jewish judge, paskens it based on the Torah, then it's not ืฉื›ืœ ืื ื•ืฉื™, it's not ืฉื›ืœ of a human being, then it's Torah that comes from Hashem. And that is the main difference. As Rashi says on the first words of the parsha: ื•ืืœื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, and these are the ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื you should put in front of them. So Rashi says that ื•ืืœื” means ืžื•ืกื™ืฃ ืขืœ ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื™ื. ื•ืืœื”, whenever it says with a ื•, it means to add on the previous ones. To teach us that ืžื” ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื™ื ืžืกื™ื ื™, ืืฃ ืืœื” ืžืกื™ื ื™. Just like the previous parsha, which is Parshas Yisro, tells us about the inyanim that were given by Har Sinai, so, too, these ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื in this week's parsha are also given ืžืกื™ื ื™. What is this telling us? That even though these are ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื that seem to be things which are understood ืขืœ ืคื™ ืฉื›ืœ, nevertheless they are not ืฉื›ืœ, they are here because Hashem wants us to do it. Just like we find by the Aseres Hadibros itself, by Matan Torah. The first part of the Aseres Hadibros are the deepest inyanim in Yiddishkeit. There you have the deepest inyanim in achdut Hashem, in the unity of Hashem: ืื ื›ื™ ื”ืณ ืืœืงื™ืš, ืœื ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœืš, etc., etc. The other ones are very simple things: ืœื ืชืจืฆื—, ืœื ืชื’ื ื‘, not to kill, not to commit adultery, etc., etc. These are very simple things that if not for the Torah, then we would know it ourselves. Nevertheless, the Torah put it together, and Hashem, at the same time when He told us the deepest inyanim in achdut Hashem, also commanded us on these simple things to teach us that these simple things also have to be done because of ืื ื›ื™ ื”ืณ ืืœืงื™ืš, because Hashem told us to do it. It is not enough to keep these mitzvot just because sechel tells us to do it, but we have to do it because of ืื ื›ื™ ื”ืณ ืืœืงื™ืš. Not only because if we do it only mitzad sechel, then who knows if we'll constantly do it, because maybe at one point our sechel will say, don't do it, and then we won't do it. But more than that, even if we constantly do it, if we do it mitzad sechel, then we We're doing our own thing. If we're doing because Hashem' said so, then this is kedushah, this is godliness, this is Hashem' himself, as the whole Torah u'mitzvot. The Torah is ื—ื›ืžืชื• ืฉืœ ื”ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ืจื•ืš ื”ื•ื, ื”''s wisdom, the mitzvot are ืจืฆื•ื ื• ืฉืœ ื”ืงื“ื•ืฉ ื‘ืจื•ืš ื”ื•ื, ื”''s will, so we connect ourselves to Hashem'. And this is the real meaning why we have to bring the dinim only to the ื“ื™ื™ื ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, not to the goyishe judges, even if they'll pasken the same, because if they pasken it, then it's physical things. If the judges of Torah pasken it, then we're doing it because of Hashem', then this itself is the chochmah of Hashem' and the ratzon of Hashem'. In other words, when we fulfill the mitzvot of mishpatim, we have to do it with the same kabalat ol malchut shamayim, with the acceptance of the yoke of Hashem', as when we do chukim. By chukim we definitely do it only because of kabalat ol malchut shamayim. When we do mishpatim, we have to have the same kabalat ol. And this is the reason why davka concerning mishpatim the Torah teaches us ืœื”ืจืื•ืช ืœืคื ื™ื”ื that you have to give him the reason. Because if you're not going to give him the reason, and you're going to leave it up to him, he might find a logical reason, which is ืฉื›ืœ ืื ื•ืฉื™, physical sechel, human sechel, rather than a ืชื•ืจื” ืฉื›ืœ. Concerning chukim, even if you won't tell him the reason why he has to fulfill them, and he's going to look for the reason himself, he'll only be able to find a reason of kedushah, a reason of Torah, because there is no logical reason. Even when it comes to the fulfillment of edot, because these are mitzvot that on our own we wouldn't do it, there is more chance that he will find a Torah reason. But when it comes to mishpatim, being that the mishpatim have a logical reason too, so maybe the reason he's going to find will be a logical reason. So then the mishpatim he's going to do will not be really the mitzvot of Hashem', but they will be logical inyanim that lehavdil the goyim also have. That's why the Torah tells a teacher who's teaching Torah, make sure that you teach him even by mishpatim the reasons, because then he will have Torah reasons rather than logical reasons. And this fits to the deeper pshat that we find in Chassidishe sefarim on this ืคืกื•ืง, ื•ืืœื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื, that the word ืœืคื ื™ื”ื comes from the word penimiyut, the inside, the deeper inside, that you have to put it ืœืคื ื™ื”ื into their penimiyut because even the mishpatim, they have to fulfill because of the penimiyut of the neshamah, the inner of the parts of the neshamah, rather than chas veshalom doing it because of ืฉื›ืœ ืื ื•ืฉื™. And that's why davka by mishpatim the Torah tells us, ืืœื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืืฉืจ ืชืฉื™ื ืœืคื ื™ื”ื.

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