Welcome to the continuation of the series concerning the explanation behind the arguments of בית שמאי and בית הלל, the the school of שמאי, the school of הלל. And as we explained in the previous שיעורים, the previous lectures, that it's all based on one way of thinking, and that is whether we follow the בכח or we follow the בפועל, which means whether we follow the potential or the actuality. בית שמאי is always of the opinion that when we have a possibility of following either one, we follow the one that's the בכח, and בית הלל says we follow the בפועל. And because of that, we explained different arguments in a variety of subjects in Jewish law that were all were all based on this thought, whether we follow the בכח or follow the בפועל. And now we will continue along the same lines to bring more examples where we see this. And just by the way, the more examples we find, the more it shows that this is true, because then it shows that this is really what they're thinking, because we see that in many, many places. And by the way, there's something else that we gained by all this, is that we get familiar with many different subjects in Jewish literature and Jewish law, some things that maybe people never even heard about, and just by learning this שיעור, this class, we will get familiar with all these different things. And again, we are going to go to a different subject altogether, and then we'll go to a different subject altogether, and we will see how all this is all based on the same way of thinking. Now we're going to the tractate of שבת again, which is the tractate of the תלמוד which deals with the laws of שבת. Now we all know that on שבת we are not allowed to do any מלאכה. מלאכה means work. The פסוק says לא תעשה כל מלאכה, do not do work. Now, just to clarify, even though it's not so important to our discussion, but work doesn't mean what we think is work. Work doesn't mean to pick up a heavy package, carry a heavy load, that's hard work. That's not what the פסוק, the תורה, the verse means, do not do work on שבת. What it means is there are certain types of acts which fall into the category of מלאכה. There are actually 39 general types of work that fall into this category, and they are all things that a person do does that have the nature of creation, so to speak. Well, no one could create, but God is the Creator. But when we do something that makes something happen, something to change, to become a different to make a change in it, that falls under the category of מלאכה. Like, for instance, just to give an example, striking a match, making a fire is one of the 39 types of work that one is not allowed to do on שבת. And one might ask, how hard is it to strike a match? Why would that be forbidden on שבת? We understand something that's heavy and hard to do. Well, just like God rested on the seventh day, so we have to rest, too, and we can't do hard labor. But striking a match is very small, something very easy. And there are some people I heard say that in the olden days, in order to make a fire, it was a big job. You had to take stones and you rub them together, and it's a whole big big deal. So then it was forbidden. Nowadays, because it's so easy, it's not forbidden anymore. It's a big mistake. מלאכה doesn't mean hard work. מלאכה means creative work. To strike a match means you're creating something. You're making a fire which was not there before, and anything that's creative is forbidden. Just like God rested on the seventh day from the creation, not from hard work. God didn't work hard. It didn't take it wasn't hard for Him to do to to make the world, to create the world. It was easier for Him to create the world than for us to do any small thing. But nevertheless, He rested on שבת on the seventh day from His creating, so, too, we have to rest from our creative work. So therefore, there are 39 categories which the חכמים, our rabbis, our sages, had in tradition going back all the way to when God gave us the תורה on Mount Sinai to Moses, to משה רבינו, that they are these are the 39 types of work, and they include many, many other details, but they're all branches of these 39. That's the general idea of not doing work on שבת. What about doing something before שבת that will continue into שבת, and the work will be done on שבת, but you will not be doing it? Like the example that the משנה gives, and this is going to be in the tractate of שבת, דף י״ז עמוד ב׳, which means the 17th page, the second side. בית שמאי אומרים, בית שמאי say, אין שורין דיו וסמנין וכרשינין אלא כדי שישורו מבעוד יום. When you want to soak different things in order for it to dye, get dyed, or other types of thing that you will do, which on שבת is forbidden, but what you're going to do, you're going to put it into the water before שבת, and then by itself it will continue into the שבת. Is that allowed? So בית שמאי says you're not allowed to. ובית הלל מתירין, and בית הלל says that you are allowed. בית שמאי אומרים אין נותנין אונין של פשתן לתוך התנור, when you want to work with the flax, with the linen, and the way they used to prepare it to make it, they would put it into an oven, and that would warm it up, and whatever the way it was, so בית שמאי says you can't do it before שבת. Because if you do it before שבת, you'll start before שבת and it'll continue into שבת, that means on שבת a מלאכה is done. This creative work that we're talking about will be happening on שבת. And בית הלל says you are allowed. בית הלל מתירין, בית הלל says you're allowed. Now what is the reason for this argument? So I have to say, there is one way that this is explained, and that is in תלמוד בבלי, in the גמרא that we learn, the תלמוד that we learn, which is called the Babylonian Talmud, as I explained in the previous class, there it says that בית שמאי is of the opinion that שביתת כלים is forbidden. And I'll explain what that means. We know that a person, a Jew, is not allowed to do any of this type of work on שבת. Then there's another הלכה, another law, that a person's animal is also not allowed to do a work on שבת. Any type of work that a Jew himself is forbidden to do on שבת, his בהמה, which means his animal, his cow, his horse, is not allowed to do. And therefore you can't have your horse or your ox plow on שבת. You're not allowed to plow, so you can't have them work. That's a special law concerning שבת. Then the question is, what about your כלים, your vessels? So בית שמאי says there is such a concept as שביתת כלים. Your vessels also have to rest. You cannot have a dish of yours do something, be part of something that is called a מלאכה. And therefore בית שמאי says if you're going to put, let's say, this into the oven before שבת, and on שבת it's going to continue, so that means on שבת your oven is doing a מלאכה, and that's forbidden. While בית הלל says no, your animal is not allowed to do work that you're not allowed, but the כלים, the vessels, are allowed. That's the way the בבלי explains the argument. And I just brought this in just to widen our our knowledge, that's all. But that's not important for our discussion. What's important for our discussion is the interpretation of the ירושלמי. The ירושלמי has a different interpretation why בית שמאי says you're not allowed. He says like this: because since you will start the מלאכה before שבת, you will start this type of work before שבת, and on שבת it'll go on, it's considered as if you did it on שבת. Because the reason that it's happening on שבת is because of what you did. You started it. And therefore it's considered that as if you're doing it on שבת, and that's why it's not allowed. While בית הלל says no, you're not doing it on שבת, you're doing it on Friday, and then on שבת it's happening by itself. You're not doing it. And בית הלל doesn't hold that the vessels are forbidden from doing anything, and therefore there's no problem with it. Now if we start thinking a little bit deeper behind what's behind this, it's very clear that this is the explanation we've been giving the whole time in the previous classes of whether we follow the בכח or we follow the בפועל. Because when you do something before שבת, potentially this is if it's going to continue in שבת, so you already started, so potentially you are, let's call it מחלל שבת, you are desecrating the שבת, because this is the potential of what's going to happen later. So since now already you are doing something which has the potential of what's going to happen later, we follow the potential. What's going to happen later is שבת, and what's going to happen later is that a מלאכה, this type of work which is forbidden, will be happening on שבת. So now that you are doing it before שבת, in a potential way, it is happening, that's as if you are doing it on שבת, because we look at it from the from the potential. While בית הלל says that we look at everything in actuality. In actuality, when you are doing this on Friday, it's not שבת. Even though this is the potential of a מלאכה of שבת, it's a potential of work that will be done on שבת, it doesn't count. Because we follow the בפועל. But בית שמאי says we follow the בכח, and בכח, even though today is not שבת yet, but בכח it is a מלאכה of שבת, it is a work of שבת. And therefore בית שמאי says you're not allowed to do. So here again we see a case where The argument between בית שמאי and בית הלל is based on whether we follow the בכח or we follow the בפועל. בית שמאי says we follow the בכח, and therefore if it is potential desecration of שבת, חילול שבת, it is already forbidden. And בית הלל says that that doesn't matter because it's only potential, but in actuality this is not שבת yet, and you are not doing in actuality a מלאכה on שבת, that's why this is allowed. So this is another case in this דין of שבת. Now we'll go to another case in another subject. That is in a different place, in a different tractate, and in a different subject. When we get finished with this, you're going to be fully aware of so many different Jewish laws of the תלמוד. You might be considered a scholar. And this is in a tractate סוטה. Let me explain what is a סוטה. There is a special law in the תורה, in the Bible, that if a husband warns his wife to not go into a private room with a certain man, and she doesn't listen, and she does. Now we don't know what she did there. Maybe she misbehaved and she was immoral, or maybe she wasn't. But the husband warned her, do not do this. If she did it, the law is the husband, in the time when we had the Holy Temple, would take her to the בית דין, to the Jewish court, and they would take her to the בית המקדש, to the Holy Temple, and there was a whole process that was done there. They would take some water from the special vessel which was in the Holy Temple, from where the priests would wash their hands and feet, and they would put some water into a cup, then they would take some sand from the floor of the Holy Temple, put it into the water, and then they would take a parchment and write certain verses of the Bible on it, erase it into the water, and they would give her to drink. And this would prove whether she's innocent or guilty. If she was guilty, then she would die a very horrible death. If she was innocent, nothing would happen to her, and then she would be able to go home. Now what happens if a woman says, \"I don't want to drink. I don't want to go through this test.\" She has a right to do that, but then what happens is she cannot go back to her husband, she has to be divorced from her husband, also she loses her כתובה. Now let me explain that. A כתובה is a document that is written at the time of the marriage. And this is up to today. This is part of the marriage, we do this today too. It's a document written the time of the marriage, signed by two witnesses, in which the חתן, the groom, promises his wife, which at that time she's the bride, the כלה, and says to her that, \"If I divorce you, or I will die, you will get a certain amount of money.\" It sounds like a prenuptial agreement, but that's a תלמוד type of prenuptial agreement which everyone writes, and he writes a certain amount of money that she gets. And that is actually what happens: if he divorces her, she gets that amount of money; if he dies, she gets that amount of money from his estate. If a woman misbehaves and is immoral, and therefore the husband is forced to divorce her, she loses her כתובה, she doesn't get her money. In other words, if it's her fault why he had to divorce her, then she loses that כתובה, and she doesn't get the money. If it's not her fault, if sometimes there is a reason to divorce for other reasons and it's his fault or or no one's fault or whatever it is, then she doesn't lose her כתובה. In this case of the סוטה, that if she drinks and she is found guilty, obviously she's guilty, and therefore she dies a horrible death, the her heirs don't collect any כתובה because she doesn't get the כתובה, she doesn't deserve the כתובה. If she's found innocent, she goes home, and she gets her כתובה. If she says, \"I don't want to drink,\" so they tell her, \"Okay, then you should know you can't go back to your husband, and you will lose your כתובה, because since you said you don't...\" Here there is a question in the משנה on דף כ\"ד עמוד א' in the tractate of סוטה, page 24, on the first side, מתו בעליהן עד שלא שתו. What happens if before she managed to drink that water which we call the מים המאררים, before she was able to go through this test, her husband died? What happens here? בית שמאי אומרים נוטלות כתובה ולא שותות. So now that she has no husband, the whole purpose was to see whether she should go to her husband or not, in this case when her husband died, she doesn't drink, that's for sure, and she gets her כתובה. She gets the כתובה. We don't know whether she's innocent or guilty. There is no way to verify this, because she's not going to drink, because she cannot drink if there is no husband. So therefore, בית שמאי says she gets her כתובה. ובית הלל אומרים, בית הלל say, או שותות או לא נוטלות כתובה. בית הלל says no. If she doesn't drink, she doesn't get her כתובה. In other words, in this case she cannot drink the water, she cannot go through this test, and as I said, the reason is because her husband died, so she has no husband, and only if your husband is alive and you have a husband, that's when we go through this test, but she doesn't get her כתובה either, because we don't know whether she's innocent or guilty, and it's possible that she's guilty, and if she's guilty, why should she get her כתובה? So here we have an argument between בית שמאי and בית הלל in a case like this, and just to recap it again, in a case where a woman becomes a סוטה, she has the status of a סוטה, which I explained before what that means, and she is ready to drink and go through the test that the תורה, the Bible, says she has to go through, but now she cannot do it because her husband died, so בית שמאי says she can't drink and she gets her כתובה. Why shouldn't she get her כתובה? Because she didn't do anything wrong, I mean she did wrong by hiding, but we don't know if she's guilty, so she gets her כתובה. בית הלל says no. She cannot drink, true, but she does not get her כתובה either. What is the basis of this argument between the two? The basis is, as we said before, dependent on whether we follow the בכוח or בפועל. How is it? The fact that she had the כתובה, she didn't collect any money yet. The whole time when a person, when a woman is married, she didn't collect it. It's only potential that she will collect. If something happens, eventually she will collect her money. But now she didn't collect it yet. Potentially, it's as if she collected, because this is what a document is. A document is made to collect. If a person lends someone money and he has a document, what does that mean? I have the proof that I will be able to collect. So a person feels safe. If you don't write a document, you don't feel secure that you'll get back your money, cuz who knows, maybe the guy will never pay you, he'll deny it. But if I have a document and it says clearly that you owe me the money, I'm secure. Why? It's almost as if I have it in my pocket already. It's almost as if I have the money there. I don't yet, because you didn't give it to me yet, but I know I'm going to get it. So potentially, the fact that I have a document is almost as if I collected it already. In actuality, obviously you didn't collect it yet, you didn't get the money yet. So this is not only concerning a document, any document, the same thing with a כתובה. The כתובה is a regular document written by the husband before they get married, telling his wife that I will give you the money if I die. So potentially, she has the document, which potentially she has the money. But in actuality, she doesn't. So בית שמאי says, being that potentially it's as if she collected, we call this in Hebrew, and I'll use the Hebrew terms, כל העומד לגבות כגבוי דמי. Whatever is standing, is ready to be collected, בית שמאי looks at it as if it's collected. And בית הלל says, no, we do not say כל העומד לגבות כגבוי דמי or whatever is potentially collected as if it's collected, it's not collected. And this is the argument here. בית שמאי says that in this case, why shouldn't she collect her כתובה? Because maybe she's guilty? Well, the rule is, and this touches another point which might sound a little more complicated, but if you pay attention, it's not, we have a rule that if there is a question about collecting money, the rule is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. The one that's trying to collect, the burden of proof is on him. If I have money, and you claim it's yours, so since I'm holding it, you want to collect it, you have to prove, as long as you don't prove it, I keep the money. That's always the rule. In this case also, בית שמאי says, since she has the document, it's as if she collect it. So if since as if she collect it, so therefore she has the money. Now if somebody's going to come and say, let's say, an heir of the husband will say, \"We don't want to give you the money because maybe you're guilty.\" Because again, what's the question here? If she's guilty, she can't collect her כתובה. If she's innocent, she could. Now we don't know if she's guilty or innocent. Where is the burden of proof on? On who is the burden of proof? There are two sides here. The heirs of the husband say, \"We don't want to give you because maybe you're guilty.\" The heirs or she says, \"I want you to give me, because I claim I'm innocent.\" Who's the burden of proof? So בית שמאי says, \"You know who the burden of proof is on? The burden of proof is on the children of the husband.\" Because we look at it as if she already collected the money. What they're trying to do, they're trying to take it back. So we tell them, \"She has the money because she collected it already. You're trying to take it back, you have to you have to prove it.\" Why do they say that we look at it as if she collected? She never collected it yet, the כתובה was not given yet. But because it was potentially collected, so we say it's as if she collected it already. And therefore, those who claim, \"We don't want to give you,\" it's not that they're claiming we don't want to give you, they're basically claiming we want to take it away from you. To take away money from somebody, you got to prove it. So בית שמאי says that she will she does collect her כתובה, because really she collected it already and you can't stop her from having it. You don't want to give it to her because you want to take it away, prove it, and as long as you can't prove it, she keeps it. But בית הלל says no, she never collected the money yet. It's only potential. But we don't look at the potential part, we look at the stage of actuality and this was in פועל ממש, בפועל, wasn't collected yet. So if it wasn't collected yet, she is trying to collect the כתובה. They have the money and she's trying to collect it. If she's trying to collect it, who's the burden of proof on? The burden of proof is on her. And as long as she can't prove it, and she cannot prove it that she's innocent, they don't have to give her. And this is the bottom line of this argument between בית שמאי ובית הלל. They're arguing about a different thing. They're arguing whether a סוטה that her husband died, whether she collects the כתובה or not. But this argument is based on the question of whether we look at the בכח or בפועל. And again, just in short, בית שמאי says we look at the בכח, the potential, so בית שמאי says that as long as she has this document, we consider it as if it's already done because potentially it's done, and therefore as if she collected it, and no one could take it away from her unless they prove it, but no one will be able to prove it, so she keeps it. And בית הלל says we do not look at the בכח, we look at the בפועל, and בפועל she didn't collect it yet, so she's trying to collect it, so the burden of proof is on her. And since she can't prove it, so that's why she doesn't collect it. So here again we see how this is an argument, again in a complete different subject altogether from all the subjects we mentioned before, and it's also based on the logic of whether we follow בכח and בפועל. So this is another case. Let's go to another case. And this is an argument in tractate בבא קמא. We're jumping from one case to the other, from one subject, even in different סדרים, different orders of the משניות. This is already in נזיקין. This order is called נזיקין of the ששה סדרים, of the six סדרים. And this is in tractate בבא קמא. בבא קמא is part of that section that talks about damages and all kinds of monetary discussions. Because the משניות is divided into six. Some talk about טומאה וטהרה, purity and impurity. One section talks about sacrifices in the temple, in the בית המקדש. Some talk about, like I said before, plants and all the things that have to do with agriculture and farming. And then we have the part called נזיקין, which deals with damages and monetary questions and disputes and things like that. So here we have a complete different subject, which is considered called the question whether שינוי קונה. I'll tell you what this is all about. שינוי means a change. קונה means to acquire. The question is, and this is an argument, is שינוי קונה? Does a change acquire? What in the world does this mean? Let me explain it. When a person steals something, God forbid, he is obligated to return it. The פסוק says והשיב את הגזילה אשר גזל. The verse in the Bible in חומש says והשיב את הגזילה אשר גזל, you shall return the stolen object that you stole. So you got to return it. So if a person stole, let's use an example, a pen, you have to return the pen. You can't say to the person, \"Well, the pen is worth $10, so I stole something worth $10, I'll give you $10.\" You can't do that. You got to got to give back the pen itself. You stole the pen, you got to give back the pen, or whatever object you stole. What happens if you do not have the object anymore? Whether it is like you stole food and you ate it up, you stole something and it broke, or whatever it is, you don't have it anymore, then the law is that you don't you have to at least pay the value. You don't get off scot-free, you still have to pay, but since you don't have the object, then you pay the value of the object that you stole. That's the law concerning גזילה, concerning stealing. What happens if the object you stole is still around, but it was changed? You made a change. For instance, you stole grapes, and you squeezed them, and you made them into wine. You stole flour, you stole wheat, and you ground it, and made it into flour. Under which category does this fall? Is this considered that you still have the same thing that you stole, and therefore you got to give it back? So if you stole grapes, and you turned it into wine, you got to give back that actual wine that you made out of the grapes, because, like I said, if you have the object that you stole, you got to return the object itself? Or do we say no, the object is not around anymore. You stole grapes, there are no more grapes around. You have something else, you have wine. So you don't have to give back the wine, you just have to pay back the value. This is the question of שינוי קונה. שינוי means a change. You took something and you changed it, does that mean that you acquired it, and now that is your thing, and it's not the same thing that you stole, or we say שינוי אינו קונה, the change does not acquire, that means that even though it's changed, but it's not broken, it's not lost, it's still there, and even though it's changed, it doesn't mean that now it's something new, and that you could keep, you acquire it, and you have to pay just the money? And that the תלמוד tells us here in בבא קמא דף ס״ה עמוד ב׳, which is page 65, the second side, it says, is an argument between בית שמאי and בית הלל. בית שמאי says שינוי במקומו עומד. Even though there was a change, it still stands in its place, which means the object is still considered the same object, and therefore you must return it. And the example the תלמוד actually gives is if you stole חיטים ועשאן סולת, you stole wheat and you made it into flour, זיתים ועשאן שמן, you stole olives, you made them into oil, ענבים ועשאן יין, you stole grapes, you made them into wine. So בית שמאי says, makes no difference, it's considered the same object, and therefore you got to return it. And בית הלל says no. בית הלל says that it's considered a different object, which automatically means that the original object is not there anymore, and if it's not there anymore, you can't return the original object because it's not there, so you got to pay the value of the object that you stole. What is the basis of this argument? Again, if you start thinking about it, the basis of this argument is whether we follow the בכח or follow the בפועל. Because anything that you have, potentially it contains all possible forms it could have. When you have grapes, it is grapes בפועל, in actuality it is grapes, but potentially it is wine. Olives are olives, not oil, but potential, it has the potential of becoming oil. You have חיטים, wheat, it's wheat, potentially it is flour. בית שמאי says since whenever there's a discussion and a possibility of following the בכח or the בפועל, בית שמאי says we follow the בכח, and therefore we look at the בכח and we say, \"What did you steal? You stole grapes. No, no, you didn't just steal grapes. You stole grapes, and you stole the potential of wine. So, therefore, you actually stole wine. So if you stole wine, you still have, now it's wine, you got to give back the wine. You stole olives, you stole the olives, but you also stole the oil because the olives potentially is oil. You stole the wheat, potentially it's flour.\" So בית שמאי says you follow the potential, and therefore we consider it that it's not something new So you still have what you stole, and therefore you got to give it back. And בית הלל says no, we follow the בפועל, and in actuality what you stole were grapes and not wine, and now it's wine so it's not the same thing that you stole. If it's not the same thing that you stole, what do you return? The money, but you can't don't return the object, the object is not even there. You stole olives, you didn't steal oil. Now you have oil, it's something else. You can't return olives, you don't have olives, because in actuality that's not what it was. Potential it was, but we don't follow the potential. That's why you got to pay money. And the same thing is with stealing wheat and turning it into flour. So here again we see that this is an argument between בית שמאי בית הלל בכוח ובפועל. So here again we had three more cases again in addition to the other classes that we had, three more cases concerning the argument between בית שמאי ובית הלל. And the three cases were one was concerning שבת, that if you do something on Friday that will make שבת a מלאכה happen, so potentially there was חילול שבת, there was a מלאכה on שבת. So בית שמאי says it's forbidden, בית הלל says we don't care because it's potential, in actuality it wasn't שבת, so you didn't do מלאכה on שבת, so you're allowed. The second case of the סוטה, where we're talking whether she loses her כתובה or not, and the reason is because she has the document. So בית שמאי says because she has the document we look at it as if she collected it already and therefore no one could come and say you can't get it because you're trying to take it away from her, so you got to prove it, and you can't prove it, so you got to give it. And בית הלל says in actuality she didn't take it yet, so the burden of proof is on her. And here we have a third case where in the case where you stole grapes let's say and turned into you made it into wine, בית שמאי says potentially what you stole you stole wine, therefore it's considered that you have still what you stole and you got to return it. And בית הלל says that you only we look at the בפועל, and בפועל you did not steal wine, so now that you don't have the grapes and you have wine, it's not the same thing that you stole, and therefore you don't return it, but you're able to pay back just the value of it.