hold that the whole inyan of אוכל נפש is a taam, a sibah, you call it, a reason, obviously in the case where it's not for אוכל נפש the reason isn't there, it's asur. If you hold it's a siman on which melachot are mutar, so it's not that it depends if you're doing it for אוכל נפש. It's just a siman on which one, that's why we would say mitoch, which by the way answers a very, I remember even when I was a kid I always wondered peshat of mitoch, when I learned the first time I learned, I remember as a kid I learned Masechet Beitzah, I always couldn't stand, what is the peshat of mitoch? Taytsh the words: because the Torah was matir these melachot for אוכל נפש, so it's mutar also not, also for not אוכל נפש. I think that sounds conservative a little bit. That's what they say. Since the Torah was matir this, but נו, הבנו, what does that mean? What does it mean mitoch? The peshat is, you know that the, if the Torah was matir this, so the Alter Rebbe in Shulchan Aruch uses a lashon that קיבלו חכמים, it's a halacha leMoshe miSinai it seems like, chachamim were mekabel that it doesn't mean only אוכל נפש, it means everything. But the לשון מתוך, that's not mitoch. What is a, what is a zach? Since the Torah was מתיר אוכל נפש, נו, it can't be something like that. The peshat is mitoch means that, it's a taytsh because it's אוכל נפש and it's אוכל נפש not לשם טעם, but אוכל נפש is that's the siman. So it

comes out like this: the difference between the two sof kol sof is בית, uh Beit Hillel says you do, Beit Shammai says you don't. That בית Beit Hillel holds you do say mitoch and Beit Shammai says you don't. So it comes out like this: that according to Beit Hillel, these specific melachot are be'etzem not assur on Yom Tov. That's what, since there's a siman, they're not assur. According to Beit Shammai, these melachot are also assur, the Torah just gave a heter in a certain case. Now, Rabbi Akiva looks at everything be'etzem. How could Rabbi Akiva say that these, since be'etzem they are melachot, they are, we say on Shabbos they're assur, and they have be'etzem the melachot, so why, so Rabbi Akiva says how could you say that on Yom Tov, since the Torah says don't do melacha, that be'etzem they're not assur? That's why Rabbi Akiva says we don't say mitoch. See, Rabbi Yishmael who doesn't look at the be'etzem, so the Torah, you look on the way it's for people. So it could be they're be'etzem melachot, but who cares? But since for people it's special, they're מלאכות אוכל נפש. See, the whole thing of being melachot, this the category of מלאכות אוכל נפש is only לגבי us. Really looking at the מלאכה מצד עצמה, it has the same creative thing. So Rabbi Yishmael says everything comes way לגבי us. So לגבי us, these are, like, different. There's a category of מלאכות which are for food, so they could be a separate category. But according to Rabbi Akiva that they're בעצם, you look at everything בעצם, בעצם these are the same מלאכות. The fact that this is for food and this is not for food, that's only in ציור. That's only how it's לגבי the יחס to the אדם. And that's why in this גופא we have a מחלוקת between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Akiva says here, we do not say mitoch, because he does not like the idea that it should say that these are not מלאכות when they are מלאכות בעצם. And Rabbi Yishmael could argue, maybe, and he says that you look at the ציור, and that's why they're a special category. According to Rabbi Akiva not a special

category, there's no such thing as a category of אוכל נפש. Because אוכל נפש is a ציור, and the עיקר is the עצם. על כל פנים, in a case where there is a ספק here, where there's a שאלה, when there's no ספק he agrees, but where there's a שאלה here, what it is, so he says that's what he holds. So it comes out like this: that these three ענינים are דוקא Rabbi Akiva, it's Rabbi Akiva לשיטתו, and it's against Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Yishmael maybe argues on this לשיטתו, he holds, and this answers the שאלות in Rashi, that according to Rabbi Akiva דוקא, that's why Rashi says these things. The last piece, Rabbi Akiva held like בית שמאי? Yeah. And why? Because he holds that these מלאכות are אסור בעצם on Yom Tov, too. They're only מותר לצורך אוכל נפש. Why? Because if to hold like Beit Hillel, what would come out? That they're a special category of melachot. How are they a special category? Not מצד העצם. They're different because in in in יחס to people. But he holds we don't look at things יחס to people. And therefore he would not hold that it's בעצם these. But is there a category? Huh? Is there a category there, or there's no category? So that's why according to Beit Shammai there's no category. That's what Rabbi Akiva holds. But according to to Beit Hillel there's a category, because they look בּיחס to people, and בּיחס to people there is a category of this, and how people use food. So Beit Shammai is what what what do they have in common? Well, is there a reason for this? There is no category, but but but No, because if it's for food the Torah was מתיר. The Torah wants that on Yom Tov you should have geshmacke food, the Torah, like that, the Torah was מתיר it. So there is a category. It's not a category. It's a reason, just, not a category. In order to have שמחת יום טוב the Torah was מתיר it. Actually some mefarshim say that the reason is שמחת יום טוב. But really

according to Beit Hillel, if you look deeper than just the food of eating, because if it's just to eat and you can't do it at other times, then you can say it's strictly a for a human thing, because you needed to eat, so it's a human thing. But according to Beit Hillel, it's really the whole the the actual עצם of the mitzvah is that take away the food is just a siman, Right. and it's really Or we'll still have a siman. Beit Hillel is just a siman. So really it means the category, it's really it's really allowed to us. So lema'aseh, Rabbi Akiva says that's not right, because why should it be allowed? It's all בעצם. You can't, no. So he says since he holds בעצם, and בעצם these are melachot, so how could you say they're מותר? That's why they're מותר. No, no. That he holds, how could you say בעצם they're מותר? It's just a siman telling us which ones are מותר. That's what the pasuk, that's how you learn. But he said, \"I can't learn like that, because we know that these thirty-nine melachot all are the same. Why would these, and if the Torah אסר מלאכה on Yom Tov, this should also be asur. Why are these different? Because they're different in ציור, but they're not different in עצם. And since we look everything at the עצם, so how could they be mutar on Yom Tov? If the Torah would not be מתיר any melachot, if the Torah would not אסר, but the Torah אסר מלאכה, so you can't say there's a category that's mutar, there's no category. Because בעצם they're all the same. בעצם every melacha, whether it's שחיטה or melacha that has nothing to do with אכילה, it's all the same נקודה. I ציור is different, but he doesn't look at ציור.\" \"I understand looking at it that way. It would seem like because you're looking at it all as one, and this is But Beis Hillel's explanation, when he says that really all I'm doing is pointing out, it's not אוכל, it's not because you need to eat, that's just a way for me to identify which ones are allowed.\" \"Right, so in other words, but would Rabbi Akiva hold בעצם they're allowed when בעצם it's a melacha?\" \"No, I guess not.\" \"No, it makes sense. בעצם it's a melachot, and in עצם it's not different than the other melachot. So why would he think it's So if the Torah would say בפירוש, you'd say where there is no question, he holds. But here where there is two ways to learn, and he has to choose one, so he So that's what the that's what the Rabbi writes, that obviously it's not always, but since there is whenever there's a ספק, that's where Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva would argue. Here also, there's a ספק, there are two ways to learn. Comes Rabbi Akiva and says, 'I could pick one of the ways. So I can pick that בעצם they're mutar, that it's never asur? How could I say that? You could tell me they're בפועל מותר because of a certain case, but to say that they're not a melacha? I can't say that, because looking inside the עצם, there's a melachah.' Rabbi Yishmael says, 'Why not? We don't look at the עצם, we look at what is a melachah? The way it's in ציור, and in ציור it's not...' \" \"And Beit Shammai cannot hold at all like like Rabbi Akiva.\" \"Well, obviously here Rabbi Akiva doesn't hold according to Beit Hillel, like again. Doesn't mean that he's holding one thing, other ways he could see there other reasons could could affect and change, but this is a thread that goes through all the different things.\" \"Now, is it also that Beit Hillel is always like Rabbi Yishmael?\" \"No, I wouldn't say like that. That just happens to be in this It happens to be here, right. It would be going too far.\" \"They don't have the same...\" \"No, no, no, no, no. Unless you figure it out, I mean, that would be

plausible.\" \"A perfect example of the beauty of the Gemara, where it comes out, a pasuk says, you have to destroy on the first day, you have to destroy. No one holds that. Everyone knows that. Then you go through pages and differences of all different things to prove that that's not what that's not what...\" \"What I just said is nothing. Even the Gemara itself has different ראיות, all kinds.\" \"It's all because of like one thing. One word, exactly. On the first day.\" \"Monday...\" \"Who says that Pesach started on Monday?\" \"I don't know.\" \"The עצם with the פירוש was just because on Tuesday.\"