עמוד ב׳. The Gemara quotes a baraita the Megillat Setarim that Rav Chiya found. וכתוב בה the Gemara says, and this Megillat Setarim, this hidden piece of parchment, said like this: איסי בן יהודה אומר, אבות מלאכות מ״ם חסר אחת. Issi ben Yehuda said, there are 40 minus 1 melachot, אבות מלאכות, that means there are 39 אבות מלאכות. ואינו חייב אלא אחת. And you're only chayav one. And the way Rashi explains, the hava amina the way the Gemara thinks pshat in this baraita, in this Issi ben in Megillat Setarim, is that if a person did more than one מלאכה בהעלם אחת, there was one forgetting and he did more than one melachah, let's say he forgot that you're not allowed to cook and that you're not allowed to write. Forgotten both. And he sat down, and he cooked and he wrote. So it seems like Issi ben Yehuda says you're only chayav one korban. But the Gemara says that cannot be the pshat in Issi ben Yehuda, because והתנן, it says in the Mishnah later on on דף ע״ג, אבות מלאכות מ״ם חסר אחת, that there are 39 40 minus 1 melachot, 39 melachot. והוינן בה, and the

Gemara says we thought about it, מנינא למה לי? Why does the Mishnah have to give us a number? And אמר רבי יוחנן, and Rabbi Yochanan explained to teach you שאם עשאן כולם בהעלם אחת חייב על כל אחת ואחת. The reason it gives you a number to tell you that there is a possibility to be chayav 39 chatatot for one forgetting, that means if you forgot and you did every melachah, you are chayav for every melachah. So the Gemara shows that it's not possible to say that Issi ben Yehuda said that if you do a few מלאכות בהעלם אחד you're chayav only one, when from the Mishnah, the way Rabbi Yochanan explains the Mishnah on דף ע״ג it's clear that you're chayav for every one, even though you did it all בהעלם אחד with one forgetting, you're chayav on every one. So it couldn't be that this is what Isi ben Yehudah said. And therefore the Gemara changes that what did really Isi ben Yehudah say? Something else. He said that even though there are 39 melachot, there is one of them that you are not חייב חטאת. סתירה. The Gemara goes about that. That's not the נקודה we're going to go into. We're going to go into the נקודה of the way the Gemara proves that it couldn't be that Isi ben Yehudah held that if you do a few מלאכות בהעלם אחד you're chayav only one, because we proved from the Mishnah, the way Rabbi Yochanan explained the reason the Mishnah gives a number to teach you you're חייב על כל אחת ואחת. Let's look at the Rashi.

Rashi says, the way we thought לכתחילה פשט in איסי בן יהודה, אינו חייב אלא אחת, and even though there are 39 melachot you're only chayav one, השתא משמע, רש״י says now it seems, דאם עשאן בהעלם אחד, what he's telling us is that if you did all the melachot with one העלם, one forgetting, שלא נודע לו בין כל אחת ואחת שחטא, that in between he didn't remind himself that he did an עבירה, אינו חייב אלא אחת, he's only chayav one, דכל חילול שבת גוף אחד של עבירה הוא, because we're thinking any all חילול שבת is one aveirah, so if you did a few types of חילול שבת, a few melachot, you're still chayav only one. That's what we thought. But then the Gemara says it's not true, because in the Mishnah on דף ע״ג it says a number, and the question that we asked, מנינא למה לי? I'm reading all the Rashi's. ליתני אבות מלאכות הזורע והחורש. It should have just said אבות מלאכות, what are they, and continue with a list of all the מלאכות. למה לי לאשמועינן מנינא? Why does he have to give us a number? הא מני להו ואזיל. Doesn't he mention them all? So if he would just write אבות מלאכות are חורש, זורע and all through the whole list, I would know it's 39. All you have to do is count them. Read through the list and you'll count, you see 39. Why does he have to give the introduction there are 39? So Rabbi Yochanan said that to teach us חייב על כל אחת ואחת, to tell you that you're חייב on all. ובא ל... Rashi says, and this is what's important now, ובא להודיענו סכום החטאות שאדם חייב באיסורי שבת בהעלם אחד. The Mishnah gives a number to teach us how many חטאות is a person חייב if you do all the מלאכות. ואשמעינן, so he tells us, מ״ם חסר אחת הן, that there are 39 חטאות you're able to be חייב, ותו לא, and not more. What's that not more? Why would I think more? If there's only 39, how could there even be an hava amina of more? שאפילו עשה תולדותיהן עמהן, even if you did the 39 מלאכות, and you did the תולדות, each מלאכה could have five תולדות, so you would think if you did 39 מלאכות and all five תולדות, maybe you're חייב 150 חטאות. אינו מביא על התולדות. The

תולדות you don't bring היכא דעשה עם האבות, if you did the אב and the תולדה, the תולדה of this אב, you're חייב only one, דהוו ליה כעשה וחזר ועשה. It's like you did it and you did the same thing again. Imagine a person forgot that you're not allowed to cook, and he cooks, and then 5 minutes later he cooks again. There for sure you're only חייב one. So too, if you do the אב of cooking and the תולדה of cooking, you're also only חייב one. דכולה חד עבירה, it's all one עבירה. So, Rashi says here that what does the number what does the Gemara here bring in that the number of the Mishnah, 39, comes to teach you? That you're chayav 39 chatta'ot, and then Rashi, and you're not chayav anymore, you're not chayav for the toldot, you're not chayav more than 39. So, the obvious question that comes up here, why is that important to tell us? It's true, the din is that if you do an אב with its תולדה, you're chayav only one, mimela if you did 39 melachot with all the toldot, you're only chayav 39. But why is that noge'a to say? Lichorah, what Rabbi Yochanan said is very simple: If not for the לשון of the Mishnah, the number of the Mishnah, what would I think? That if you did five אבות מלאכות, you're only chayav one. Comes the number of the Mishnah to teach you that you're chayav five, which means you could be chayav all the way up to 39. That's what's noge'a here, because the Gemara is trying to show that what we thought Isa ben Yehuda said is not true. We thought Isa ben Yehuda said that if you do a full a few melachot you're chayav one, but we see from the Mishnah, the way Rabbi Yochanan explains the number of the Mishnah, that it's not true, you're chayav for each one. That's the main kushya here, so mimela we show that Rabbi Isa ben Yehuda couldn't mean that, they meant something else. Why is it noge'a here to mention that from the Mishnah we see that if you do all if you do it with the toldot you're not chayav more, you're not chayav on the the the toldot also? That's not the point here. The point is is that you are chayav 39, you are chayav on each one, not that, but on the toladot you're not chayav. So, Rashi האקט אריין here that it teaches you how many you're chayav, and it tells you you're chayav only 39 and not anymore. Rashi should have said exactly like he says in the real place. Where is the real place where this Rabbi Yochanan is? The Gemara on דף ע\"ג. The Mishnah is on דף ע\"ג: אבות מלאכות ארבעים חסר אחת, and the Mishnah goes to hold this. So right away, in that Gemara our Gemara quotes that Gemara. What does that Gemara say? So you look in דף ע\"ג עמוד ב' right on top, the Gemara has the she'eilah: מניינא למה לי? Why does it say a number? אמר רבי יוחנן: שאם עשאן כולן בהעלם אחד חייב על כל אחת ואחת. That if you do it בהעלם אחד, you're chayav on each one. And Rashi explains, what does that mean? ובא להודיעך, the Mishnah comes to teach you, שאם נתעלמו כל הלכות שבת ממנו, if you forgot all the halachot of שבת, כמה חטאות חייב, חייב עולו. How many chatatot you're chayav. Now, actually the emet is that Rashi there includes both inyanim. When Rashi says it teaches you how many chatatot you're chayav, it teaches you both things. How many means you're chayav 39, not one; and how many means also 39 and not more. True. But Rashi doesn't taytsh it to this because it's not important. And over there, where is the ikar place of Rabbi Yochanan's memra, there Rashi doesn't go to tell you, \"Ah, but you're not chayav for the toldah and you're only chayav 39 because if you do the toldah it's like you did the same thing,\" like the גאנצע אריכות as Rashi says here. If Rashi would want to tell us that that's included, it would fit more probably over there, cuz there is the ikar place. So Rashi wants to tell us it. There Rashi makes it very bekitzur, one line. That by so by saying the minyan, Rabbi Yochanan tells us, it tells you how many chataot you're chayav, which automatically could could include both. But Rashi doesn't go into the pratim to tell you that you know that for a toldah you are not chayav. That's In our Gemara it's certainly not noge'a because what are we trying to show? That Isa ben Yehuda could not have said that you are chayav for many melachot, one, because from the Mishnah we see you're chayav for each one. That's all Rashi should have said. Why does Rashi go into this? That's the she'eilah. Now, Rashi also says here, why aren't you chayav for the toldah? Not why, he says that if you did the תולדות, אינו מביא על התולדות. You don't bring on the toldah. Is that how we would learn? Forget about the first she'eilah, what's noge'a here? Let's look at the etzem din. If you do an av and a toldah, you're chayav only one. What would you think, why are you chayav only one? Because the one that you bring goes on both. Whatever the one that you bring is already includes both. That's not what Rashi says. Rashi says the one that you bring is on the av, and on the toldah you don't have to bring. Rashi doesn't say that one פוטר'ס both. You don't bring on the toldah. Actually, Rashi in Bava Kama said it even more clear. Rashi in Bava Kama, we're gonna we'll get a little bit in Bava Kama soon, in Bava Kama דף ב׳, so Rashi says here, אי עביד אב ותולדה דידיה, no, sorry, לא מיחייב אלא חדא, that if you do an av and a toldah you're only chayav one, so Rashi says אאב מלאכה, you're chayav for the אב, אבל אתולדה דידיה לא מיחייב. You're not chayav for the toldah. Rashi says it here, Rashi in Keritot, in Keritot דף ט״ו עמוד א׳, Rashi says the same thing here, כדאמר רב אלעזר שאם עשה אב ותולדה בהעלם אחת חייב שתים. If an אב, אב, כגון קוצר וקוצר, זה זו וזו אב מלאכה, he's not talking about a toldah, he's talking twice אב, פטור מן אחת. You're patur from one. But the she'eilah is, why is it noge'a here to know that the pshat is that you're patur from the toldah? Rashi should have said, if you do the av and the toldah you're only chayav one for both. One for both. But not the vort that you're chayav only for the av and not chayav for the toldah. Why is this Rashi trying to give us a קוועטש? So to explain the way Rashi learns the pshat in the Gemara, let's go back. Let's go back to the havah aminah. We thought that Isi ben Yehudah holds that you're only chayav one. What's the reason why we thought you're only chayav one? If you do more than one מלאכה בהעלם אחד, you're only chayav one. What's the sevara? So Rashi gives a sevara. The sevara is דכל חילול שבת כל חילול דשבת גוף אחד של עבירה היא. Because any chilul Shabbat is one aveirah, the same aveirah. It's all one guf of an aveirah. So what's the difference if you cooked or you wrote? It's all chilul Shabbat, memeila it's as if you did twice the same, same thing. Now we'll explain what this Rashi means, and that's going to be the hakdamah to further. Every melachah of Shabbat has two inyanim in it. You have the nekudah of it, or let's call it the etzem of it, and then you have the tzurah of it. The tzurah, the shape, the the form. The nekudah is you are doing a melachah, you are doing chilul Shabbat. You are doing a melachah, and what's a melachah? A melachah, as we learned many times, why is hotza'ah called a מלאכה גרועה? Because the geder of a melachah is you are creating something. You are making something. The Aibershter doesn't want you to make anything on Shabbat, which is like something new. And the Aibershter didn't even say in the Torah 39 melachot. There's one פסוק, כל מלאכה, the same pasuk a few times, but there's one thing: לא תעשה כל מלאכה, don't do any melachah. So really, all the melachot have a common denominator. They're all a melachah, they're all creative work, that's what it is. That's the etzem of the melachah. Then you have the tzurah of the melachah. What's the ציור? How do you create? You create through cooking, you create through writing, you create through through through through baking, you create through through shechting, every מלאכה is another form of the creation, another form of the מלאכה. So you have the עצם המלאכה, and you have the ציור of the מלאכה. When the Torah says you are חייב for the מלאכה, for which part of the מלאכה are you חייב? Are you חייב for the עצם of the מלאכה, because you created, or are you

חייב for the ציור of the מלאכה? Now, if you are חייב for the ציור of the מלאכה, then farshteyt zikh, the ציור of writing, the form of how you're creating through writing, how you're creating through cooking are two different things, writing and cooking are not the same. So then what should be? You're חייב for writing, and you're חייב for cooking. If you do both, you're חייב for both, you're חייב two. If the main reason you're חייב is for the עצם, הנקודה of the מלאכה, what's the עצם? That You are doing a מלאכה, you are doing a חילול שבת, or put in these words, you are doing some creative work, if that's the reason, so what's the חילוק if you cooked or you or you wrote? You did the same thing twice. The ציור is not what counts, the ציור is a ציור, but what counts for the חיוב חטאת or the חיוב סקילה, whatever it is, is because of the עצם. And that's what Rashi says, that when we had an hava amina that Isi ben Yehuda held that you're חייב only one, so Rashi, why? Because we learn דכל חילול דשבת גוף אחד של עבירה היא. Any חילול is the same עבירה. Ah, it's not the same, this is cooking and this is writing? But that's not the real reason for the chiyuv. The chiyuv is because of the גוף עבירה, the חילול שבת שבדבר, the the the מלאכה שבדבר. And since it's the melachah, it's all the same. It's like if a person, let's say, cooks meat and then he cooks fish, it's a different ציור. You'd say you're chayav two? Because the melachah is the same. So על דרך זה if you learn if it's the עצם, they're both the same. I do want to stop for a moment and b'avornen that we find in a different place where we look at the עצם of the melachah and the ציור of the melachah from a different angle. And that's not a setirah to what I'm saying. The

famous sichah in חלק ז׳, צו צייכענען חלק ז׳ עמוד 190, where the Rebbe is masbir the machloket between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon whether מלאכה שאינו מתכוין is chayav or not. Rabbi Yehudah says if you do a melachah and you're not mechaven to do it, you meant to do something else, lemashal, the practical example, you schlep a chair from one corner of the house to the other, and the floor is made of sand, and while you're schlepping it, it makes a חריץ, it makes a a line in the ground, in the sand, which is a מלאכה דאורייתא, but that's not what you need. You want the chair here, that's all. So Rabbi Yehudah says you are chayav even though you were not mechaven to the melachah, and Rabbi Shimon says you are patur. Then there's another case: מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. If you do a melachah, but you're doing it not with the kavanah for what the melachah is usually intended. למשל, חופר בור, digging a hole in the ground is a מלאכה דאורייתא. Well, what happens if you dig the hole not because you need a hole, because you need sand? That's a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. So your kavanah is not really for what the melachah stands for. Same מחלוקת. Rabbi Yehuda says you're חייב, Rabbi Shimon says you're פטור. And the Rabbi is מסביר what's the נקודה of their מחלוקת, and this is what the Rabbi says: that they go לשיטתם. We find another מחלוקת between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, and then we find another מחלוקת between Rabbi Yehuda and the חכמים. The Rogatchover explains that the פסוק says והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ. Hashem says when משיח will come, I will destroy wild animals. So Rabbi Yehuda says what that means is, I will destroy them, they will not exist anymore. Rabbi Shimon says they'll exist, but שלא יזיקו. I'll destroy, meaning I'll take away the fact that they are מזיקים, that they are מזיק. So the Rogatchover says, what is the מחלוקת? The מחלוקת is the same מחלוקת as another מחלוקת. Not Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yehuda and the חכמים, and Rabbi Shimon is one of the חכמים. By חמץ, the Torah says תשביתו, you have to destroy the חמץ. Rabbi Yehuda says how do you destroy the חמץ? אין ביעור חמץ אלא שריפה, you have to burn it. And the חכמים say you don't have to burn it, מפורר וזורה לרוח, you can take the חמץ, break it up into pieces, make it not edible, throw it in the in in in the in the toilet, you're allowed to be. What's the נקודה of the מחלוקת? The Rogatchover says, Rabbi Yehuda says when the Torah says תשביתו, destroy, it means the עצם. The thing itself, the whole עצם of the chametz has to be destroyed. If you break it up in little pieces and make it so that you can't eat it, what you destroyed was the צורה, the ציור, the shape, the the ability to eat it. The עצם of chametz is still there. Zogt Rabbi Yehuda, you didn't you didn't do enough. The Torah says תשביתו, תשביתו means the עצם, so you have to burn it. When you burn it, you burn the whole thing, now it's left as ashes. Mah she'ein kein the Chachamim hold, no, you don't have to burn, Chachamim hold תשביתו does not mean the עצם. As long as you destroy the צורה, the shape of it, the ציור, the it's enough. The same thing the Rebbe says is machloket the Rogatchover said machloket Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon by the חיות. Rabbi Yehuda says תשביתו means the עצם, so when the Torah says והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ, it means the עצם of the חיה. That means that the חיה will not be there. And Rabbi Shimon says, no, the צורה. The עצם חיה is is the עצם חיה, and then you have the fact that the חיה is מזיק, that's the צורה of the חיה, that's the form. So Rabbi Shimon says that והשבתי means of the צורה we'll get rid. This is the Rogatchover. So the Rebbe says that Same thing by Shabbos, because by Shabbos we find the same lashon. What's the reason for the מלאכות? איסור מלאכת שבת is because it says ביום השביעי תשבות, which is from the same shoresh as תשביתו as והשבתי. So there you have the same thing. There is the etzem of the melachah and there is the tzurah of the melachah. The etzem of the melachah is actual doing of the melachah. The kavanah of the melachah, since by Shabbos there's a special din of מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה, you have that machshavah, so the kavanah that's the tzurah of the melachah. So R'' Yehuda who holds that תשביתו means the etzem, והשבתי means the etzem, תשבות also means the etzem. When what does the Torah want us to do? Get rid, you're coming back, right? Okay. Get rid of the etzem of the of the melachah. So if you don't have kavanah, it's אינו מתכוין, but you did the melachah, you got rid of the tzurah of the melachah because the kavanah is the tzurah, but you didn't get rid of the etzem of the melachah, cuz you did the מלאכה, סוף כל סוף the melachah was done. So R'' Yehuda says you did not fulfill תשבות, ביום השביעי תשבות, so you're still chayav. Rabbi' Shimon says no, when the Torah says תשבות על דרך like tashbitu, all the Torah needs is get rid of the צורה, we don't care if the עצם stays. So if you don't have the proper כוונה, you're not over already, because you already did not do the מלאכה, because the עיקר of the עיקר the what the Torah wants you not to do is the צירה צורה, and you didn't do the צורה because you didn't have the כוונה. So it's לשיטתו. Remember when the Rebbe said this sicha it was a a גאנצע big chidush, it was like a big buftu in the whole pshat of the מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and אינו מתכוין, and if you look at the sicha there, all the הערות there, it's a lot, because it's a גאנצע למדנישע ענינים that this is a machloket. So lechora, we have a

different טייטש of עצם and צורה here. According to this, the עצם of the מלאכה is the מעשה המלאכה, the פעולה of the מלאכה, the צורה is the כוונה. I was saying something else before. I was saying there's the עצם נקודה of the מלאכה that you are doing a מלאכה, and then there is a צורה of the מלאכה, what shape of מלאכה, whether you did the creative work, the creative work is the עצם, whether you did it through this or this form or this form. But it's no סתירה, obviously it's no סתירה. Why? Because עס ווענדט זיך וואו מען רעדט. And I don't mean that joke, chas veshalom, in Chassidus, עס ווענדט זיך וואו מען רעדט. There are two different types of עצם and צורה. There is בנוגע יחס to the מעשה and the kavanah, this is the עצם and this is the צורה. But when we're talking in the melachah itself, what's the עצם and what's the צורה, so the מעשה המלאכה, the physical way you're doing it, that's the צורה, the עומק הדבר, what's behind it, what that that's the עצם. So they're not they're not עצם and צורה of the same thing. Chassidus we

learn that. Famous kashya. Says Rosh Hashanah there's עליה of מלכות from העלם. What's עולה? The פנימיות is עולה, only the מקיף remains, the חיצוניות remains. Shabbos it says the חיצוניות עולה, only the פנימיות stays. So the Rebbe has a שאלה, what about יום טוב של ראש השנה שחל להיות בשבת? So סיי the עולה the פנימיות is עולה, סיי the מקיף the חיצוניות is עולה, so it shouldn't be the world shouldn't exist. And the Rebbe explains it's in חלק ט', it's not the same מקיף and פנימי. This is not the מקיף the the פנימי and and חיצוניות of the same thing. This is פנימיות חיצוניות of in one ענין, so the פנימיות of that is עולה. Here it's the חיצוניות of something else, it's not the same thing. Same the same thing here, the the עצם and צורה that we're talking about here is a different סדר of עצם and צורה. There we're talking the מעשה versus the כוונה, and here we're talking in the מעשה גופא, there is the עצם המעשה, the the תוכן, the עומק המעשה, which is a מלאכה, and then you have the צורה of how the מלאכה was done, which way you did this מלאכה. So the

bottom line is, this was just דרך אגב to get to the point, what I'm trying to say is that if you say that the עיקר of the מלאכה is the עצם נקודה of the מלאכה, then you're חייב only one even though you did two מלאכות, because the the two מלאכות are really the same, then the the עיקר of the מלאכה is the same. מה שאין כן if you say the צורה of the מלאכה, the shape, how you did it, then that's different. This is cooking and this is doing it some other way. Okay, this is to explain that. What the Gemara did was, the Gemara thought that Isi ben Yehuda holds that the עיקר is the עצם, and that's why you're חייב one. So the Gemara says can't be. Why can't it be? Because we see from the Mishnah, the way Rabbi' Yochanan explains, you're חייב on each one. If you're חייב on each one, assuming that what, that the עיקר of the מלאכה is not the נקודה עצמי the עצם, but it's the צירה of the מלאכה is why you're חייב. ממילא, Isa ben Yehuda couldn't have said that. Let's understand, why can't it be that Isi ben Yehuda argues against the Mishnah? Isi ben Yehuda was a תנא. Why can't Isi ben Yehuda argue against the Mishnah? Maybe he holds the עיקר is the עצם. Well, but it's a Mishnah. So, there's a חילוק between Tosafot and Rashi, and you have to help catch me exactly.

According to Tosafot, we have a ראיה that Isi ben Yehuda does not argue with the Mishnah. We have a ראיה. According to Rashi, there is no ראיה. Now, I'll tell you why. When Rabbi Yochanan makes his דיוק that from the Mishnah we see that you're חייב for each one, where is the דיוק? What What made him say that? The Gemara has a קשיא, מניינא למה לי? Why did it say a number? Vos zogt Rashi? What's their קשיא? זאגט Rashi, let's look into the Rashi. מניינא למה לי? So, Rashi says, since the Mishnah continues and tells you the whole list of all the מלאכות, don't have to give you a number. Read through the list and count them, you'll see 39. Why does he say מניינא? Look at Rashi. למה לי? List Let it say אבות מלאכות, הזורע והחורש, go through the list. למה לי לאשמועינן מניינא? Why does it tell? הלא מנה וגמר, doesn't he mention them all, goes ahead and mentions them. Since he mentions them all, you could see. If this is the re'ayah, the re'ayah is only when it says the number if he lists the melachot, then you could say there's no need to

What does Tosafot say? Look in Tosafot, ואמר רבי יוחנן. Tosafot says, אין צריך לפרש דפריך דמסתמא לא פליג איסי עלה. It's not because מסתמא Isi does not argue in the משנה, אלא מדברי איסי נמי יש לדקדק כן. From Isi ben Yehuda himself! Why? מדקתני מניינא. Isi ben Yehuda said the same lashon. Isi ben Yehuda said, איסי בן יהודה אומר, אבות מלאכות מ״ם חסר אחת. So, the same diyuk we have in the Mishnah that from the number is a re'ayah that you're chayav on each one, we have from Isi ben Yehuda himself. You can't say he holds you're chayav one on many when he says the same lashon. Now, according to Rashi, is that a re'ayah? Did Isi ben Yehuda go through the list of all the melachot? From the Mishnah? He has his what he wrote. No, he's actually, he was before the Mishnah. Isi ben Yehuda was before. He wrote Megilat Setarim before Mishnah was written down. So, Isi ben Yehuda did not write a list. So, what's the re'ayah from Isi ben Yehuda, from the fact that he says there are 39 melachot, a re'ayah that he holds that you're chayav on each one? From the Mishnah it's a re'ayah like Rashi says, because since the Mishnah goes through the list, the question is, why do you need a number? But if you wouldn't go through the list, you need a number. What's wrong if Isi ben Yehuda wants to tell us there are 39 melachot? So, there seems to be a מחלוקת Rashi and Tosafot. Rashi learns that the re'iyah is only from the Mishnah, that the Mishnah gives us the list. Tosafot learns that the re'iyah is just from the number. That's why Tosafot says the same number we have in Isi ben Yehuda. The fact that you're telling me a number is a re'iyah that you want to tell me how many chata'ot you're chayav. So, according to Tosafot, the Gemara's got a good kashya: how could you say Isi ben Yehuda held that you're chayav only one, when he writes a number, and the number shows that you're chayav 39? But according to Rashi, that Rashi says that the whole re'iyah that you're chayav 39 is only because you write a number even though you have a list, so from Isi ben Yehuda there is no re'iyah. So lichorah the fact that we have What's that? The fact that we have Rabbi Yochanan saying peshat in the Mishnah that you're chayav for each one, is no re'iyah that Isi ben Yehuda also holds like that. So what's the kashya? The Gemara is trying to say, you can't tell me Isi ben Yehuda holds that you're chayav only one, when from the Mishnah we see you're chayav with everyone. Big deal! So he argues! So according to Rashi, we have to say like Tosafot warns, Tosafot says אין צריך לפרש, you don't have to say that מסתמא לא פליג. According to Rashi, yes, that's the peshat. According to Tosafot, we have a re'iyah from Isi ben Yehuda himself. According to Rashi, the re'iyah is not a re'iyah. It's a mistama. Since it says in the Mishnah, mistama, like Tosafot said, מסתמא לא פליג איסי עלה, מסתמא איסי doesn't argue. So according to Rashi, the re'aya is only the mistama. Okay. Since we're saying a re'aya is only from mistama, Rashi wants a little bit more in this mistama, not stam probably doesn't argue. What do you mean probably doesn't argue? He befeirush argues. He says befeirush, \"אינו חייב אלא אחת.\" And he could argue. And from his beraita itself there is no re'aya that he holds that you're chayav for each one, so mistama he does argue. I mean, not only mistama, he argues. So there must be in this mistama there must be a little bit more. There's a sevara here. There's a sevara that mistama he doesn't argue. In order to explain that sevara that mistama he doesn't argue on the Mishnah, where do we have an extra addition, not a re'aya again, it's not a hechreach, from what I'm going to say is not a hechreach, but it adds more to the understanding, is from the fact that you're only chayav on the av, not on the toldah. And I will explain soon why. But this is the reason why Rashi here when the Gemara wants to show that Isi ben Yehuda does not argue on the Mishnah, and probably he never meant to say you're only chayav one, and we change Because of that, we change. Rashi says, what makes this more is because in what Rabbi Yochanan said, and what the Mishnah says is included a din that you're not chayav on the toldah. And since you're not chayav on the toldah, is a sevara to tell you that mistama, the one that holds that you're not chayav on the תולדה, holds you're חייב על כל אחת ואחת. And since no one, that for sure, no one argues Everyone holds, no, Rabbi Elazar argues, but most people hold that when you do a מלאכה with the תולדה, you're חייב only on the אב, from that we will see מסתבר that you're חייב על כל and and and still you're חייב על כל אחת ואחת. This will be a shtikel סברא what makes us say that Isi ben Yehuda doesn't disagree. What's the פשט? What's נוגע to know, and how does it change the fact that you're חייב on the אב, not on the תולדה? So

let's go into this whole ענין of אב and תולדה. There is a מחלוקת whether you are חייב on if you do an אב and a תולדה, if you're חייב or not. What's the sevara of the מחלוקת? So the sevara of the מחלוקת is בהמשך to what we said before, but let's go into this. I explained in the beginning of the year, when we spoke about אבות and תולדות, that this falls into the שאלה When we say the אבות teach you which תולדות are אסור, is it a בחינה of the siman to the תולדות, or is it the טעם of the תולדות, the סיבה, the cause of the תולדות? And not to repeat באריכות, but just בקיצור, what this נקודה is, if you remember we spoke, that there are certain things which is a reason why something else is a certain דין, and sometimes it's not a reason, it's just a סימן which is it. And the best example is, nu? Nu? Last time when I said it and I asked the same question, about 10 guys answered right away. Ah? Which question? Where do we have something which is a question, is it a siman or a siba? The famous chakirah that the Rebbe brings בבהמה. בבהמה! When we say there are two simanim of what makes a בהמה כשר, so the Rogatchover, the Rebbe brings from the Rogatchover the she'eilah, is this the reason why it's kasher, because it has these two סימנים, מעלת גרה ומפרסת פרסה, or it's only a siman to know, instead of the Torah giving us a list of which behemot are kasher, gives us a a siman, but it's not the cause, it's only a siman to know. Another example I gave, just to make it clearer, when it says by Yom Tov, that this is in חלק א׳, this what I'm saying now is in חלק ו׳, אה חלק י״א, בנוגע Yom Tov, when the Torah says on Yom Tov you're allowed to do מלאכת אוכל נפש, a melachah for food, is it a siba, because it's for food that's why the Torah allowed it, or that's just a siman, which melachot are mutar on יום טוב בעצם? So instead of the Torah giving you a whole list, gives you a siman, anything that has to do with food. What's the nafka mina? So lekhora, and the Rebbe goes on it's not so pashut, the machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, Beit Hillel says that just like you're allowed to do, מתוך שהותרה לצורך אוכל נפש, הותרה נמי שלא לצורך. Since the Torah said you're allowed to these melachot for food, you can do the same melachot if it's not for food. Beit Shammai says, \"No, only for food.\" What's the nekudah of the machloket? Stam Beit Hillel says, \"Well, since you're allowed to do this, you're allowed to do this also.\" That sounds conservative to me. If you're allowed to do the aveirah, you can you're allowed to do this, mistama you can do this also. Beit Hillel holds that when the Torah said you're allowed to do the melachot of אוכל נפש, it's not a sibah, not because of אוכל נפש, it's a siman which melachot are mutar. So mimela we don't care if it's for food or not, the melachot are called מלאכות אוכל נפש. Beit Shammai says, \"No, it's a sibah, it's a reason for אוכל נפש, for it, you're allowed, if not אוכל נפש, you're not allowed.\" Be-emet this is by I don't think I mentioned it last time, but there are many more examples, but this is another example, בנוגע קנינים. There's a famous Maharit which has a whole she'eilah. When you make a kinyan, make a משיכה, הגבהה, I'm קונה, you want to give me something. So there's a she'eilah, is this the reason Is this something that makes it mine? Because I picked it up or whatever, that makes it mine, that's the cause, the sibah, or it's a siman. Be-emet what makes it mine, if you decide to give it to me and I decide to take it, the גמירת דעת makes it mine. But how do you know that the guy had a גמירת דעת? So the קנין is a siman that you had a גמירת דעת, but that's not the sibah of גמירת דעת. So we find that in all kinds of places, many more places. The same she'eilah about אבות and תולדות. If when we say a certain אב is a ראיה that anything similar to this אב is also asur, is it a siman, or is it a ta'am? Because the av is asur, this is also asur, or is it a siman? And I'll explain what that means. The nafka mina will be, if you look into the av and the reason you're chayav the av is because of the of of the nekudah of what's in this in this av, then it would be a ta'am, the toldah has the same nekudah. Let's give an example of an av and a toldah. הגם the example I'm going to give is just it's not the exact same example, it's not exactly because that could be an av also, but let's use that as an example. The av, let's say, is ofeh, is baking. Cooking is a toldah, bishul is a toldah. So you could say like this: the nekudah of what baking is asur, because you make raw things into edible. That's why it's asur. Cooking accomplishes the same thing. It's a different form, but accomplishes the same thing. So if you learn that the reason why bishul is asur because of what's behind what's what afiyah is asur, what's in afiyah, then when we say bishul is asur, it's a ta'am. It's the reason, because it has the same reason as this. It has the exact same nekudah as this. If you say siman, know what it means? You're chayav for bishul not because of the nekudah of afiyah because it makes something that's not, it's raw into edible. What happened there is you actually baked it. Baking is asur. Now, bishul looks like it, but it's not the same thing. Bishul is not baking. If you say that, then it's only a siman. This is a siman, but this is not the reason. In other words, the reason why you're asur for the melachah, if it's the nekudah of it, then the toldah is a is a a ta'am. If you say it's not the נקודה, it's the whole, what it is, that's what's assur, if what it is it's assur, then the תולדה is only a סימן, because the תולדה is not the same thing, but it's a סימן to know which things are assur. The nafka mina will be, who cares, call it like this, or סתם געדרייט דעם קאפ? This is the yesod of the machloket whether if you do an אב and a תולדה, are you chayav one or are you chayav two? If you say the reason why you're chayav for אפיה is not for the baking of it, but for the changeover from being raw to being to being edible, then when you cook, you did the exact same thing. If it's a ta'am, you did the exact same thing. You did the same thing, because in both cases, you did exactly the same thing. So therefore, how could you be chayav two? Imagine you baked twice. If you baked twice, you're definitely chayav only one. Same thing here. If you say it's only a סימן, and we're chayav for baking not because of the exchange from the raw to this to, but you're chayav for baking because of the baking, then the cooking is not the same thing. We have a סימן that you're chayav for this also, but it's something else. So you are chayav for the תולדה also. So the one that obviously that holds that you're chayav for a תולדה, which has תולדה במקום אב, you're chayav for both, because he holds that the עיקר, that נקודה that's here is the the ציור ממש, the full-fledged ציור of exactly what you did, that's the reason why you're chayav. If you're chayav for that, then the תולדה is something else, even though from here we know that the תולדה is chayav, that's all. But this is not the same thing. But if you hold that the עיקר is not the way the ציור חיצוני is, but what's behind it, that's why you're chayav for the אב, and the תולדה is a reason why the תולדה, because it's the same thing, so you're doing twice the same thing.

Which by the way, this explains the Gemara in Bava Kama. In the beginning of Bava Kama, how does bichlal the whole thing of Shabbos get into the beginning of Bava Kama? Bava Kama starts ארבעה אבות נזיקין. There are four nezikin. It's pashut very noge'a because today's חת״ת, yesterday's חת״ת, and this חת״ת of these days, we're talking about the אבות נזיקין. Today's חת״ת is the four types of nezikin. The Gemara says here, מדקתני אבות מכלל דאיכא תולדות. If there are four אבות נזיקין, there are toldos. And the Gemara's question is, תולדותיהן כיוצא בהן או לאו כיוצא בהן? כיוצא בהן. Are the toldos of the אבות נזיקין have the same din as the av or not? And the Gemara goes into, גבי שבת תנן, by Shabbos we also have avos, and mimela there are toldos there too. There תולדות כיוצא בהן, there the toldah is the same as the av. In which way do we see the toldah is like the av? לא שנא אב חייב חטאת, לא שנא תולדה חייב. You're chayav for the av, you're chayav for the toldah. לא שנא אב סקילה, לא שנא תולדה סקילה. Then the Gemara continues asking a she'eilah, right, so if they're both So what's the difference between an av and a תולדה? ומאי איכא בין אב לתולדה? So the

Gemara says the difference is, if you do two אבות, you're חייב two, but if you do an אב with its תולדה, you're חייב only one. Lichorah, what's in that Gemara נוגע the קשיא the Gemara has? The Gemara just wants to know, is a תולדה like the אב by נזיקין? And the Gemara brings different places. By Shabbos, the תולדה is like the אב. By טומאה, it's different. The Gemara wants to know, what is the din by נזיקין? What's noge'a, the Gemara is asking a she'eilah over there, so if you're saying you're חייב for the אב and you're חייב for the תולדה because the תולדה is like the אב, so what's the difference between an אב and a תולדה? And we answer, the difference is that if you do them both together, you're פטור, only חייב one. What's it noge'a to that Gemara? So the nekudah I want to say is like this. When the Gemara asks to the saying to כיוצא בהן, is the תולדה like the אב or not, the Gemara is really asking, is the אב When the Gemara asks is the תולדה like the אב, know what the Gemara is really asking? Is the אב to the תולדה a סימן or a סיבה? If it's only a סימן, then it could be have a different דין. If it's a If it's a ta'am, which means the נקודה is the same in both, so it will have the same דין. And then the Gemara wants to prove that the נקודה is the same. The

Gemara wants to know, by Shabbos it's כיוצא בהן. How do we see it's כיוצא בהן? Not enough from the fact that you're חייב for the תולדה and you're חייב for the אב is חייב סקילה, תולדה is חייב סקילה. The fact that you're if you do an אב and a תולדה, you're only חייב one, what does that show? That the by Shabbos, the אבות and the תולדות is a ta'am. What does it mean it's a ta'am? It's not that we're looking at the חיצוניות'דיקע part, pashut you baked. We're looking at what's behind it. Where do we see And that's טייטש כיוצא בהן. Where do we see it's כיוצא בהן? Where do we see by Shabbos it's כיוצא בהן? From the fact that you're חייב on the תולדה is still not such a re'aya. The re'aya is from the fact that if you do an אב and a תולדה, we consider you did the same thing twice. Ah, you didn't do the same thing twice, here you baked and here you cooked! Obviously, we're looking at the נקודה. We're looking at not at the חיצוניות'דיקע ציור, we're looking at the נקודה. So it comes out like this here, according to this, that if you're חייב one when you do, or you're not חייב on the תולדה, why? Because you just repeated it. That shows that it's a טעם. What does it mean it's a טעם, we said? It shows that we're looking at the עצם, not at the נקודה. Ah, that's where we're going to go. So we're looking at the עצם, not at the נקודה. But at the same time, what does Rabbi Yochanan say? That even though we're looking at the עצם, not at the עצם, not at the ציור, but it depends which עצם. Now we're going a new thing. There are two עצם's here. There's the עצם נקודה of it being חילול שבת, being א מלאכה, and that, everything is the same. Whether it's writing or cooking, that נקודה is the same. Then we have the ציור. The ציור, this is writing, this is cooking. Then we go a step further. In the ציור גופא, we

have דרגות. The ציור itself, you have the עצם of the ציור and the ציור of the ציור. The עצם of the ציור is that when you cook, it's not the same creation as writing. The real, real עצם, they're both creation. Then you go to the ציור. But you have that this is writing and this is cooking. But in cooking גופא, you have the עצם of the ציור of cooking or the נקודה of cooking. The נקודה of cooking is that you change it from being raw to being edible, and memeila, the תולדה has the same. And what do we see here? It's not a הכרח at all, but what we see here from Rabbi Yochanan, the way he said pshat in the Mishnah, that afilu if a person looks at the עצם or the נקודה, and therefore you are only חייב one when you did an אב and a תולדה, but we don't go so far to go into the עצם עצם of the מלאכה. And therefore, you are chayav for each מלאכה separately. So we see from here a sevara that you're going to tell me that we go into the עצם of the מלאכה, what are you saying? Isi ben Yehuda said you're only chayav one, which means we're going into the עצם of the מלאכה, and it makes sense. Comes the Gemara and says, no, we see from the Mishnah where R'' Yochanan explains that even when we go into the עצם, we don't go that far. In other words, we see from here, lichora you would say R'' Yochanan who goes into the עצם of the מלאכה, וואו ראיה goes to the עצם? Because you're chayav on the אב and the תולדה you're only chayav one. A סימן it goes into the עצם! Nevertheless, so far to go to the עצם to say that you're chayav only one on all the מלאכות, that's not. So a סימן that even if you look at the עצם, it's not correct to look all the way at the עצם of the מלאכה itself. Mimeila, we

come back and say mistama that Isi ben Yehuda also doesn't hold like that. Why? Because if Isi ben Yehuda would hold like that, why? Because like Rashi says כל חילול שבת גוף אחד של מלאכה, it's all one עצם. But we see from here, mimeila if you say we don't look at the עצם at all, Isi would argue. He says we look at the עצם, we say we don't look at the עצם. That could be. But here we see that we agree with him. We agree that you look at the עצם. And nevertheless, we do not go that far to look at the עצם of the מלאכה, but we look at only at the עצם of the ציור. So מסתמא, I'm not saying, it's only מסתמא, that that adds that מסתמא Isi ben Yehuda does not argue on the Mishnah. Because the reason he would argue on the Mishnah is because he goes at the עצם, and the Gemara and the Mishnah goes on the ציור. But we see we don't go on the ציור completely either. The Mishnah doesn't go on the ציור. וואו ראיה doesn't go on the ציור? That the Mishnah holds that you're not חייב on the תולדה. That means we're looking at the עצם, not Because if you look at the ציור כפשוטו, you'd be חייב on the תולדה separately. So since we so we see that that we also agree we don't go on the ציור, and nevertheless, to the further עצם we don't go. So it's hard to say already that that Isi holds we're looking at the עצם, and therefore, we're חייב on on only one. Because we see that even when you're looking at the עצם, we don't look at every at the real עצם. So it's again all based on the fact that Rashi ever learned that's מסתמא, because what I'm saying, a הכרח, you could say, \"Yeah, he still argues!\" Maybe Isi ben Yehuda argues and he says, \"Yeah, we go on the real עצם!\" But it's מסתבר. But what's this מסתבר here? מסתבר that even if you're looking at the עצם, there is a גבול of how far you go. Only מסתבר, not מוכרח. What's the מסתבר? That the Mishnah goes as far as what's written? I'm saying, no, the שאלה is if בכלל we argue if you go on the עצם or you go on the ציור. That's our that's our two extremes. The Mishnah found middle ground therefore So the Not that you can look at it that way, but the Gemara says מסתבר. If the Gemara would have no choice, the Gemara would stay with that. But מסתבר, since we see that even when we look at the עצם there is no need we don't go further, so unless you have no choice, you won't say he goes the other extreme. Because it's a because it's a הכרעה of the whole thing? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, that that's only מסתבר. Yeah, because it's a מכריע, it's מסתבר. I wouldn't say I wouldn't be מכריע, but it's מסתבר. When you have a way to מכריע, there's no need to say. Like this you could say, \"I don't believe you that you look at the ציור, I think you look at the עצם.\" Fine. But when you see you can look at the עצם and still not be, why would we have to say differently? And it's not מוכרח, but it's all מסתבר. So I

want to say this answers the שאלה why Rashi here brought in the whole thing of the תולדות. Because the שאלה was what is נוגע the whole ענין of the תולדות here? He says you're חייב on on five אבות one, we see in the Mishnah you're חייב on each one. מנינא למה לי? To tell you you're חייב על כל אחת ואחת. Why is it נוגע that you're not חייב on the תולדה? לא, אי סבר the תולדות you're not חייב, so that adds to the point. Whichever way you're going to learn Rashi, definitely a מסתבר, but this definitely adds to the point to understand the the גדר of the מלאכה, and to say that he argues could be, but it's not מסתבר because we have a way to look at the עצם, and which עצם? Still not the real etzem. And we see he, in other words if ר' יוחנן would argue completely, so okay, he looks at the etzem, he's not. But we're saying he also looks at the etzem, אלא מאי, not so far. So it's more karov, I'm not saying again, it's karov to say that he doesn't argue. This is why Rashi brings this in. If you want to say this thing more פשטות, in a different way to explain this whole thing here, not בנוגע the תולדות, but could be the תולדות also, we'll see in a second. What's the נקודה of the machloket? As we're going back to this, whether you're chayav one on all, if you do many בהעלם אחד you're chayav one, or you're chayav many? One of the סברות is based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin. The

Gemara in Sanhedrin דף ע״ח ע״א, brought down in other places also, the גמרא here says like this, and this is an interesting machloket. תנו רבנן: הכוהו עשרה בני אדם בעשר מקלות בעשרה מקלות, if 10 people hit the guy, each one hit him with a stick, ומת, and he died at the end, who's chayav for שפיכות דמים or רציחה, for killing, for murder? So, the Mishnah, the baraita is like this: בין בבת אחת ובין בזה אחר זה פטורין. Whether they all hit together or one after another, they're all patur, because none of them really did the whole killing. רבי יהודה בן בתירא אומר: No, בזה אחר זה האחרון חייב. If one after another, the last one who gave the last blow and killed him, he's chayav, מפני שקירב את מיתתו, because he made his מיתה closer. אמר רבי יוחנן: ושניהם מקרא אחד דרשו. Rabbi Yochanan said like this: ושניהם מקרא אחד דרשו, they both דרש-en the same פסוק. The פסוק says: ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם. If a man will hit, will kill כל נפש אדם, that's the lashon. What's the פשט כל נפש אדם? כל נפש אדם. So רבנן סברי כל נפש, עד דאיכא כל נפש. כל נפש means if you killed the whole nefesh. If 10 guys hit him and the last guy killed him, he didn't kill, really, he started to be killed by the rest, so he didn't kill the whole nefesh, and therefore you're patur. And רבי יהודה בן בתירא סבר, the same pasuk, כל נפש means כל דהו נפש. כל דהו נפש means any little bit of the nefesh. So lif'oal this guy killed him. איי he only killed him 10%, the bottom line he killed him, and 10% is enough because the pasuk says kol, it means כל דהו. You know what the difference between the two peshatim is? There are two words in Yiddish what the Rebbe used to use many times. He used to say the lashon: אלע אידן און יעדער איד. What's the difference? אלע אידן means all the אידן, all together, as one. יעדער איד means each one separately. When it says kol, does it mean the כל נפש means the גאנצע נפש, or the יעדער שטיקל פון די נפש? So that the Chachamim who say you're patur say it means אלע, and this if the last guy who killed him didn't do אלע, didn't do the whole thing. And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: No, it means יעדער, any little bit. And since you killed him, even though it was a little bit of nefesh, you're chayav. The same thing is בנוגע מלאכות שבת. What does the pasuk say? לא תעשה כל מלאכה. Does kol mean יעדער מלאכה, or does kol mean אלע מלאכות? You can learn kol means אלע מלאכות, don't do all the melachot. And if that's the peshat, what would I learn? That if you do two מלאכות, you're chayav only one, it's all the same, the Torah says do not do all the all מלאכות. If you say כל means יעדער, the Torah says don't do each מלאכה. So if you do each, if you do two separate מלאכות, you're chayav for two. Now lichorah, if you darsh-en, if you say you're chayav two, that means that we're darsh-ning יעדער מלאכה. If we're darsh-ning יעדער מלאכה, every מלאכה, then what should be the דין of אב and a תולדה? Should also be chayav for both. The Torah says לא תעשה כל, every יעדער מלאכה. What do we see? That as much as the Torah says יעדער מלאכה, that means that when we darsh-en that you're not chayav for the תולדה, that means we're darsh-ning כל מלאכה means אלע מלאכות, which doesn't mean יעדער מלאכה, nevertheless, when it comes to the אבות, we do darsh-en יעדער מלאכה. And this is what we're trying to say to Rabbi Yehuda: You want to you're saying maybe he holds that you're chayav only one, why? Because he darsh-ens כל מלאכה means אלע מלאכות, I want to show you that even if we darsh-en כל מלאכה is not יעדער מלאכה, nevertheless you're chayav on each one. Where do we see it? From the תולדות. You see by the תולדות that everybody Rabbi Yochanan the Mishnah agrees that you're chayav only one when you do the אב and the תולדה. So when you do the אב and the תולדה you're chayav one, obviously you were דרש-ning not יעדער מלאכה. So basically, we're learning like you, not יעדער מלאכה. You're saying you're chayav only one because it's not יעדער מלאכה. Yeah, the Mishnah also holds not יעדער מלאכה, and nevertheless, what does the Mishnah say? You're חייב על כל אחת ואחת. So mimela we see that it's not learning יעדער מלאכה is not מכריע. Again, it's not it's not a מוכרח, you can you could say he says differently, but again I'm just trying to say that it's all to the mistama that since we see that in one way we hold like you and there is a way to hold like you and nevertheless חייב על כל אחת ואחת, so mistama he also holds the same way, which is the same גאנג as before, but before I went to the whole thing in טעם וסימן. Here I'm going just from the פסוקים, that since he דרשנ'ס כל, and he says the אב and the תולדה you're chayav one, so we דרשן not ידע במלאכה, so why would you go and דרש ידע not ידע במלאכה all the way that you're chayav only one when you do more than one? So that is מסתבר that even Rabbi Yosi ben Yehuda holds that you're חייב על כל אחת ואחת. According to Tosafot, we don't have to say this whole thing, because according to Tosafot we said Tosafot learns that we have a re'ayah from Yosi ben Yehuda himself. But according to Rashi that we don't have a re'ayah, so we have to bring a re'ayah from sevara, this is a sevara. Ela mai in Tosafos גופא, in the previous Tosafos, Tosafos said that how do we know? Because mistama, yeah, דלא פליג אמתניתין דכלל גדול, like mistama he doesn't argue. How Tosafos learns here that we have a re'ayah from himself, okay that's already the Maharsha, so we won't go into that, look into the Maharsha. You're done? Yeah.