Jewish Audio on Chabad.org. Today's שיעור will be in מסכת בבא קמא דף פ״ח. We will start four lines from the top of עמוד א׳. The גמרא here quotes the משנה. We learned in the משנה: החובל בעבד כנעני של אחרים חייב וכולי, that if somebody injures an עבד כנעני that belongs to somebody else, he's obligated to pay all five things: נזק, צער, ריפוי, שבת, and בושת. But the משנה says that רבי יהודה holds that אין לעבדים בושת, that you do not pay בושת for embarrassment to an עבד. The גמרא says, מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה? What is the reason of רבי יהודה? And the גמרא says, אמר קרא, because the פסוק says: כי ינצו אנשים יחדיו איש ואחיו. Where do we know בכלל that you have to pay for embarrassment? There's a פסוק in פרשת כי תצא, קפיטל כ״ה, פסוק י״א, where it says: כי ינצו אנשים יחדיו איש ואחיו, if men will fight together, argue together, a man and his brother, וקרבה אשת האחד להציל את אישה מיד מכהו, and the wife of one of them will get close to save her husband from the other person who's going to hit him, ושלחה ידה והחזיקה במבושיו, she'll stretch out her hand and grab him in a place where it's embarrassing, so the תורה says, וקצותה את כפה לא תחוס עינך, chop off her hand, but it means really that you have to pay money. So from here we know that if you embarrass somebody, you have to pay for embarrassment. But since the פסוק starts off with the words: כי ינצו אנשים יחדיו איש ואחיו, that if men will argue together, a man and his brother, so the תורה tells us that למי שיש לו אחוה, that this only applies to somebody who has the concept of brothers. יצא עבד, this comes to exclude an עבד, שאין לו אחוה, that has no brotherhood. Which means, as רש״י says, that he cannot marry into כלל ישראל, because an עבד is אסור לבוא בקהל, and therefore he is not considered a brother of יידן. Another פשט brought down in the גליון on the side of רש״י is that means that he is allowed to marry his sister, or he is allowed to marry the wife of his brother, and that shows that an עבד has no brotherhood. תוספות has the פשט that means that his children will not be considered brothers, because the children of an עבד are also עבדים, so they're not considered brothers. So whichever פשט we're going to learn, it means nevertheless that by an עבד there is no אחוה, there is no brotherhood. And since in the פסוק that deals with בושת, it says clearly איש ואחיו, so from here we learn out that an עבד is not included in the דין of בושת. But then the

גמרא asks, ורבנן? What will the רבנן answer, the רבנן who say that you do pay בושת for an עבד, אי the תורה says איש ואחיו? So the גמרא answers, אחיו הוא במצות, he is considered your brother, because concerning מצות he is your brother, because we know an עבד is obligated to do the מצות like a woman. So since he is obligated to do מצות, he is considered the brother by יידן, and therefore when the תורה says איש ואחיו, it also includes an עבד. Then the גמרא says, אלא מעתה לרבי יהודה, now according to רבי יהודה, זוממי עבד לא יהרגו? If two witnesses come and testify concerning an עבד that he's חייב מיתה, that he did something where he should be put to death, and then these two witnesses are found to be עדים זוממין, which means that another group of witnesses come and they say, that how can you testify that you saw this עבד do this thing at this and this place at this and this time, when at that time you were with us? And the דין is in a case like that, that ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו, that you have to do to them what they wanted to do to him, which means that since they wanted to have this עבד put to death, so you have to kill those עדים זוממין. But now that we said that wherever it says אחיו it comes to exclude an עבד, so the דין should be that עדים זוממין of an עבד should not be put to death, דכתיב, because the פסוק says: ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו, you should do to him as he wanted to do to his brother. And since an עבד is not considered a brother, so then he should be excluded from the דין of עדים זוממין, but this is not so. We know the דין that concerning מיתה, an עבד has the same דין as a ישראל. So in other words, if you become עדים זוממין concerning an עבד, the דין is that you do get put to death. But according to רבי יהודה who דרשנ'ס אחיו to exclude an עבד, so why isn't an עבד excluded from the דין of עדים זוממין? The גמרא says, אמר רבא, רבא said, אמר רב ששת, in the name of רב ששת, because אמר קרא, because by עדים זוממין the פסוק says: ובערת הרע מקרבך, that you should get rid of the evil that's among you. So מכל מקום, in any case, since it is an evil thing, so that comes to teach you that in any way that the עדים זוממין are done, you have to get rid of the evil. So that comes to add that even in a case where you would have thought that the person would not be included in the דין of עדים זוממין, so this פסוק comes to include him. And that's how we know that by an עבד there is also a דין of עדים זוממין. Then the גמרא asks:

אלא מעתה, but now, the רבנן, according to the רבנן, that say that where it says אחיך, or אחיך, it does include an עבד, עבד יהא כשר למלכות, let an עבד, a slave, be כשר to be a king. We know that a עבד is פסול to be a king, because the פסוק says: מקרב אחיך, that you should make a king from amongst your brothers. So from here we learn out that an עבד is פסול to be a king. But if we say that an עבד is also considered your brother because he is חייב במצוות, so why shouldn't an עבד be כשר to be a king? And the גמרא answers: אמר, I will tell you, ולטעמיך, according to you, the one that's asking the question, תיקשי לך גר, I can ask you a קושיא concerning a גר, a convert, לדברי הכל, according to everybody. Concerning a גר, there is no מחלוקת. Everyone agrees that a convert is considered אחיך. Concerning an עבד we find here a מחלוקת between רבי יהודה and the חכמים. But concerning a גר, everyone agrees that he is considered your brother because he is a regular איד. And nevertheless, we know a גר cannot be a מלך, because

the פסוק says: מקרב אחיך. The question is: Why? Isn't he a brother? אלא, you must say: אמר קרא, because the פסוק says: מקרב אחיך, from amongst your brothers. That means: ממובחר שבאחיך, from the chosen of your brothers. That means that he has to be not just a איד, one of your brothers, but he has to be a מיוחס. And therefore a גר, if his mother was not originally Jewish, but his mother converted, he cannot be a מלך. So we see that here it is not the word אחיך that excludes the גר, but it is ממובחר אחיך, from the word מקרב אחיך. So the same concerning an עבד, that if it would just say אחיך, maybe טאקע an עבד would be able to be a מלך. But since the תורה says: מקרב אחיך, and that comes to tell us it has to be ממובחר אחיך, from the best, from the chosen of your brothers, that is the reason why an עבד is פסול to be a מלך. אלא מעתה, לרבנן, now the גמרא asks another קושיא: according to the רבנן that say that an עבד is considered your brother, יהא עבד כשר לעדות, let an עבד be כשר to testify, to become a witness. דכתיב, as the תורה says: והנה עד שקר העד שקר ענה באחיו. And if a person testifies false it says, that he testified false, falsely he testified and answered falsely in his brother. And from here we know that an עבד is פסול to be an עד. But if you say that an עבד is considered your brother, so why shouldn't he be כשר to be a witness? אמר עולא, עולא says: עדות לא מצית אמרת. Concerning witnesses you have nothing to say, concerning testifying, you have no question that let an עבד be כשר to testify, because אתיא עדות בקל וחומר מאישה. Because that an עבד is פסול to be an עד, we learn out with a קל וחומר from a woman. And we say as follows: ומה אישה שהיא ראויה לבוא בקהל, if we see a woman that is fit to enter the congregation, meaning a woman is allowed to marry a Jewish man, nevertheless, פסולה לעדות, she is פסול to be a witness, עבד שאינו ראוי לבוא בקהל, an עבד which is not allowed to enter the congregation Jewish congregation, meaning he is not allowed to marry into the Jewish nation, אינו דין שפסול לעדות, so certainly he should be פסול לעדות? And how do we טאקע know that a woman is פסול לעדות? So רש"י says because by עדים it says: ועמדו שני האנשים, and the two men should stand in front of the judges, the תורה says clearly they have to be men. So from here we learn out not women. And also the דין that a קטן, a child under בר מצוה, is פסול to be a witness, is also learned out from that פסוק. Because the תורה says אנשים, men, and a קטן is not a man yet. And another reason רש"י gives that a קטן is פסול לעדות, because it is עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה. The rule is that when is an עדות כשר? If it is a type of testimony that you could be מזים. That if another group of עדים will come and say to the first group that עמנו הייתם, and you were with us at the time you claim you saw this happen, then we would do to the witnesses what they planned to do to that person. If it is a kind of testimony that this could be done if they would be מוזם, then that testimony is כשר. But any type of testimony that is אי אתה יכול להזימה, that even if other witnesses will come and be מזים them, you still would not be able to perform in them the דין of הזמה, לכתחילה such a witness is פסול. Now if children come to testify, even if they will become עדים זוממין, you still couldn't do do to them what they wanted to do to that person, because we know that קטנים לאו בני עונשין נינהו, children are not able to be punished. So therefore you couldn't punish them and do to them what they wanted to do to that person. So ממילא, when children come to testify, it is considered עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה. It's a type of testimony that can never become זוממין, and a type of testimony like that is פסול. So that's how we know that children are פסול לעדות. But what's important to this גמרא is not the דין of children, but the דין of the woman. That from this פסוק we learn out that a woman is פסולה לעדות, and make a קל וחומר: מה דהא woman that is allowed to marry is nevertheless פסולה לעדות, an עבד, which cannot marry into the Jewish nation, certainly is פסול לעדות. And that's what he's saying, that even if we hold like the רבנן, that an עבד is considered your brother, and therefore when it says by עדות the word באחיו, it doesn't come to exclude an עבד, but nevertheless an עבד is excluded from this קל וחומר from a woman. And then the גמרא asks: How can you make a קל וחומר from a woman? I could tell you: מה לאשה, you know why a woman is פסולה לעדות, that שכן אינה ראויה למילה, she is not fit to the מצוה of מילה. So this shows that there is something lacking in her. Maybe that is the reason why she is פסולה לעדות. But if so, תאמר בעבד, say by an עבד שהוא ראוי למילה, he is fit for מילה. Perhaps the reason why she is פסולה לעדות is because she's lacking the מצוה of מילה. And therefore an עבד, which is not lacking this מצוה, maybe he is כשר? Then the גמרא says: קטן יוכיח. I will answer you this through through a קטן. We see that a קטן שישנו במילה, he is included in the מצוה of מילה, ופסול לעדות, and he's still פסול לעדות. So we see from here that by being in the מצוה of מילה doesn't make you כשר לעדות. We just said that maybe an עבד should be כשר, because he has the מצוה of מילה, but we see that a קטן has the מצוה of מילה, nevertheless he is פסול. So we see that מילה has nothing to do here. But then the גמרא asks: You can't prove anything from a קטן, to show that a קטן, even though he has מצוה of מילה, is פסול, because a קטן could be פסול for a different reason: מה לקטן שאינו במצות, you know why a קטן is פסול for עדות, because he is not in מצות, meaning he is פטור from all the מצות. תאמר בעבד שהוא במצות, but an עבד is חייב במצות. So how can you prove me that just like a קטן is פסול, even though he has מצות מילה, so too an עבד should be פסול? Maybe a קטן is פסול for a different reason, because he's not חייב במצות. But then we go back: אשה תוכיח. We'll prove it from a woman, שישנה במצות, a woman is obligated to do the מצות, ופסולה לעדות, and nevertheless she's פסולה לעדות. So that shows that by being חייב במצות is not a reason to be כשר for עדות. But then when we come in with אשה, we could right away go back with the original question: Maybe the reason a אשה is פסול is because she doesn't have the מצוה of מילה? But then we're going to answer back: Look at a קטן who does have the מצוה of מילה, nevertheless he's פסול. Then we're going to say: But from קטן is no ראיה, maybe because he doesn't have מצות, and that's why he's פסול. We're going to go back and say: But see, a woman does have מצות, and nevertheless she's פסול. So וחזר הדין, this goes back and forth, לא ראי זה כראי זה, this is not like this, ולא ראי זה כראי זה, this is not like this. There's something in a קטן which we don't have by an אשה, and there's something in an אשה which we don't have by a קטן. So one thing we do see, that it is not these two things that cause them to become פסול לעדות. It is not because she's missing the מצוה of מילה that make him make her פסול, as we see a קטן is also פסול even though he has מילה. It is not by a קטן the fact that he doesn't have מצות that he is פסול, because we see a woman does have מצות, and nevertheless she is פסול. So obviously, none of these two reasons are the reasons to make a פסול. But הצד השוה שבהן, the one equal, common point in both of them is שכן אינם בכל המצות, that they both don't have all the מצות. A קטן has none, and a woman doesn't have all. But both don't have all. ופסולין להעיד, and they are פסול. אף אני אביא את העבד, so I could also bring in from here a ראיה that an עבד שאינו בכל המצות, he also is not obligated to do all the מצות, ופסול להעיד, he should also be פסול. So that's how we know that an עבד is פסול לעדות. But then the גמרא asks: You can't say that, because מה להצד השוה שבהן שכן אינן איש, you know, there is one point that both have, a woman and a קטן have, which could be the reason why they're פסול, and that does not apply to an עבד. And since an עבד doesn't have that problem, maybe he is כשר. What is the problem that they both have? Both are not a man. A woman is not a man because she's a woman, a קטן is not a man because he's still young, he didn't reach the level of becoming a man. So תאמר בעבד, but say by an עבד שהוא איש, he is a man. So ממילא, maybe the reason they are פסול is because they're not a man, so an עבד, which is a man, should be כשר. אלא תיתי מגזלן, therefore the גמרא says we will learn it out from a גזלן. We will learn out עבד is פסול לעדות from a גזלן, from a robber, because a גזלן is ראוי לבא בקהל. A גזלן is allowed to marry into the Jewish nation, and nevertheless, he is פסול לעדות, as we learn out from the פסוק, "אל תשת ידך עם רשע". So we learn out from there, do not accept the testimony of a רשע, of a גזלן. So an עבד, which is אסור לבא בקהל, which cannot enter the Jewish nation, certainly he should be פסול לעדות. But then the גמרא asks, "I could ask you, מה לגזלן שכן מעשיו גרמו לו? You know why a גזלן is פסול לעדות? Because his own action caused it. He did a criminal act, so he caused himself to become פסול. תאמר בעבד שאין מעשיו גרמו לו, but say by an עבד which his actions didn't cause it, he didn't do anything wrong that we should be able to say that he should be פסול לעדות. So how can we learn it out from a גזלן?" אלא, so the גמרא says, therefore, תיתי מגזלן ומחד מהנך. We will learn it out from גזלן and from one of the previous ones, or from the אשה, the woman, or from the קטן. And we say like this: just like a גזלן is פסול לעדות even though he is כשר לבא בקהל, certainly an עבד, which is פסול לבא בקהל, certainly is פסול לעדות. Then you ask, "Hey, a גזלן, you know why he's פסול, because his actions caused it." So we will say, "A woman יוכיח, or a קטן יוכיח, that neither of them did anything wrong, and nevertheless, they are פסול." But then we could ask, "You know why either of them are פסול? If it would be a woman, we will say it is because she's not במצות מילה. If it's a קטן, we'll say because he is not במצות." So then we're going to answer, "A גזלן יוכיח." And then we're going to go back and forth. הצד השוה שבהן, the common point between a גזלן and a woman, or between a גזלן and a קטן, is that both of them are not in all the מצות. A גזלן is not in all the מצות because he didn't keep all the מצות. A קטן or a woman are not obligated in all the מצות, but nevertheless, they both have this common point that they're both not within all the מצות and they are פסול, so too an עבד, which is not in all the מצות, he is also פסול. Then the גמרא says, "מר בריה דרבינא אמר", but מר בריה דרבינא said he has a different ראיה that an עבד is פסול לעדות. Because אמר קרא, the פסוק says, "לא יומתו אבות על בנים". פשוטער פשט means that fathers should not die through the children. But he דרש'ס that it means, "לא יומתו", people should not die על פי אבות שאין להם חייס בנים, based on the testimony of such people that could not be fathers if they would have children, that their children would not be מיוחס after them, they would not be considered their children. That's how he דרש'ס from the word, "אבות על בנים", that אבות who have בנים, people who could be considered fathers and their children are their children, so they could testify. But you cannot accept testimony and kill somebody based on this testimony of people who would not be considered fathers because their children would not be מיוחס after them. And he says you must say that that's the פשט in the פסוק, דאי סלקא דעתך כדאמרינן, if you're going to say the פשט in the פסוק is as we say in other places, for instance in the גמרא סנהדרין, that it means, "לא יומתו אבות על בנים", בעדות בנים, that fathers should not die through the children, meaning through testimony of children, and this shows that you cannot accept testimony of relatives, if that's the only thing the תורה wants to tell us, לכתוב רחמנא "לא יומתו אבות על בניהם", why didn't the תורה write that the fathers should not die through their children? מאי "בנים"? Why does it say through "children"? שמע מינה, that comes to teach us, שלא יומתו על פי אבות שאין להם חייס בנים, that a person should not die through the testimony of fathers that do not have the ייחוס of their children, that their children do not go after them. And that is an עבד, because if an עבד has a child, it's not considered his child. There is no ייחוס by עבדים. And that's what the תורה tells us, that an עבד is not accepted as an עד. But then the גמרא says, אלא מעתה, if so, "ובנים לא יומתו על אבות", the תורה says further that children should also not die through the fathers. הכא נמי will you also tell me that what does the פסוק mean, לא יומתו על פי בנים שאין להם חייס אבות, that you cannot die, which means you cannot kill a person based on the testimony of people who do not have the יחס as children to their fathers? Who is that? A גר is not considered a child to his father. A גר is considered a father to his child. His child is מיוחס to him since after he was מגייר as a regular איד, so his child is considered his child. But his father who is a גוי, or even if his father was מגייר, but still he is not considered his father. So if you're going to say that the פסוק "לא יומתו אבות על בנים" means that you cannot accept testimony of such people that cannot be considered fathers to their children, so the other פסוק where it says, "ובנים לא יומתו על אבות" would mean that you cannot accept testimony testimony of such people who are not considered children to their fathers. So if so, אלא גר הכא נמי דפסול, so you will tell me that a גר is פסול for עדות, which is not true. We know a convert is כשר to be an עד. And since we see that a convert is כשר, obviously we do not learn the פשט in the פסוק of ובנים לא יומתו על אבות that way. Since we don't learn the פשט in that part of the פסוק that way, so let's assume that we don't learn the פשט of the פסוק in the beginning either, that when it says לא יומתו אבות על בנים, doesn't mean as you said, that you do not accept the testimony of people who their children are not מיוחס after them. But the גמרא says, "No, אמינא, I will tell you, it's no

comparison. היכא השתא, what kind of comparison do you make here? גר, a גר, נהי דאין לו יחס למעלה, even though he doesn't have יחוס above, meaning going back to his father, he doesn't have יחוס, but למטה יש לו יחס, but going down, meaning to his children, to his descendants, he does have a יחוס. לאפוקי עבד, but this comes to exclude an עבד, דאין לו יחס לא למעלה ולא למטה, an עבד has no יחוס, not going up and not going down, his father is not considered his father, and his son is not considered his son. And therefore, since we see this difference between an עבד and a גר, therefore we understand that from the פסוק we cannot learn out that a גר is פסול לעדות, even though we do learn that an עבד is פסול לעדות. But why? And he explains himself. אי סלקא דעתך גר פסול לעדות, if you're going to think that a גר is פסול for an עדות because of the פסוק where it says ובנים לא יומתו על אבות, so ליכתוב רחמנא, let the תורה write, לא יומתו אבות על בניהם, כדאמרינן. The first part of the פסוק should have said that fathers should not die through their children, and from there we would have learned out, as we say, פשט: לא יומתו בעדות בנים, that fathers should not die through the עדות of their children. And the תורה should not teach us anything concerning עבד. The only way we know an עבד is פסול, as we said before, because the תורה doesn't say בניהם, it just says בנים. So he says let the תורה say בניהם, and then we would not know anything concerning עבד. וליכתוב רחמנא ובנים לא יומתו על אבות, and let the תורה then write ובנים לא יומתו על אבות, דנשמע מינה תרתי, that from there we would know two things: חדא, one thing, the פשט: לא יומתו בנים בעדות אבות, that children cannot die with the testimony of their fathers, ואידך, the second thing we would know: לא יומתו על פי בנים שאין להם יחס אבות. Since the תורה doesn't write אבותם, their fathers, but the תורה just writes that the children should not die through fathers, so we would know from there that a person cannot die through the testimony of somebody who is not considered a child to his fathers, which means that a גר would be פסול לעדות. So the תורה would just have to tell us the דין of a גר, ועבד נפקא ליה בקל וחומר מגר, and an עבד would automatically be learned out from a קל וחומר of גר. We would say, מה גר דלמעלה הוא דאין לו יחס, if a גר, which only going up he has no יחוס, meaning his father is not considered his father, אבל למטה יש לו יחס, but going down he does have יחוס, nevertheless פסול לעדות, עבד שאין לו יחס לא למעלה ולא למטה, an עבד which has no יחוס not up and not down, not to his father and not to his son, אינו דין שיהא פסול לעדות, certainly he's פסול לעדות. So

why did the תורה have to write that an עבד is פסול לעדות? And the תורה does write that. Since the תורה writes לא יומתו אבות על בנים and doesn't write לא יומתו אבות על בניהם, that change itself teaches us that an עבד is פסול לעדות, that anybody who his son is not מיוחס after him is פסול לעדות. So that comes to teach us that an עבד is פסול לעדות. But why did the תורה have to tell us an עבד is פסול לעדות? If the דין would be a גר is פסול לעדות, then the תורה should have just told us the דין by a גר, and we would have known the דין of an עבד with this קל וחומר. אלא מדכתב רחמנא לא יומתו אבות על בנים, but since the תורה did write לא יומתו אבות על בנים and not על בניהם, דמשמע, which is משמע, לא יומתו על פי אבות שאין להם יחס בנים, that you should not have someone die based on the testimony of somebody who doesn't have a יחוס for his children, שמע מינה, from here we know that עבד שאין לו יחס לא למעלה ולא למטה הוא דפסול לעדות, and only an עבד which has no יחוס not up and not down, he is פסול לעדות. אבל גר, but a

גר, כיוון דיש לו יחס למטה, since he does have a יחוס down, meaning to his son, כשר לעדות, he is כשר לעדות. In simple words, that means to say, that by the mere fact that the תורה had to tell us the דין that an עבד is פסול לעדות, that itself tells us that a גר is כשר לעדות. Because if the דין would be a גר is also פסול לעדות because of the second half of the פסוק, the תורה should have just told us the second half of the פסוק that a גר is פסול, and we would have known that an עבד is certainly פסול. Now that the תורה told us an עבד is פסול, that itself tells us that only an עבד is פסול, but a גר is not פסול לעדות. But then the גמרא says, וכי תימא, you might say, ליכתוב רחמנא, that the תורה write ובנים לא יומתו על אבותיהם, that children should not die through their fathers. למה לי דכתב רחמנא בנים לא יומתו על אבות? Why did the תורה change that and write that children should not die through fathers? דמשמע that it seems to be telling us, לא יומתו על פי בנים שאין להם יחוס אבות, that they should not die means a person should not get killed through the testimony of somebody who doesn't have the יחוס of a father. If טאקע a גר is כשר לעדות, so why טאקע does the תורה make

it in such a way which would seem to be telling us that somebody who doesn't have the יחוס of a father is פסול לעדות? Because if the תורה wouldn't want to tell us that, then the תורה should have said לא יומתו על אבותיהם and not על אבות. And the גמרא answers, איידי דכתב לא יומתו אבות על בנים, since the תורה writes already לא יומתו אבות על בנים and doesn't write על בניהם, and there the תורה had to do it because the תורה wanted to exclude עבדים, כתב נמי ובנים לא יומתו על אבות, and therefore in the סיפא, where the תורה could have written ובנים לא יומתו על אבותיהם, nevertheless the תורה went along with the same לשון as in the beginning, and the תורה wrote ובנים לא יומתו על אבות and not על אבותיהם. Concerning what we mentioned before, that רש״י gave three reasons from where we know that a קטן is פסול לעדות. One is because it says in the פסוק ועמדו שני האנשים, the two men, and a child is not a man. Another reason was because a קטן is an עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו. You can't be מזים him because even if you will be מזים him, you can't punish him because a קטן is not in the category of punishment. So since he is an עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, so therefore he is פסול לעדות because an עדות which you cannot be מזים, לכתחילה cannot be accepted as עדות. So רבי עקיבא איגר in the גליון הש״ס says that when רש״י brings the reason that a קטן is פסול because we learned it out from the פסוק ועמדו שני האנשים, that's what the גמרא says in בבא בתרא דף קנ״ה עמוד ב׳, and he explains the reason why the גמרא there only mentions the first פשט of this רש״י, and the גמרא there doesn't give the reason a קטן is פסול because of עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, so he says because after the חכמים made a דין that דיני ממונות doesn't need דרישה וחקירה, but where there is a דין that you have to investigate exactly what time it happened and when it happened, so then you have to have עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו. But the חכמים made a תקנה in order to make it easier for people to borrow money, that when it comes to דיני ממונות, you do not have to investigate that way. So automatically, by דיני ממונות, you do not have to have an עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, as the סמ״ע says in חושן משפט סימן ל״ג סעיף קטן כ״ט. So now that you don't need עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, so a קטן should be כשר לעדות. So therefore the גמרא there couldn't say a reason a קטן is פסול לעדות because it's עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, because by דיני ממונות, even if it's עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, still should be כשר. Therefore, the גמרא there gives the reason because the פסוק says ועמדו שני האנשים. But here, where we're learning the way the דין is מדאורייתא, we're trying to prove it from פסוקים, מדאורייתא דיני ממונות does need דרישה וחקירה. So מדאורייתא דיני ממונות also has to be עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו. So therefore here רש״י is able to say that the reason a קטן is פסול is because it's עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו. But according to this פשט that the reason a קטן is פסול because it's עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, רבי עקיבא איגר asks a very strong קשיא and remains with a צריך עיון. The גמרא here says קטן יוכיח. The גמרא wants to prove that even if you are שייך to מילה, nevertheless you are פסול לעדות, as we see by a קטן that he is שייך in מילה, nevertheless is פסול. But what kind of ראיה is that? If a קטן is פסול because he is a קטן, then this is a good ראיה. This would only fit if the reason a קטן is פסול because it says אנשים and he's not considered אנשים. But according to the סברא that he is פסול because of a side reason, because he is an עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, that has nothing to do with him being a קטן. Even a גדול, if it would be in a case of עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו, would also be פסול לעדות. So what does the גמרא say here that we see from a קטן that he is פסול לעדות? A קטן is not פסול לעדות. It is just happens to be that a קטן is always an עד שאי אתה יכול להזימו. So then what kind of קטן יוכיח does the גמרא bring? And he doesn't answer the קשיא, he remains with a צריך עיון. And now we will continue with the גמרא. The גמרא quotes the משנה. It said חרש, שוטה, וקטן, פגיעתן רעה. A deaf-mute or a שוטה, not normal person, or a קטן, a child under בר מצוה, so it is bad to meet up with them. In other words, if you injure them you are חייב to pay, if they injure you they are פטור. So therefore, if you meet up with them and you come into trouble, you're always in trouble, you never get any money from them. The גמרא tells a story, and the גמרא tells a story, אימיה דרב שמואל בר אבא מגרוניא, the mother of רב שמואל בר אבא מגרוניא, הות נסיבא ליה לרב אבא, she was married to רב אבא. This רב אבא was not the father of רב שמואל בר אבא. This was a second marriage to her. Her first husband, who was the father of רב שמואל, was also called אבא, and now she married someone else who was also called אבא. So after she married this רב אבא, כתבינהו לנכסה לרב שמואל בר אבא ברה, she wrote away all her possessions to her son רב שמואל בר אבא. בתר דשכיבא, after she died, אזל רב שמואל בר אבא קמיה דרבי ירמיה בר אבא, so רב שמואל בר אבא came to רבי ירמיה בר אבא, wants to know what kind of דין does it have. Since his mother wrote all her possessions to him, does he get it or not? And the problem was because normally the דין is that a husband inherits from his wife. So now that she died, so if she wouldn't have written all these possessions to her son, automatically her husband רב אבא would have inherited from her. But since she did write away all her possessions to her son, so he came, this son רב שמואל בר אבא, to רבי ירמיה בר אבא to find out what is

the דין. אוקמיה בנכסי, he kept him in the נכסים, he said the possessions belong to you. That since she wrote it to you before she died, so then her husband doesn't inherit. If she wouldn't have written it, he would have inherited, but being that she wrote it to you, so you get the first claim, and therefore he said that רב שמואל בר אבא keeps the נכסים. But obviously, the husband רב אבא was not happy with this. אזל רב אבא, רב אבא went, אמרה למילתא קמיה דרב הושעיא, he said this to רב הושעיא, he told him what happened. אזל רב הושעיא, אמרה קמיה דרב יהודה, so רב הושעיא went and said this to רב יהודה. אמר ליה, so רב יהודה said to him, הכי אמר שמואל, this is what שמואל said: האשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג בחיי בעלה, if a woman sells any of her נכסי מלוג in the lifetime of her husband, נכסי מלוג are things that belong to the wife, but while she's married to her husband, her husband eats the פירות, any profit that they bring in go to the husband. The principal belongs to her, but the profit goes to the husband, and after he divorces her or if he dies, it goes back to her as is when he dies or when he divorces her. So he said, if a woman sells from the נכסי מלוג the lifetime of her husband, ומתה, and she dies, הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות, so the husband could go and take it away from the לקוחות, from those that bought it. Since the דין is that a husband inherits from his wife, so she had no right to sell it, because the husband has the first claim over it. So therefore, the husband is able to go and take it away from the buyers. So here, too, since the husband has the right over it, she had no right to give it away to her son. And now that she died, the husband could come and take it away from the son. So he argued against the פסק דין of רבי ירמיה בר אבא. אמרוה קמיה דרבי ירמיה בר אבא, so they said this over to רבי ירמיה בר אבא. אמר להו, he said to them: אנא מתניתא ידענא, all I know is, I know a משנה. The reason I פסקנ'ד the way I did because I learned it out from a משנה. דתנן, we learn in a משנה: הכותב נכסיו לבנו לאחר מותו, if someone writes that all his possessions should go to his son after he dies, הבן אינו יכול למכור, so the son cannot sell them, מפני שהן ברשות האב, because they are still in the possession of the father. The father just wrote that after the father dies, it should go to the son, but till he dies, it's still in his possession. So even though it belongs essentially to the son, because he sold, he gave it away to him, but nevertheless, he has the right to eat the fruit, to take any profit it brings in, till he dies. So therefore, the son has no right to sell it, because as long as the father is alive, he is the one that eats the fruit from it, so it is in his רשות, so the son has no right to sell it. והאב אינו יכול למכור, the father cannot sell it, מפני שהן כתובין לבן, because they're written away to the son. So the field itself, the property itself belongs to the son, so therefore the father has no right to sell it to anybody else. מכר האב, if the father did sell it, מכורין, they are sold, עד שימות, till he dies, because as long as he's alive, he's supposed to eat the fruit, so he is able to sell his right. So if he sells it, the buyer eats the fruit, but as soon as he dies, so his right is finished, so the son comes and takes it away from the buyer, because now it goes to the son completely. But if מכר הבן, if the son sold it, אין לו ללוקח עד שימות האב, so the buyer has nothing of it till the father dies. Because as long as the father is alive, the son had no right over it, so the buyer who came in place of the son also has no right over it. So therefore, as long as the father is alive, the buyer from the son has no right over it. That's what we learned in the משנה. But from here we see, כי מיית אב קני ללוקח, that one thing we do see, from when it says that if the son sold it, the buyer has no right over it as long as the father is alive, comes out that when the father does die, then the לוקח gets it, the buyer gets it. And since in the משנה it didn't say whether the son is still alive or not, it didn't say that when does the buyer get it after the father dies, only if the son is still alive, it didn't say that. So it comes out that ואף על גב דמת הבן בחיי האב, even if the son died in the lifetime of his father, דלא אתא לידי הבן, so it never came to the possession of the son, nevertheless, when the father dies, it goes over to the buyer. כרבי שמעון בן לקיש, and this fits according to the way that רבי שמעון בן לקיש learned פשט in the משנה, דאמר that he said, לא שנא מת הבן בחיי האב, it makes no difference whether the son died in the lifetime of his father, דלא אתא לידי הבן, that it never entered the hands, the possessions of the son, ולא שנא מת האב בחיי הבן, makes no difference whether the father died in the lifetime of the son, that means that when the father died, the son was alive, דאתא לידי הבן, that it entered the possession of the son, in both cases, קנה לוקח, the לוקח gets it. If the father died first, then it's understood why the לוקח gets it. Since the son was supposed to get it after the father dies, so since the son sold it to a לוקח, so as soon as the father dies, it goes to the son, and the son already sold it, so right away it goes over to the לוקח. But what happens in the case where when the father died, the son wasn't alive anymore? So it never went over to the רשות of the son. So here there would be a סברא to say that the לוקח doesn't get it, the לוקח only gets it after the son gets it. He is a buyer from the son. But after the son has it, it goes to him. Here the son never got it, so maybe it shouldn't go over to him. But nevertheless, ריש לקיש says that the פשט in the משנה is that it still goes over to the לוקח. And from this משנה, he wanted to prove that the דין is that in the case of the mother that wrote the possessions to her son, and then she died, the father has no right to take it away. But before the גמרא managed to conclude how this proves the point, the גמרא went in to explain the מחלוקת between רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש פשט in this משנה. Because as we just said, it is ריש לקיש who learns the פשט in the משנה this way. So the גמרא already brings in the מחלוקת between רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש, because רבי יוחנן argues on ריש לקיש. And after we see the מחלוקת, the גמרא will come back to show how רבי ירמיה proved his point from this משנה. דאיתמר, because we learned, what would be the דין in the case mentioned before where the father wrote away his possessions to his son, and his son in middle sold the possession to someone else, so it says, מכר הבן בחיי האב ומת הבן בחיי האב, if the son sold the property in the lifetime of his father, but the son died in the lifetime of his father, so what would be the דין after the father dies? רבי יוחנן אמר, רבי יוחנן says, לא קנה לוקח. The לוקח, then, doesn't get it, because when he bought it, it was only that after the son gets it, he will get it. Since the son died before he got it, so the לוקח doesn't get it either. וריש לקיש אמר, ריש לקיש says, קנה לוקח, the לוקח does get it. And the גמרא explains the מחלוקת. דרבי יוחנן אמר לא קנה לוקח, רבי יוחנן holds the לוקח doesn't get it, אמר לך, he will say the פשט like this: כי קתני מתניתין, what did the משנה mean when it said that מכר הבן לא קנה לוקח עד שימות האב, that if the son sold it, the לוקח doesn't get it till after the father dies, which means, דכי מיית האב אית ליה ללוקח, that if the father dies, when he dies, the לוקח does get it, that means only דלא מת הבן בחיי האב, that's only in a case where the son did not die in the lifetime of the father, דאתא לידי הבן, so it went to the hands of the of the son. Since the son was alive when the father died, so as soon as the father died, automatically it goes to the son, and since the son sold it, it automatically goes to the לוקח. אבל מת הבן בחיי האב, but if the son would have died in the lifetime of his father, דלא אתא לידי הבן, that it never came to the hands of the son, כי מיית האב, so when the father dies, נמי לית ליה ללוקח, the לוקח doesn't have it either. He learns the פשט in the משנה definitely only in the case where the son was alive when the father died, that's when it goes to the לוקח. And אלמא we see, קסבר that he holds, קניין פירות כקניין הגוף דמי, that רבי יוחנן holds that anybody who owns possessions over something only enough that he eats the fruit from it, it's not really his, he just has the right to eat the fruit from it, it has the same דין as if he would own the whole thing. And therefore, וכי זבין לאו דידיה זבין, so when he sold it, he didn't sell his own, since in the lifetime of the father, even though it was given away to the son, but the father had the right to eat the פירות, and if we hold, that having a קנין over the פירות is as if you have the קנין over the thing itself, so it comes out that in the lifetime of the father, it is the father who had the ownership over the thing. So when the son sold it, he didn't sell his own thing, he had no right to sell it. And therefore, it doesn't go to the לוקח. But רבי שמעון בן לקיש אומר, and רבי שמעון בן לקיש says, קנה לוקח, the לוקח is קונה. And he explains the פשט that כי קתני מתניתין מכר הבן אין ללוקח עד שימות האב, that if the son sold it, the לוקח doesn't get anything of it until the father dies, which means that כי מיית האב מיהת אית ליה ללוקח, that when the father dies, the לוקח does get, so it means לא שנא, makes no difference that לא מת הבן בחיי האב, if the son did not die in the lifetime of his father, דאתי לידיה דבן, that it got into the hands of the son after the father died and then it goes to the לוקח. So then definitely it goes to

the לוקח. ולא שנא, it also makes no difference if מת הבן בחיי האב, if the son died in the lifetime of the father, דלא אתי לידיה דבן, that it never entered the hands of the son, also קנה לוקח, the לוקח also gets it, even though the son never got it. אלמא we see קסבר that he holds קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, that someone who owns the ownership, the right only over the profit, over the פירות, is not considered as if he owns the whole thing. And therefore, וכי קא זבין, when the son sold this field in the lifetime of his father, דידיה קא זבין, he sold his own. Even though he had no right over the פירות, the father had the right over the פירות, nevertheless, it is not considered the father's, because he owned it, the father only had the right over the פירות. But the right over the object itself, over the field itself, he had. And since the right over פירות is not considered the right over the whole thing, so it is not considered the father's, it is considered the son's, and therefore

the son had a right to sell it. That's the פשט in the משנה according to רבי יוחנן and according to ריש לקיש. Now the גמרא says, ואנן we השתא now בין רבי ירמיה בר אבא ובין רב יהודה כרבי שמעון בן לקיש סבירא להו. Whether it is רבי ירמיה בר אבא or רב יהודה, must hold like ריש לקיש, because the rule is in ש״ס that in this מחלוקת the הלכה is like ריש לקיש. So obviously, both of them hold like ריש לקיש. So both of them have to hold that when it says in the משנה that if the son sold it, the לוקח gets it after the father dies, it means even if the son died before the father died. And if we hold that way, this obviously proves that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף. And that's what the גמרא says רבי ירמיה holds.

והכי אמר רבי ירמיה בר אבא, so רבי ירמיה בר אבא says, אי סלקא דעתך קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי, that if someone owns the ownership only over the פירות, it is the same as if he would own the whole thing, כי מיית האב ומיית הבן בחיי האב, אמאי אית ליה ללוקח? After the father dies, if the son died earlier, before the father died, why does the לוקח get it? And obviously the דין is that the לוקח gets it, because we פסק'ן like ריש לקיש, because כי קא זבין לאו דידיה קא זבין. When he sold it he didn't sell his, it still belongs to the father if we hold קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי. And since we say that the לוקח does get it, אלא לאו שמע מינה, doesn't this prove that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, that the קנין over the fruit, over the profit, doesn't have the same דין as קנין הגוף? And therefore, when the son sold it, even though the father had the קנין פירות, the sale is a good sale, like ריש לקיש says. And that is the reason of רבי ירמיה בר אבא why he פסק'נד in our case that the husband has no right to take it away from the son. Even though while she was alive the husband ate the fruit, because the דין is by the נכסי מלוג that a wife brings into the marriage, the principle is hers, but the fruit is eaten by the husband, so if we would hold that קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי, so then she had no right to give it away to anybody, because since the husband has the ownership over the fruit, and that is as if he would have the ownership over the thing itself, so when she gave it away she's giving away not her thing. But since we just proved that from what ריש לקיש says we see that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, so here too, even though the husband, רב אבא, had the קנין פירות, still it is not כקנין הגוף. Who really owned it? She, because she owns the thing itself, the principle. So when she gave it away to רב שמואל בר אבא, she had a right to do it. And therefore, after she died, it goes to רב שמואל בר אבא, and her husband, רב אבא, can't take it away. But the

גמרא says, אהדרו לקמיה דרב יהודה, this got back to רב יהודה. רב יהודה was the one that said that she had no right to give it away, and the husband should take it away. So when he heard what רבי ירמיה had said, אמר להו, so he said to them, הכי אמר שמואל, this is what שמואל said, that זו אינה דומה למשנתנו, that this case, the case of a wife giving away something to her son, and then she dies, is not the same case as the משנה that we just quoted. Even if you hold like ריש לקיש, מאי טעמא, what is the reason? אמר רב יוסף, so רב יוסף said like this: We wanted to prove from this משנה the concept of קנין פירות is not כקנין הגוף. So he says, בשלמא אי תני איפכא, מילא if it would say just the opposite, the reverse, it would say הכותב נכסיו לאביו, if someone writes his possessions to his father, if a son writes away his possessions to his father, and there the דין would be that if the father sold it in the lifetime of the son, the לוקח doesn't get it, but after the son dies, the לוקח gets it, איכא למיפשט מינה, then you would have been able to prove from it דקנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, that the קנין of פירות is not like a קנין הגוף. Why? Because there would be no other reason to say, why is the דין that after the son dies, even if the father died before him, it still goes to the לוקח? לכאורה, when the father died before the son, so the father never got it from the son, how does it go to the לוקח? Obviously, the father had a right to sell it to the לוקח, because even though the son had the קנין פירות, the son left himself the right to eat the fruit as long as he's alive, but still, this father who received it from the son, he owned it, and therefore he had a right to sell it. And we do not say that since the son had a right over the פירות, that means that it's his and the father had no right to sell it. So then it would be a good ראיה that קנין פירות is not כקנין הגוף. אלא השתא, but now דקתני that since the משנה said הכותב נכסיו לבנו, that the case was when this father wrote away the נכסים to his son, so here you could say the reason why after the father dies it goes to the לוקח, even if the son died before, it is for a different reason, משום דראוי ליורשו, because the son was fit to inherit it from the father. Meaning, that normally, טאקע maybe קנין פירות כקנין הגוף. If someone leaves himself the right over the פירות, he has the right over the field, and the other person cannot sell it. The reason why here we say that if the son sold it, it is considered a sale, it is since he was able to inherit it. So the question is, why did the father write it for him anyway? The father wanted to eat the פירות while he's alive. After he would die, his son would get it anyway. So why did he have to write it? Obviously, what he meant was, he meant to give him away the ownership over the גוף, over the thing itself, while he is alive. So even though normally, since he left himself the ownership over the פירות, it is considered his, but in a case like this, we say that it is not considered his, because if he would mean to have it stay his, he wouldn't have written it, because during this time it's his anyway, when he would die, the son would get it anyway, what was the purpose in his writing it? Obviously, he meant to give away the true ownership to the son, even during his own lifetime. And therefore, here we say that even if the son died during the lifetime of the father, the sale is a sale, and after the father dies, the לוקח takes it. So if so, you cannot prove from this משנה that the דין is that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף, because maybe קנין פירות כקנין הגוף. And only in a case where he wrote it to somebody who would inherit it anyway, that's where we say that your קנין פירות is not כקנין הגוף. And therefore, in the case of רב שמואל בר אבא, since he is not ראוי ליורשו, he would not have inherited from his mother, because the דין is that a husband inherits from a wife and not a son. So therefore, here we cannot say the reason she wrote it to him is because she wanted to give him away the complete גוף. Here we say the reason she wrote it to him because she wanted him to have it after she dies rather than her husband having it. But since normally the דין is that קנין פירות is כקנין הגוף, and the husband had the קנין פירות, so she had no right to give it away, and therefore, when she died, it should go to the husband, not to the son. אמר ליה אביי, so אביי said to him, what did you say? That if the דין would have been in the משנה concerning a son giving away his נכסים to his father, so there we would have a ראיה that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף. Since the case is when a father wrote to a son, and since a son is fit to ירשן, there we say the דין is different. So he said, אטו ברא ירת אבא, אבא לא ירת ברא? Is only the דין that a son inherits from a father, a father doesn't inherit from his son? If a son dies and leaves a father, a father could also inherit from the son. So a father is also called ראוי ליורשו. So just like you say that the way the משנה is written now, we cannot prove that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף, because maybe the reason his sale was a good sale because ראוי ליורשו, the same thing would have been if the case would have been different, if the case would have been when a son wrote his נכסים to his father. אלא we must say לאברוחינהו לנכסי מברכתא. What was the reason? If the case would have been of a son that he wrote his נכסים to his father, why would he have done it? The פשט is, he didn't want his own children to get it, because the דין is if a person dies and has children, they come first, even if he has a father, his own children ירשן first. For some reason he didn't want his children to ירשן, so therefore he wrote his נכסים to his father. And the reason why his giving away is valid, and therefore the דין would be that even if his father died before him, nevertheless it would go to the לוקח, is because קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף, so since he left to himself only the קנין פירות, his father has the right to sell, because it's considered his father's not his, even though he has the right over the פירות. So הכא נמי now too, in the case that the משנה is written, that when a father writes the נכסים to his son, the reason for it probably would be לאברוחינהו לנכסי מאחוותא. He has more sons, brothers of this one son, and for some reason he doesn't want them to get it. Therefore, he wrote away all the נכסים to this one son. And what is the reason it's valid, that this son is able to sell it, that even if he will die first, nevertheless it'll go to the לוקח? It must be because קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף. The only reason we said before why we cannot prove from the משנה that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף, is because the question we asked was, why did he have to write it to him? He would have ירשנ'ט anyway. So since he wrote it over to him, probably it is because he wants to give it to him more than regular, so he gave it to him away completely. So therefore, even though normally could be קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, and when the father is left with the קנין פירות it's really his, but since he wrote it to a son for no reason, he probably gave him more right over it. But we said now, no, there is a reason why he wrote it to a son, not because he wanted to give him more right over it, he wrote it to a son because he doesn't want the other brothers to have it, but not because he wanted to give him more right. Now, since this is not an extraordinary case, why is the דין that the son has a right to sell it, and if the son would die before the father nevertheless it would go to the לוקח, it must be because he has a right to sell בעצם? Even though the father has the right over the פירות, קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, and the right of sale is for the son, not for the father. So we're back to the ראיה, that from this משנה we see that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף. And now that we see that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף, automatically in the case of רב שמואל בר אבא, the דין should be it should stay with him, because the husband only had קנין הפירות, and since קנין פירות לאו is not כקנין הגוף, so the mother had a right at that time to give it away to whoever she wanted, and since she gave it away to her son, her son should keep it. So לכאורה, this proves what רב ירמיה בר אבא פסקנט. So what did שמואל mean that this case is not similar to the case of the משנה? אלא מאי אינה דומה למשנתנו, so we must say what did he mean that this is not similar to the משנה? משום תקנת אושא. Because the משנה has a special דין because of a special תקנה that the חכמים were מתקן in the city of אושא. אמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא, because רבי יוסי בר חנינא said, באושא התקינו, in אושא the חכמים made a תקנה that an אשה שמכרה בנכסי מלוג בחיי בעלה, a woman sells from her נכסי מלוג in the lifetime of her husband, ומתה, and she dies, הבעל מוציא מיד הלקוחות, the husband can take away from the לקוחות. So this is a special דין only concerning a wife selling her נכסי מלוג. So טאקע in the משנה we see that קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי, and therefore, concerning a father and a son, if the father left himself the קנין פירות, and gave away the קנין הגוף to the son, the son has the right to sell it. And if he sells it, then it belongs to the one that bought it. And therefore, even if the father died after him, nevertheless it goes to the לוקח. But in the case of רב שמואל בר אבא, since there it was a case of a woman giving away her נכסי מלוג to somebody else, there there is a special תקנה, as they were מתקן in אושא, that a woman if she sells her נכסי מלוג the lifetime of her husband, and then she dies, her husband is able to go to the לקוחות and take it away. And the reason for that was משום איבה,

because the חכמים wanted to avoid any hatred between husband and wife, so they made this תקנה to strengthen their companionship. Because if the דין would be that she has a right to sell it, then this might cause that the husband will get upset. So therefore the חכמים said that she has no right to sell. And therefore, in this case שמואל בר אבא, the נכסים have to go to the husband, not to the son, רב שמואל בר אבא. But

תוספות ask the קשיא: According to רבי יוחנן, who holds קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, וממילא when a woman has נכסי מלוג, so then the husband who eats the פירות owns the גוף at that time anyway, and a woman has no right to sell it because of the דין of קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, what was the reason for the תקנה in אושא? Why did the חכמים in אושא have to make a תקנה that if a woman sold her נכסי מלוג, so then her husband could later go to the לקוחות and take it away? If not for this תקנה, the דין would be the same. Since קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, so מצד הדין, the wife has no right to sell, because the husband has a קנין פירות. So if not for the תקנה, she couldn't sell it anyway. So what was the reason for the תקנה in אושא? And תוספות answers that there could be a case where the husband will not have a קנין פירות. For instance, if the husband לכתחילה writes to her that he takes upon himself not to take any profits from her possessions, not from the פירות, not from the פירות of the פירות, not from the profit that the profit will bring in, etc., עד סוף העולם, forever. Now in a case like that, since he himself said that he will not take any profit, so he has no קנין הפירות. So if only מצד הדין of קנין פירות כקנין הגוף, she would have a right to sell in that case, because he has no קנין פירות in that case, so her sale should be valid. So that's where the חכמים in אושא made a תקנה that no matter what, anytime a woman sells her נכסי מלוג, even if there is no קנין פירות to the husband, nevertheless, after she dies, the husband could go to the לקוחות and take it back.