name of שמואל, משום ר' שמעון בן אלעזר, חכמים תיקנו להם, our sages were מתקן, לבנות ישראל, for the בנות ישראל, לבתולה מאתים, a betulah gets 200, ve'almanah manah, gets one manah. So this is the takanah of ketubah, that the Gemara is talking about here. And our Gemara is telling us the name of Rav Shimon ben Elazar, that Chazal were metaken a ketubah for a betulah and an almanah, each one respectively the amount that they are entitled to. And והם הימנוהו, these very same chachamim, the chachamim that established and mandated this ketubah, they said שאם אמר פתח פתוח מצאתי נאמן. And if he comes with a claim of פתח פתוח מצאתי, he is believed, and in the context of what the Gemara is talking about here, it's with regard to the ketubah. So he is ne'eman based on his claim of פתח פתוח, that she is not a betulah. These, this very same chachamim that were metaken the ketubah said we give him an ne'emanut, and he will be believed for her to be mafsid her ketubah. So on the top of דף י' ע\"ב, so the

Gemara asks, if that's the case, our chachamim came along, our sages came along, and they established a ketubah, which obviously we know ketubah is in whose benefit? Benefit of the ishah, the benefit of the woman. So they established a ketubah which is in her benefit, primarily if he dies or divorces her, she is entitled to a certain amount of money as we mentioned. And asks the Gemara, if the husband could come with this simple claim of פתח פתוח, מה הועילו, in fact, says the Gemara, מה הועילו חכמים בתקנתם? What did the sages accomplish with their takanah, with what they established? The fact they established the ketubah, what did they accomplish? And the Rishonim explain with regard to this specific woman. When we have a woman whose husband claims that she is not a בתולה, and he doesn't really have anything to back it up other than his claim of פתח פתוח מצאתי, and then she loses out. So it would seem to show us that the תקנה of חכמים did not help all women. That is the לשון the way the ראשונים explain, like we saw this last week right? The ראשונים explain מה הועילו, what way did the חכמים benefit this kind of woman with their תקנה? So that is the Gemara's question.

אמר Rava, Rava introduces us this new idea, the חזקה which we I think we mentioned quickly earlier. Rava says, חזקה אין אדם טורח בסעודה ומפסידה. There is a חזקה that a person does not spend money and maybe time and effort into the סעודה of נשואין, and then go ahead and be מפסיד, make himself lose all that money and time and energy that he put into it, based on a claim just because he doesn't want to live with her anymore and because he doesn't want her to earn her כתובה. A lot more money is going to be going into the garbage for this סעודה. So if his claim was fabricated and for whatever reason he did not want to be married to this woman, he could have divorced her before the נשואין. Why is he going ahead with the נשואין and he is following through, he seems to want her, and the next morning he comes with פתח פתוח? That indicates that in all likelihood we could believe what he is saying, and that there is validity to his claim of פתח פתוח. עד כאן דברי הגמרא. Okay, so that's what the Gemara says. Now I

want to go through the Rashis here, because it's going to be important to really understand what the Gemara here means before we get into the קשיא the ראשונים ask. And Rashi says with regard to the מימרא here of רב נחמן אמר שמואל משום ר' שמעון בן אלעזר, רש\"י says חכמים תיקנו לאשה, and look at this כלומר, what does כלומר mean? You see the first word in Rashi? So usually that כלומר is indicative that there's something below the surface here that Rashi is pointing out. What? כלומר means like Like it means to say. What does it mean to say? It means that it doesn't really say it clearly, but it means to say something which you don't really see. What does it mean to say here, says Rashi? That there's something unspoken here. The Gemara made an assumption that the חכמים, the sages, were the ones who established the כתובה. Being that they established the כתובה, they also gave credibility to the claim of the husband that he found her to be פתח פתוח, that she's not a betulah. So Rashi says that what we mean to say here is אי הוי כתובה דאורייתא, for had ketubah been something which was not mandated by our chachamim, but rather by the Torah itself, the Torah itself was the source for the halachah of ketubah, then he would not have ne'emanut. לא הוי נאמן להפקיע אלא בעדות ברורה, only with clear testimony. So it's only because the כתובה, Rashi is pointing out here, it's only because the ketubah is derabbanan, which is what our Gemara means, it's only because it's rabbinical, that's why these same rabbanan gave him the ne'emanut. But had ketubah been de'oraita, if the halachah was that any man who marries a woman מן התורה is obligated in a ketubah, then we wouldn't just take his word, \"Oh, she's not a betulah, I don't have to give you a ketubah.\" We won't be so quick to be ne'eman what he says. Okay, and just to read Rashi here: כלומר, אי הוי כתובה דאורייתא, if the ketubah would be דאורייתא, לא הוי נאמן, he would not be believed lehafki'a, to remove his obligation, אלא בעדות ברורה, only with clear testimony. אבל כתובתה, however her כתובה, חכמים תקנוה, our sages, our chachamim, they were metaken, they established the takanah of ketubah. So hem amru vehem amru, you ever heard that expression? They were the ones that say, and they were the ones that say. Meaning they were the ones that put this ketubah in place, so they also are the ones that they give give give a ne'emanut to this husband who they were mechayev in a ketubah, he's the one who's obligated in ketubah, but he also will be believed if he claims that she's not a betulah. So הם שתיקנוה, they, the ones who were metaken the כתובה, אמרו שהוא נאמן להפסידה אף בטענת פתח פתוח, even with this seemingly not so strong of a טענת פתח פתוח, they also gave a נאמנות to the husband. And let's just continue the Rashi here. The Gemara asks: אם כן, נהי שבידו להפקיע, that if the husband has the ability to remove his obligation of the ketubah by claiming that she's not a she's not a virgin, מה הועילו חכמים בתקנתם? What did the chachamim help and benefit and accomplish with their תקנה שתיקנו לה that they were מתקן for this woman ketubah, a ketubah? And that the Gemara says, which Rashi goes on to explain: חזקה אין אדם טורח בסעודה. Says Rashi: אין לחוש, we're not concerned, שיטעון אדם כך אלא באמת. We could assume that one who claims that his wife was not a בתולה, we could assume that he's claiming so the אמת, the truth. שאם היה שונאה, because if he really did not want to be married to her and he hated her מתחילה, originally, לא היה טורח בסעודה, he would not have bothered with making the סעודה of נישואין ומפייסה, and take her in as a wife, ומפסיד סעודתו חנם, and then the סעודה goes to the waste, אלא היה מגרשה מתחילה, he would have divorced her before he got into any trouble. So this is what the Gemara says. Now,

before we take this apart a little bit, I'd like to point out that there really are, in the big picture, two considerations that we have to take into account as to why she may possibly not be entitled to her ketubah when he realizes that she's not a בתולה. When the husband comes to נישואין, and as we said, it was generally accepted that the kiddushin, the erusin, was a year prior to the נישואין, and they come to the נישואין and he lives with her for the first time and he sees that she's not a בתולה, and the נידון here is does she lose her ketubah? What would be the reason why she would lose her ketubah? What could be the reason? So as we mentioned many times, could be really for two one of two reasons could could be possible. Firstly, maybe there was some kind of Deception here. He thought she was a virgin, and before he ever met her, she already was had something with someone else, then she's not a בתולה, she's not a virgin. And only a בתולה is entitled to the full ketubah, to the 200 זוז. And if she's not a בתולה, so it's a machloket. The Gemara later discusses maybe she will get downgraded to a מנה, or maybe she will lose it entirely, and the whole kiddushin could be really is a question, maybe it's a מקח טעות, he never really had in mind to marry her. That's one possibility. So, maybe she loses her ketubah because of the fact that she was not the same quality that he thought. He thought he was getting a Lexus, then he got a Camry, I don't know. Is that a good mashal? Can you have a better one? He thought he was getting something of good quality, and she's not that בתולה, and only a בתולה gets the gets the ketubah, is entitled to this ketubah. The other possibility is that she was did not mislead him. When at the time of the kiddushin, that first step of marriage, which happens a year prior to the nisuin, she already was I'm sorry, she still was a בתולה. And then it could be that someone was מאנס her against her will. Somebody lived with her and was מזנה with her against her I'm sorry, not against her will, but rather willingly, I'm sorry. If it was willingly, she will lose her ketubah. She forfeits her ketubah because she's an אשת איש, we spoke about last week that if she's מזנה ברצון, then she forfeits her ketubah. And now that he sees that she's not a בתולה, that also is a question, maybe she was מזנה ברצון during this time between the kiddushin and nisuin. And therefore, there's a big question mark here if this woman really deserves to get her ketubah.

What about a מוכת עץ? See, that is also a possibility that is brought up in the Rishonim, which could be we will mention, but we're not going to talk about that right now because Tosafot already said that if she's a מוכת עץ, she would wouldn't be bashful, and she would she would have said something, and she's she's either arguing with him and she's saying, \"I am a בתולה,\" or she was שותקת, and she's denying. The fact that she doesn't say anything shows seems seems like that מוכת עץ we don't have to really take into consideration. I think that's the peshat. It does it does seem to keep coming up here again. Yeah, seems like yeah, she pleaded the fifth, and we have to we have to work with what we have. If it's a טענה against her שתיקה, or they're arguing with each other, then we have to see who who we who we go with. So, lichorah, it's מפורש in the Gemara here is that if a ketubah was a real חיוב, and it was a חיוב דאורייתא, then when the husband claims that he's not really sure if he has he's obligated for her ketubah, it seems like it's דבר פשוט that we disregard his claim. It's sorry, Charlie, ketubah comes along with the marriage, you married her, you're מחויב in a ketubah, and you'd have to have a real solid basis, proof that either you're flat, or she was מזנה, otherwise you have to give her the ketubah. He has and he does not have any נאמנות at all. It's only because a ketubah is דרבנן. And not only that, additionally, it seems like the Rishonim seemed to understand, we had a Rashi also on דף ח׳ עמוד ב׳, that even though ketubah is דרבנן, we still don't take his word without this extra chazakah that we have of חזקה אין אדם טורח בסעודה ומפסידה. Just his claim alone that פתח פתוח מצאתי in order to פטור himself from the ketubah based on the possibilities that she will not be entitled to it anymore, the claim itself is not enough without the without the chizuk of the chazakah that the Gemara says that that he has this chazakah of אין אדם טורח בסעודה ומפסידה, that a person's not going to put all this energy into the seudah and lose out on it.

Seems like from this Gemara that it really would be the man. Yeah, seems like the man Definitely a good part of the responsibility, I guess, was on the man. Whatever it was, it was not worth his time and energy to just throw it in the garbage. If he didn't like her, he should have just given her a get. What are you bothered by? Yeah. Neyn, zogt er, az an alman mit an almone. What does that have to do with anything? Of דרבנן. What's that? This this this Tosafot is not talking about does with does with קידושין. קידושין is not דאורייתא. קידושין is דאורייתא! Tosafot says Tosafot says you make your קידושין contingent on the דעת of the חכמים. כל דמקדש אדעתא דרבנן מקדש. I don't understand what you're saying. What does that What is what's more חמור, קידושין or ketubah? More חמור? Yeah, what's more חמור? It's not a matter of more חמור, less חמור. קידושין is a קנין. קידושין is an acquisition, it's a way of acquiring an אישות. The ketubah, like we learned about earlier, is a ראיה on a התחייבות, an obligation that the husband has to his wife. That's what a ketubah is. Now every time a man and woman get married, the שטר the שטר כתובה is a proof that he holds of the obligation, not of the Kiddushin, of the obligation that he has to her as a wife. Meaning not the not the actual Kiddushin, but if he dies or divorces her, she's entitled to a certain amount of money, למשל. There's other חיובים also included in the כתובה. But not the Kiddushin! Get that out of your head. It's not the Kiddushin. Kiddushin is something else. You have trouble with it, I know. It happens to be a הלכה that you're not supposed to live together with your wife, the Gemara says you're not supposed to remain as a husband and wife together, even to be to live together, if the כתובה is missing. But that's for a different reason. That doesn't take away from the actual חלות of the marriage. The Torah recognizes you give a woman a dollar or a שוה פרוטה and say, \"You should be מקודשת to me,\" the Torah recognizes that as Kiddushin. They're married! Leave כתובה out of it. Now there's another question: Does a person who marries a woman, does he have to obligate himself to to give her money? So the רבנן established that when you marry her you have to obligate yourself a התחייבות, all sorts of obligations that include 200, 100 if he dies, divorces her, yeah. There's some obligations that are during the marriage also. But that's an obligation which is an addition to the marriage that that is the that is the put of that is put on the husband. The question is if that obligation that's on the husband, is that an obligation that's מדאורייתא? When when does it take effect? So it okay, so there's a

מחלוקת, which we'll get to a little later, either at the time of the Kiddushin, or according to some at the time of the נישואין. It's a מחלוקת. Some say it takes effect at the time of the Kiddushin, some say at the time of the נישואין. What? Yeah, because only at the נישואין he found out. Nothing. Right, he's deaf. Guys, let's work this out later, okay? We'll talk to you after. Okay? So the Rishonim ask, and the Ramban really starts with a question, that why doesn't the husband just be נאמן? Why don't Chazal, why don't Beit Din, why don't we believe the husband at face value, even if this obligation was a דאורייתא obligation or if it was דרבנן, why do you need this extra חזקה? We should believe the husband. Why should we believe the husband? So the

Ramban says that we have to understand here what the intentions of the husband were with this כתובה and what the understanding of this כתובה is. He says that a person only writes a כתובה to his wife, and we're talking about a כתובה that is meant for a בתולה, he only writes it שהרי לא כתב לה אלא על מנת דקיימא ליה. He's only writing this to her על מנת, on condition That he finds וימצאנה בתולה, that he finds her to be a בתולה. That is like a תנאי, like it's a stipulation, even if it's not spoken out, but it's understood that he is only obligating himself this כתובה, and he's only mechuyav in this ketubah assuming that she has to fulfill her part of the agreement, which is that she's a betulah. So, being that so, so asks the רמב\"ן, וכיוון שכן, עליה להביא ראיה שנתקיים התנאי. The burden of proof should be on the woman that she fulfilled her part of the tenai. אטו מאן דמפיק שטרא דתנאי לא אמרינן ליה קיים תנאיך? One who pulls out a shtar with some kind of tenai in it, if there's a tenai involved, the one who's responsible to fulfill the tenai has to prove that they fulfilled the tenai in order for the shtar to follow through and be a shtar that you could use to collect. Is there a difference if it's de'oraita or derabbanan in that case? No. Okay. Lichora not. So lichora, when one makes a kinyan or some kind of הלוואה, and there's a tenai involved, so there has to be proof that the tenai was fulfilled. For example, if there was a kiddushin, and a husband gave a woman a ring, and he told her, \"I want to marry you on condition that you, fill in the blank, give a certain person $200.\" So now who has to prove that the tenai was kept? The kiddushin was only with a tenai based on the fact that she has to fulfill her tenai. If she fulfills her tenai, then we have a kiddushin. So if we want this to be kiddushin, there has to be a proof that she fulfilled the tenai. So the Ramban is asking that here too, we got a deal. We got a husband and a wife, they're getting married, and he wants to say that, \"I'm obligating myself,\" and whether it's a de'oraita obligation, derabbanan obligation, but he's obligating himself with a tenai, a stipulation, that she has to be a virgin, she has to be a betulah. So she has to go prove it. Now there's a question, go prove it. Now that there's a question, the burden of proof should be on her. And if he has a question, we should we should give him the נאמנות, he should have the upper hand, and not the woman. That is the kushya that the Ramban asks on our Gemara. Good. So the acharonim,

namely the Maharit, they want to take us to a Shach. And the Shach says a yesod, and he bases this on a Ritva, and he says that this rule that the Ramban just mentioned, that there's a tenai, if there's a stipulation, then there has to be proof that it was fulfilled, so the Shach says that's not across the board. It really depends on the kind of tenai. And he breaks it into two categories: one category of kum va'aseh, which means a tenai which is that someone has to go ahead and fulfill something in order for the transaction to follow, and then there's another kind of tenai which is like passive, shev ve'al ta'aseh, which means that there could be something that maybe breaks the chalut, but if everything stays on course, then the chalut will continue. So he quotes the Ritva which really distinguishes between the example I just mentioned earlier, that if one makes a kiddushin, he gives a woman money and he says, \"You're married to me on condition that you go ahead and give another person that I like, one of my friends, you give him $200, then it's a marriage,\" then yes, she has to go prove that she gave him the $200, real, real re'iyah, she has to prove it. However, if it was a different kind of tenai, that was what we call kum va'aseh, that she has to go ahead and do something, she has to give him money, but if he stipulated that this marriage is only if you don't don't go shopping tomorrow in Macy's, that was the tenai, you don't do something, shev ve'al ta'aseh, \"I'm married to you b'tenai that you don't go ahead and do something. So if everything stays status quo, then lechora they're married. So the proof, the burden of proof would have to be that she did not fulfill her tenai, that she broke it. And going to the store, going shopping, that's breaking the that's going to be breaking the kiddushin, then it would be something that the that the husband would have to prove. So with this yesod, how do we apply this to our case? This woman lechora, let's talk again to repeat the which one? The shev ve'al ta'aseh or kum va'aseh? Yeah, yeah. Kum va'aseh is actively going ahead and doing something, and shev ve'al ta'aseh is passively fulfilling it. How do you explain shev ve'al ta'aseh? Shev, sit back, ve'al ta'aseh, and don't do. Sit back and don't do. So the acharonim ask, let's look at our example for a moment. The husband is obligating himself with a ketubah. What is his tenai? What's his stipulation? His assumption and understanding is that this is as long as she is a betulah. She's a betulah. So lechora lechora what? Depend on which perspective you take. It's which one you're looking at. Kum va'aseh or Which one are we looking at? They're both here. They're both here. What determines which one you're going to emphasize? So let's say for a moment that lechora she's a betulah unless something happened. Right, lechora, eh? She has to do something to make herself not a betulah. But the peshitut is that she's a betulah. So the fulfillment of the tenai, lechora, is just in a passive way, that she is what she is. That's telling us like when, because obviously if it was before that that's a Right. So is that is that really Not really telling us when. So you can't prove when. Right, right, right, yes. It's definitely not a מקח טעות. You can't claim מקח טעות. Well it might be a מקח טעות. The husband's claiming that it's a מקח טעות. But now, does she have a right to say Prove it, or who who's the burden of proof on? So the rishonim were

asking And they're trying, the rishonim are saying that that lechora there was a tenai, she has to she has to prove that she fulfilled it. So the Acharonim are asking here that that's not so simple. She doesn't have to prove that she fulfilled the tenai, because this tenai is kind of fulfilled automatically. Something has to happen to break it. So really the burden of proof should be on him. And lichorah they they're metamiah ke'ilu on what what what are the Rishonim bothered by? What do you mean she has to prove that she fulfilled the tenai? The tenai is fulfilled. She she was born a בתולה, we know she was a בתולה. You want to say maybe it was broken and that will break the ketubah? That it's ein hachi nami, that that that that proof is on her. Right. You have to prove that she actively broke... You have She has the chazakah of בתולה. Yes, so hang on a second. The Rishonim are going to answer that. So what do what do you want to do with that? You're leaning on the husband. But, the whole point isn't it, you need edim, you cannot just uproot a chazakah. So his testimony isn't enough to uproot her chazakah. Yeah, so that's, I mean that's what the Rishonim are asking, that we could we could take his We should accept his testimony to uproot her chazakah. Because if it was before the irusin, then Right. And that would, it would be the whole tenai, meaning he's marrying her only on condition that she's a בתולה. And if at that point she wasn't, so she's not a בתולה, then the whole thing is a mistake. So she doesn't get a ketubah, the whole marriage goes out the window. It's like an over- But if he goes to her and says, \"I'm marrying you on condition that you're a בתולה,\" and then he finds out, then the question is who has to prove that? So that's what we're discussing, who has to prove that? So it doesn't matter before or after. He feels the same. Somebody has to prove it. Who has to prove it? Who has to prove that the tenai was fulfilled? So the Netivot adds one more point here. The

Netivot says that even though our case is talking about a tenai which is more of like a passive tenai, meaning she was a בתולה, it's understood that she's a בתולה unless something happened to make her not a בתולה. Says the Netivot, that still we could we still have a right to say that the burden of proof should be like what the Rishonim are asking. The burden of proof really should be on the woman. Why is that? He says another factor that we have to take into consideration is what he calls להבא or לשעבר, which means is it something for the future, something in the past. And like whatever I was saying, when a husband comes to this woman, he goes, \"Let's get married,\" and he's assuming that she is a בתולה. So if she was already not a בתולה, it's something that had, it's like a pre-existing, pre-existing condition. And if it was a pre-existing condition, and he's basing the kiddushin on the fact that she's not a בתולה, then still the burden of proof will be on her. Because he was only doing this kinyan, this chiyuv, this obligation with that understanding that she is a בתולה. Now that there is a question if at the time of the kiddushin she was a בתולה at that time, it's not a it's not a something that came up, it's not a question that came up later, it's a question that came up now already. We're not sure if there was a Kiddushin in the first place. Then she has to prove, even though it's something which is, you know, the way the לשון they call it is לשב ואל תעשה, passive kind of תנאי, but still the burden of proof will still be on the woman. And with that, he explains what the ראשונים are asking here. The ראשונים are asking that the husband should be believed. He only has an obligation for a כתובה if they're married. Kiddushin isn't marriage. Only if they're married, do we have an obligation for a כתובה. Oh, I'm sorry, for the כתובה. So that puts the ראשונים's question back in place, that husband says that he never bought he never bought a Camry, he bought a Lexus. He finds her to be a בעולה, not a בתולה, and the burden of proof should have to be on the woman, why do we believe the husband? So the Ramban answers, the

Ramban explains that the reason is that we're talking about a situation where the woman argues directly with the husband. She says, \"You're claiming I'm not a בתולה,\" and she says, \"Yes, I am a בתולה. בתולה שלימה נבעלתי.\" She says, \"You בעל'd me as a בתולה שלימה.\" The reason why she would believe, be believed מעיקר הדין if כתובה was דאורייתא, or if it was דרבנן without the extra chizuk, he says, is because because his טענה still has this weak point that maybe he's not really קים ליה, he doesn't really know what he's talking about when he says פתח פתוח מצאתי. He misjudged, the opening wasn't really open, and it was really closed. And being that she's claiming with certainty that she was a בתולה, it's going against his claim that she is not a בתולה. Therefore, we have to give extra chizuk, extra proof, or extra chazakah for the husband. to be נאמן. Now לכאורה, we can prove it the other way: not a בתולה, doesn't know. So, that's the point. So because he doesn't really know, we have to add this extra chazakah. The Gemara adds chazakah, חז״ל gave him this נאמנות. This this is his נאמנות, שהם אמרו the כתובה is only דרבנן, and they also gave him the נאמנות with the Gemara said, חזקה אין אדם טורח בסעודה ומפסידה. That if he's making this story up, if he's lying, if he's he wouldn't have thrown the whole se'udah in the garbage. Therefore, he he has the נאמנות to be מפסיד her the kesubah. So, the way I saw the Acharonim explain a little better what the Ramban means to answer here, based on some ideas from the Shamaitta, and some other poskim, other mefarshim, that there's really the hakdamah of a Gemara later. The

Gemara later talks about how a person sells a animal, the mocher and the lokeach. One sells the animal, and the buyer buys the animal, and the animal gets comes into the buyer's possession and he sees that the animal is a טריפה. The animal is a טריפה. So, when was it a טריפה? Did he buy a bad animal? Did he buy an animal that was a טריפה, or it became a טריפה in his possession? The Gemara says that he still is obligated to pay for the animal that he bought. Still mechuyav to pay for it because even though now we see that it's a טריפה, that doesn't mean it was a טריפה, doesn't mean it was a טריפה when it was by the owner. We could assume that the animal was fine, now we see the problem, so maybe the problem happened now. And therefore, the the buyer is mechuyav to still follow through and pay for the animal that he bought. So Where is that? Where is that Gemara? This Gemara is a Gemara I think it's a Gemara later, the Shamaitta brings it down, I think it's in פרק המדיר. I have to check, I'm not sure. Think so, but I don't remember offhand. Now, the she'eilah is that we compare our case to that as well. We're not sure what happened. This woman lechorah wasn't a besulah. When did when did she when did when did she become a בעולה? He claims it happened before the marriage. She claims it never happened. And what do we do? Was it a good kiddushin? Did he really marry a besulah? Did he really buy this Lexus over here that he thought, or not? So, when we go into that case of the of the the animal, so the mefarshim explain that the animal has like this kind of chazakah or rov that most animals are not טריפה, and we can assume that everything was fine until we see otherwise, which is the re'usa when it's by the the buyer, the lokeach. And so too here as the Ramban told us before, a woman is born a besulah. She has a chazakah, chezkas haguf, that she is a besulah. That's the way she was born. And says the Shamaitta that the only reason why we now will work with the claim of the husband is only because he's claiming with certainty. He what call makes a re'usa. Re'usa is like a How do you translate re'usa? Like a flaw? I don't know. Defective. Defect? Defect. A פגם. Yeah, something like that. So because of what the husband claims, that he knows with certainty that she was not a בתולה, then that puts a a question on on on whether this woman was a בתולה or not at the time of the marriage. So, it's only because of his claim with certainty. And Hu hadin if the the buyer, by the way, the buyer says, \"I know with certainty that the טריפה happened in your possession,\" then also the buyer would not have to pay, and the burden of proof would be on the seller. So, it's only because of the רעותא, because the husband is saying with certainty that, \"I know that you were not a בתולה,\" that would be the basis for believing the husband. So so the Acharonim explain that this is what the Ramban means to say. So the Ramban says, yeah, but that claim of the husband that he seems to be claiming with certainty that she's not a בתולה, that's being challenged by the woman herself, who knows better than him if she's a בתולה or not. Being that he could be mistaken and she knows, I mean maybe she's lying and all, that's another part, but she knows. If she's not a בתולה, she knows she's not a בתולה. So

ultimately what she's doing with her claim, when she says she is a בתולה, what she's doing is she's kind of being מסלק, she's removing that big question mark, she's removing that רעותא that the husband is making with his claim that she's not a בתולה. Whereas the owner of the animal, removing that רעותא. Now that that רעותא is removed, then we're back to the woman having her chazakah. We know she was born a בתולה. We could assume she always was a בתולה until proven otherwise. And therefore the husband would not be נאמן if he had a real obligation there, he would not be נאמן. And that's why the Gemara has to introduce this chizuk, this support for his נאמנות. The reason why we do believe him is only because of the fact that a ketubah is only a דרבנן חיוב, and only because of that additional sevara that we have of חזקה אין אדם טורח בסעודה ומאבדה, that a person doesn't put all this work into the seudah and lose out on it. That is the reason why we give credibility to the claim of the husband. Correct. Yeah, what's your question? So in the case of the animal, in the case of the animal, the owner can't say that it's not טרפה, because you'll know if it's טרפה or it's kasher. There's nobody defending the animal. It's very hard to prove either way. Hard to prove if it's טרפה or not. Over here the woman's defending herself, and that's what's מסלק the... Well, she knows she knows what's real, right. Right. Whereas here the owner would say... The buyer the buyer might say he knows that it was a טרפה, he knows that it fell or something, you know. And the owner says it's not. The owner has to go and prove it. Then that means the the owner would have to prove it. That's That's what That's what, you know, that's what I think the Shach says. Okay, it could be understood in that... If he knows with certainty, then that makes like a רעותא, a question mark on on the story. The animal can't speak up for itself. Makes the question mark earlier. The animal can't speak up for itself. Unless the bull was talking, yeah. Someone was reading about Balaam's donkey. Yeah, but that was a donkey, not a bull. Yeah, but it talked. It talked.