Kesubos 21b — Iyun
If You Admit You Owe, Do You Also Admit You Borrowed?
Part of Kesubos (Iyun) · 50:15
A wide-ranging Kesubos 21 shiur that opens with whether a witness and a judge can combine to verify a document, then pivots into the classic machloket between the Ketzos and the Maharival on hoda'as ba'al din -- does a person's own admission establish what actually happened, or only create a new obligation to pay? Brings in the Rebbe's chiddush on shemittah debts, a Bava Metzia case of theft from one of five people, and a Beit Shmuel-Chelkas Mechokek dispute on conditional kiddushin, before circling back to answer the Meiri's original question.
Audio Transcript
Here the Gemara in כתובות דף כ״א עמוד א׳. Here is a סוגיא that talks about קיום שטרות. When you have a document and signed by witnesses, you have to confirm the witnesses. Then you would have to come to בית דין and the בית דין would confirm it, verify it, and then the בית דין would write a הנפק. A הנפק is the verification notice, the certification of the שטר, and the בית דין would sign it. Now, what would be if somebody comes and claims that the signatures of the בית דין is forged? Could do that, too. So here the Gemara says like this: אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: עד ודיין מצטרפין. That if there is a question on the signatures, and then there is a הנפק, a certification, and now there is a question on the certification itself. Comes one of the witnesses that signed, and he says, \"Yes, this is my signature.\" And then, one of the judges who signed the certification comes says, \"Yes, this is my signature.\" So now you have two witnesses, seems to be seen there seems to be two witnesses who are certifying this שטר. So he says, \"Yes, עד ודיין מצטרפין, one witness and one judge can be combined together, and now you have two, and this שטר is a כשר שטר.\" אמר Rami bar Chama, Rami bar Chama said, כמה מעליא הא שמעתא! Ah, how geshmak, how right, how good this הלכה is! אמר Rava, so Rava said, מאי מעליותא? What's so good about it? מאי דקא מסהיד סהדא לא קא מסהיד דיינא. What the עד is testifying, the דיין, the judge, is not testifying. ומאי דקא מסהיד דיינא לא קא מסהיד סהדא. And what the judge is testifying, the witness is not testifying. And where Rashi explains, עדי השטר מעידים על מנה שבשטר כרבנן. This was our argument in the Gemara before, but the bottom line is that the רבנן hold that when the עדים themselves who signed the שטר come and say, \"This is our signature,\" they are basically testifying on the money of the שטר. They're not testifying on the signatures. See, there are a few ways a person could certify a בית דין could certify a שטר. One of the ways is, as I said, the two witnesses who signed come themselves to בית דין and say, \"Yes, these are our signatures.\" Or, you could have other two people, strangers, who have no idea what went on with this with this, you know, with the loan or with everything else with this, but they come and they say, \"We recognize the signatures.\" So when they come to say that, they have no idea about the מנה שבשטר, about the money that's written in the שטר. All they're speaking about is the signatures. Now that the signatures are good, and the signature signed a שטר where it said he borrowed money, we know he borrowed money, but they're not talking about the money. But when the witnesses themselves who had actually signed the שטר come and say it's our signature, we accept it as they're saying, \"Yes, we're testifying that he owes him the money,\" or he borrowed the money. So Rashi says this is what the Gemara means, עדי השטר מעידים על מנה שבשטר כרבנן. The witnesses of the שטר are testifying on the money of the שטר, and therefore, in this case where you have one witness and one judge, so the eid, the witness that's testifying, he's speaking about one thing. So we have one witness saying that this guy borrowed the money, והדיינים מעידים בפנינו נתקיים, and the judges are testifying that there was a kiyum done in front of us. So when you have one judge testifying that there was a kiyum done in front of him, so he's testifying one thing and the judge is testifying something else. And therefore, Rava argues and Rava says עד ודיין אין מצטרפין, you do not combine. And actually the Gemara continues and says, אלא כי אתא רמי בר יחזקאל אמר, when Rami bar Yechezkel came—now Rami bar Yechezkel was the brother of Rav Yehuda, because who was the one that said before in the name of Shmuel that you do combine the two? Rav Yehuda. Comes Rami bar Yechezkel and he says, לא תציתו להני כללי דכייל יהודה אחי משמיה דשמואל. \"Don't believe my brother that he said that Shmuel said that you do combine the two, because we don't.\" So we have here the machloket whether עד ודיין מצטרפין or not. Okay. \"Don't believe my brother meaning he didn't say it, or\" No, he's wrong. Said it משמיה דשמואל, it's not true because the din is a wrong din. A dayan, eid and dayan you cannot combine mitztaref, and the reason is, because as the Gemara says, they're testifying by two separate things: that the eid is testifying on one thing and the dayan on the other thing, so you can't combine. It's as if you have two עד אחד, two one witnesses that are speaking about two separate things. Okay.
Comes the Meiri, and like here you have the quote of the Meiri, and the Meiri asks a kashya: Why is this different than the Gemara in Sanhedrin? The Gemara in Sanhedrin, דף ל״ב עמוד ב׳, here you have a shtikel piece of the Gemara, the Gemara says like this, \"רבא, תא שמע דאמר רב: הודאה אחר הודאה או הודאה אחר הלוואה מצטרפת, הלוואה אחר הלוואה, הלוואה אחר הודאה לא מצטרפת.\" But he says that if you have two witnesses, and one witness comes and says, \"I saw him borrow money. I saw him borrow $100,\" one witness, and another witness comes and says, \"I heard him admitting that he borrowed the money,\" so you mitztaref them. So these two are two Now you have two eidim that he owes him the $100. So comes the Meiri and says, why is that different in our case? We have the Meiri here, we quoted the Meiri here, on Sanhedrin. It says, \"ומתוך כך אני חוכך לפסוק עד ודיין\", oh, okay. \"Ela shemikol makom\", oh, he has the kashya, let's look back. \"אלא שמכל מקום יש לפקפק\", right on top here, \"במה שאמרו בהלוואה אחר הודאה שמצטרפות,\" I have a kashya on this din, that we said that if you have one witness that he borrowed and one witness that he was modeh, it's mitztaref, \"כמשיתבאר בסנהדרין. ואף על גב דמאי דקא מסהיד האי לאו מאי דקא מסהיד האי,\" even though one is saying, \"I saw the loan,\" and one is saying that \"I heard him being modeh,\" which is similar to what we're doing here! One says, \"I saw the\" The ed is saying, \"על מנה שבשטר, I saw the loan,\" and the dayan is saying that the shtar is a good shtar, מקוים the shtar, and we can't combine them. How come over there we could? \"ומתוך כך אני חוכך לפסוק\", therefore, I think that the halachah is עד ודיין מצטרפין. Because in that Gemara we see that we do not care the fact that they're two separate inyanim. So then we should paskan here the same. Okay. \"Ela\", he says, I have a terutz to the kashya, \"Umikol makom\", sevara peshutah, I have an answer why this case is different than that case. Why? \"בזו תרווייהו אממונא קא מסהדי.\" Because in the case of one guy is speaking about the loan, and one guy testified that he admitted, they're both talking about the money. \"והדיין אינו מעיד על גוף המעשה כלל.\" But the dayan is not saying anything about the ma'aseh itself, not saying anything about the story. The dayan doesn't know about the loan, but the ed does speak talk about the loan, and over there it's different. Now, this Meiri needs peshat, because because what's it? Why is it any different over there? All the judge is talking about is the court process. Right, no, but what does It has nothing to do with the loan, nothing to do with The court process was imported for One second. One second. The judge says that, \"I'm testifying that the shtar is good, mekuyam.\" And what does that mean automatically, as a result? That he owes him the $100! I don't know, I didn't see him borrow the money, but I know that the shtar, which have the edim signed, I was there by the kiyum, I signed the kiyum, so I know that the shtar is good. And if the shtar is good, automatically the money is good. The shtar says he owes him $100. What is the case of the of the הודאה, the other case? The guy says, \"I saw him borrow the money. I know he borrowed the money. I saw, I heard him admit.\" That's all. Since he admitted, the דין is הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי. When a person admits, it's as good as 100 witnesses that a person We believe him. So now we know that he owes the money. So in both cases, it seems like they're not מעיד on the גוף המעשה. They're not saying on the מעשה itself. The second witness is not saying he saw the loan, he's not saying the מעשה. There's a result of what the Since the guy admitted, so we know there was a מעשה. So what is the difference between these two cases? What does actually the Meiri mean that there's a difference, when by the דיין he says it's not the גוף המעשה, and by the case of the admitting, it is called that he's admitting on the same thing that that guy is other guy is testifying? This needs ביאור. So we're going to go into here, and this will be the main thing, not so much of this Gemara here, but mainly on explaining what is the גדר of הודאת בעל דין. Obviously, from here we see that when a person admits and we say הודאת בעל דין, a person that admits it's like 100 witnesses, that means we believe him, is not exactly the same like the case where I know for sure the שטר is good, and ממילא I know he owes him the money. There's a different גדר here. So let's go into this. This is one of the things I explained in one and even two, I think, שיעורים this year already, because it happened to come up a few places before, this concept of הודאת בעל דין. And we'll go back to that ענין again.
Normally, we have the famous מחלוקת between the Ketzot and the Mahariv ben Lev in this ענין. And that's familiar because we spoke about it. What is it? The Ketzot quotes the Mahariv ben Lev, where the Mahariv ben Lev asks the question: How do we say הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי? How do we say that when a person admits, it's like witnesses, when a person's אדם קרוב אצל עצמו? A person is a relative Not a relative, but he's a בעל דין. He's the one He's the litigant himself. He's one of the בעלי דינים. So he's נוגע בדבר. How can he be a witness? How can you believe him? Just like you can't believe a If he says, \"I don't owe you the money,\" can't believe him if I say, \"I do owe you the money.\" So how could there how can we believe a הודאת בעל דין? Therefore, he quotes that the Maggid Mishneh answers that הודאת בעל דין is not נאמנות. We do not believe him. We do not believe him that he really or he says, \"I borrowed a hundred dollars,\" we don't believe him. It's like a התחייבות חדשה. Just like a person has a right to come and be מחייב himself and to make himself חייב, to say, \"I promise I'll give you money,\" and you make a קנין, whatever it is, you're חייב to get to pay. So when he says, \"I borrowed money from you,\" we don't know if he borrowed, we don't accept he borrowed. He has to pay anyway, because it's התחייבות חדשה. Comes the Ketzot and the Ketzot asks many קשיות on the Maggid Mishneh, showing different Gemarot, that from the Gemarot it comes out that it's not that, that it's really a ne'emanut. When a person admits that he owes the money, we believe him, the Torah says we believe him. Ai, the קשיא is, how could you believe him when he is a נוגע בדבר, he's a בעל דין, he's the person himself? The Ketzot answers, it's a גזירת הכתוב that it's ne'emanut. The Torah said, like normally a קרוב is not believed, normally a נוגע בדבר, somebody who has a personal interest is not believed, not for good, not for bad, but in this case, when a person admits, \"I owe money,\" we have a גזירת הכתוב, the Torah says we believe him. Where do we find this גזירת הכתוב? Migo? No, there's no migo here. What kind of migo? Somebody is modeh, so I mean he could have... No. ער קען נישט מודה זיין? Yeah. Good, but he is modeh. A migo here is when the guy wants to be patur, he could have been patur with a better ta'anah and he's patur with this ta'anah. Here the guy's not patur, he's saying straight, \"I'm chayav.\" So what about money? Huh? Only by money. But it could be he has an interest, right? He has the interest to say that \"I don't owe the money,\" but when he says if he can't, either way, \"I owe the money...\" What about a קרוב, let's say? A קרוב would say that this brother brother of mine owes the money, would you believe him? A קרוב will say that he owes the money. Milah if a קרוב says he doesn't owe, I can understand, he wants to help his brother. But if a קרוב says that brother says, \"I'm an עד that he owes the money,\" you don't believe him. Not every brother is so friendly. Yeah. That's the that's the vort of the, like I said from Ibn Ezra, I think, as a kid, nu, they asked him, \"Why is a brother or somebody like that not believed when he says against his brother?\" קורבא, מילא, you understand that. So he answered, nu, by עדות it says in the תורה ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה׳, the two men have to stand in front of Hashem, a brother that can speak against his brother is not a mentsh. Okay, that's a pshatl he said as a kid there. Sure. But this din is even when it's for against yourself. Take not by money. A person comes and says, \"I'm innocent of being מחלל שבת,\" obviously we don't believe him. א vadai he says he's innocent. What happens if he said, \"I'm guilty\"? We don't believe him either! אין אדם משים עצמו רשע! What's the פשט אין אדם משים עצמו רשע? A person is not believed when he says against himself! He's not believed if he says for his benefit or against himself! And the reason is why? Actually, Rashi here says, in the Gemara before, why אין אדם משים עצמו רשע, רש״י: אינו נאמן לפסול עצמו, because de קרוב הוא אצל עצמו, קרוב פסול לעדות. Wait, so if he admits that he owes the money, and if he admits that he's a rasha, that's not משים עצמו רשע? No, no, I'm saying על דרך זה, not that it's a rasha. But I'm saying the vort is that a person is not believed for himself even if it's for the bad! Not bad, if it was for his benefit or against his benefit, a person is not believed! If I owe somebody money, yeah so, it's not משים עצמו רשע. How do we know he's saying the truth? Oh, but he's not משים עצמו... Not a rasha, not of a rasha, but it's against, your shaila is it's against yourself. Against your interest. It's against your interest, but we don't believe anyway! Whoever is a נוגע בדבר is not believed even if it's against the interest. Isn't it... Why? Why? Because he's a liar? No, if it's to your interest, that has to... No, that's not because of that! נוגע, a בעל דין is not believed in anything as an... He could be believed in a טענה, not of עדות. Not in being believed. If a בעל דין says something, we just take him as a טענה from a בעל דין, but we can't say he has נאמנות! On what basis does he have נאמנות? A person about himself has no din of נאמנות. What, because he's קרוב אצל עצמו, and he is more, he is the person himself! On yourself you cannot be an עד. Even against you? Even against you! That's the that's the klal. We don't know why, what, because it's safer that way. You're speaking of logic of of of a lawyer. Safer, I don't know... No, no, but the but the Torah says the klal, that a person cannot, a person on himself cannot say anything, he is not believed. If two people come to בית דין, halfway through the process he decides to admit that to pay, or that he's chayav, listen, halfway through is... If a guy admits, \"I owe\", and then he says, \"I'm ready to pay,\" gezunterheit, that's not what we're talking about! He admitted that he owed, and later he said, \"I don't want to pay.\" Nu, can you call him to בית דין or not? Can בית דין force him to pay? That's the shaila here. He doesn't want to pay. If he wants to pay, gezunterheit, you could give a guy, you could throw away your money if you want! No one could stop you. No, the shaila is, he admitted, \"I owe,\" and, \"I don't want to pay.\" So, the din is הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים, and we know that you owe, and you have to pay. No, or that or that, either, \"I don't want to pay,\" or because, \"I don't want to pay,\" or because, \"I paid,\" and then it goes into the she'eilos in a case where you're not ne'eman to say פרעתי, in a case you're not ne'eman to say פרעתי. But obviously the case is where he doesn't want to give. So, we say, \"Too bad, you were modeh.\" Imagine two witnesses would come and say you owe the money, you have to pay. When you admitted, you have to pay, too. The she'eilah of the Mahari"l is, how do you do that? It's not a דין עדים. And he answered, \"You're right, it's takeh not a דין עדים. It's a דין התחייבות, it's חיוב חדש that he says, 'I'm mechayev myself.'\" And the Ketzos says we see by the דין of מודה במקצת that the Torah says we believe him. When a guy is The Torah makes a special דין that if a person admits to part, you have to swear because he admitted to part. If we don't believe him when he admitted to part, why would he have to swear? The Torah is because there's a difference between כופר הכל and מודה במקצת. Obviously, we do believe him. Anyway, he brings out that that the Torah makes a גזירת הכתוב that there is a דין of נאמנות, we believe him. Now, what I tried to explain once before with ba'arichut, I'm not going to go through all the arichut now, but the truth is, if you don't go through all the arichut, it doesn't sound so so strong, but just the point that since even according to the Ketzos, it's a גזירת הכתוב, the Torah made a דין of נאמנות that we believe him, this is a strange thing. I would say you believe him, and you don't believe him at the same time. You believe him what you what that you have to. You believe him that he owes the money, that he has to pay the money, you believe him, but you don't believe him necessarily that he borrowed. Where do we find such a thing that that we're able to differentiate in the same loan, the same thing, between the, let's call it in לשון קודש, the חוב and the חיוב to pay? There's two things: there is a חוב, I borrowed money, so I have a חוב, then there is a חיוב to pay. So, I'm trying to make a chiluk here that since it's a גזירת הכתוב, and the כלל by חידוש of the Torah is אין לך בו אלא חידושו, you only go to the minimum, so the Torah says you believe him, and he has to pay, so now he's חיוב חדש. And it answers some of the question, and it according to this also, some of the question the previous, Maharib"l, doesn't apply, because this would be enough to answer it. Basically, what I'm saying is that he we believe him that you that he has to pay, but we not necessarily know that what he says, \"I borrowed,\" he takeh borrowed. We believe him only לגבי the bottom line. Because of the Torah, we believe him partially. Now, there are certain things we can believe him in the one part, we don't believe him the other. איי, it seems like a contradiction, we don't believe him. So, that we find I brought examples, many cases where we find in דיני ממונות, we believe because the Torah makes you believe. Just just to give you an example, I don't want to go to all the פרטים, that we believe by the case of, also the Gemara in כתובות before, המכשיר בה פוסל בבתה. The Gemara says if a woman that we don't know, she we see her pregnant, and we don't know from who, and we're afraid maybe the guy was a ממזר, a פסול, a נתין, and all kinds of things, we don't know, and we ask her, and she says, \"Guy, he's a kosher'e guy, he a כשר'ע, מיוחס, he's a chashuve guy.\" So, there's a מחלוקת of Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabban Gamliel says we believe her. And the reason is because she has a חזקת כשרות, we believe her, she has a נאמנות because she has a חזקה that she's kosher, cuz till this happened, she every woman is a חזקה that she's kosher, so this ספק that we have is not enough to make a פסול, so we believe her that the guy is kosher. Then the Gemara has a שאלה, the child that's born, is the child also kosher? So, one opinion says, \"Sure. If she's kosher, that means we believe her that she was נבעלה, she was with a kosher'e person, so automatically the child is kosher.\" No, we asked her. And another מאן דאמר says, \"המכשיר בה פוסל בבתה, the daughter is פסול.\" Why? She we believe her because she has a חזקה. Till now, she was kosher, so we say that we believe her that it didn't change. The child is born with the ספק, the child has no חזקה. Makes no sense, שכל, how can you contradict? אלא מאי, the halacha says that her ne'emanus is based on halacha, it's an הלכה'דיגע נאמנות, it's not that we really know what happened. The halacha says that we believe her that that she is kasher, mimela, the halacha doesn't say for the child. It's just an example that we find. So, the same thing I want to say here, where do we find such a thing that we could differentiate, make a chiluk between, saying a difference between the chiyuv to pay and the chov?
So, we find that, I've brought that last time, in the Rebbe's chiddush in din of shemittah. The opposite direction, but it brings out the point. The Rebbe asked that kashya, that he says the the Mishnah says, המחזיר חוב בשביעית, רוח חכמים נוחה הימנו. Shemittah comes Your loan falls, you don't have to pay anymore. Nevertheless, if someone comes and says, \"I want to pay,\" so first the the lender has to say, \"משמט אני.\" Shemittah. If the the borrower says, \"אף על פי כן,\" very good, give it back. Not only it's good, the chachamim are happy if a person returns. And the she'eilah that the Rebbe asks him, \"Why are why are chachamim happy? There is no more loan, why are you happy?\" I mean, imagine the chachamim are happy if you give a present? I mean, it used to be a loan, but the Torah says it's not a loan anymore. So why are they happy? And not only that, the Gemara even the Mishnah calls it המחזיר חוב בשביעית. It's not a chov! I mean, it's not a loan! And he brings more, the Rebbe, re'ayot. And therefore the Rebbe says a new chiddush, and and I'm not going to go through all the arichut, last time I went through all the arichut, that the peshat is not like you think, that when shemittah comes, there is no more loan. The loan is still there. The Torah just says it's a loan that you don't have to pay. He owes, but he doesn't have to pay. And he's mechalek between these two things, between the chiyuv and the chov. The chov is there, and you don't have to pay. Therefore, if somebody comes and wants to pay, he's not giving a matanah from something he doesn't, he's paying back what he owes, but he didn't have to, the Torah said, \"shamot.\" And the Rebbe taytsh't the word shamot means falls, drop drops the collection. That's all. It's not that the loan doesn't exist. That's why it's lifnim mishurat hadin, and if you Okay, a peshat. But here we find this by by a borrowing money, by a loan, we find the same idea that you could divide between the two. Now I once explained this, I think that this is one inyan of a pirush also, when we say ייאוש קונה, if someone loses something and he's מייאש, he gives up hope, then anybody what finds could keep it. It's also strange. Because he gave up hope, you could keep it? What's the reason? So, I'm saying when you give up hope, it's still yours. The Torah was מתיר that you don't have to return something that's somebody else's. The Torah said even though it's his, the Torah be'emet the lashon in is the lashon in the Gemara is, מניין לאבידה שנתייאשו ממנה שהיא מותרת? You lose a thing, you say what, you מסלק yourself, not when you lose it it's still you it's still yours and the guy who finds it has to return it. If you're מייאש, now by being מייאש, all you're doing you're מסלק yourself from it, saying It's not not like הפקר. הפקר, it becomes not yours at all. And then is there any din that if I find something that you were מפקיר and I it's a good idea to return it? Why? Even if you come and say, \"You know what, I really, I changed my mind. I really shouldn't be מפקיר it.\" There's nowhere where it says, you know what, it's a good idea, lifnim mishurat hadin, the Chachamim would be happy if you return it. Why? The Chachamim would be happy if you want something and I'm able to help you, why not? The same thing with your money. By ייאוש, the Gemara says, we just learned it in Bava Metzia, the Gemara says lifnim mishurat hadin you should return it. Why? By an אבידה, a person loses an אבידה, by a person who by an אבידה, if you find it, you could keep it, if it's מייאש. So, what I'm trying to say that there also, the Gemara uses a לשון, מניין לאבידה שהיא מותרת? Doesn't מותרת means you're allowed to take something that it's not It should have said מניין לאבידה שאינה שלו? It's still שלו, but you could keep it. There're certain things that we could divide between these two. The same thing here also by Shemitah, the pshat is that the חוב is still there, the חיוב is not there. The חוב is one person's, and the חיוב is somebody else's, and the חיוב is not to give, and the חוב is. I want to say the same thing is נוגע הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי. The pshat is not that when you're modeh, we know that there was a a חוב. לגבי the חוב, לגבי the fact that you borrowed and you owe the money, we don't believe you. We don't know! We believe you enough that you have to pay. So, we're mechalek between the having to pay. So, הודאת בעל דין doesn't deal with the מעשה that happened. הודאת, see, according to the Mahari Ben Lev, הוואדע הוואדע, he says לכתחילה we don't know what happened. We don't even believe you בכלל, we just say you're מחייב yourself. But even according to the the Ketzot wanna say since it's a חידוש, it's a גזירת הכתוב, we don't go that far, and we say we believe you only in connection to the fact that you have to pay. If you're modeh, you have to pay. Same thing. Well, comes into a Few cases. Okay, so That's let's look in here. I don't know. Maybe he's not saying the truth, but that's what we believe, that he admitted. No, we believe that he owes the money. Let's look into here.
Here you have a Gemara in Bava Metzia דף ל״ז עמוד א׳. The Gemara says like this, גזל אחד מחמשה if a person stole from one of five people ואינו יודע מאיזה מהם גזל, he didn't know from who, זה אומר אותי גזל וזה אומר אותי גזל, this guy five people, each one says, he stole from me, מניח גזילה ביניהם ומסתלק דברי רבי טרפון. רבי טרפון says, take the whatever it was stolen, put it down between let them break their heads. Okay. Let's skip a little. Then the Gemara asks like אמר מר. If you have two lines from the bottom of this התם דקתבעי ליה מאי אמר להו. The case here is each one of the five says, you stole from me. What does he answer them? What's the claim? What does he say to each one? So רב יהודה אמר רב הלא שתיק. רב יהודה אמר רב says, no, the case is he's quiet. And רב מתנה אמר רב הלא צווח He admits? that he's screaming, no! Not you. To each one that comes over, no, I don't you're not, not you. And the first מ״ד says he's quiet. Now the Gemara explains, מאן דאמר הלא צווח, the one that says that when is the din that he only gives one and let them fight it out is when he is screaming, what would that מ״ד hold if he's quiet? What does he say is the din? אבל שתיקה כהודאה. Yeah. But if he's quiet, we have a כלל if you're quiet, you're modeh, so basically, he was modeh to each one. And therefore, what would be the din there? He has to give five. He has to pay, not split, has to give each one. Oh, a lot more possibility. One second. Comes the Shita Mekubetzet as you see here, and he says here: Yeah. אבל שתיקה כהודאה פירוש כגון דהאמינו לראשון כי שקתו ויהי. When the first first person comes and says, you stole for me, and he's quiet, that means he admits. He believes him, yes, you. Then דהכי נמי לשני, דהניח אחד עבור השני. He says, yes, but he's the second וכן כולם. נמצא כולם היו באמונה. So, they're all He was modeh to all of them, שהאמינם כוח שנתחייב להם. He's modeh and therefore, he has to pay. The other one says, that שתיקה is not כהודאה in this case, whatever. He says in this case, cuz not always do we hold that if you're quiet, you you admit. Sometimes the opposite. We find in the Gemara that if you're quiet, because I don't care what you say, I don't even care enough to answer you. לא איכפת ליה. Good, but the first מ״ד holds שתיקה כהודאה, that if you admit, if you're quiet, you admit it. So, it comes out here and the Shita explains, what is the reason that if he admitted, if he was quiet to all five, which would mean that he has to pay all five? Why? Because if you admit you have a shaychus. You ever hear such a thing? We know for sure he only stole from one, so how is he chayav all five? It's like קנס. There's no קנס, there's no קנס. There's no fuck no קנס. אלא מאי? The answer is like this: So according to the, well, then it's not a problem. He's מחייב! הודאה admitting is מחייב, so he's מחייב all five, he can מחייב 50 people. But according to the Ketzos, how does he learn this Gemara? According to the Ketzos that we're saying it's נאמנות, we believe him, He himself says clearly, I only stole from one, אלא מאי he did it to all five. So what's up? How do you believe him to all five? We know we know for sure there's no shailos, every one of the five people knows there was only one guy. Each one says it's me. So, I'm saying if we would say it's נאמנות on the מעשה then we couldn't say this and even if he's quiet and he admits to all, he only has to give one, he puts down. The fact that we פסק he has to give based on his הודאה to all five is because we had acquired a חיוב to pay, we believe him, and therefore, we don't go with the מעשה. There is a we believe you that there is a חיוב to pay. How seems to be a סתירה, it's like over there the case of מנא מה שכבר פסל בו ביטו. How is the סתירה? Another thing. The problem is that four guys are lying. How? The problem is that four guys are lying. Yeah, they are shouting, but what do we care? We don't care about them, we care about him, he's modeh. Let's go to another thing here. See here?
There is in Taz in Shulchan Aruch, in Even HaEzer there's a machloket between the Beit Shmuel and the Chelkat Mechokek. When a person gives קידושין on condition, and you could give קידושין on condition, he gives קידושין on condition that this and this person owes me money. So, sometimes we know that the guy owes. What happens if we don't know? He comes to him, let's say, a week later and you ask him, do you owe? He says, yes, I owe. So, we know he owes. How do we know he owes? הודאת בעל דין, he was modeh. So, here if you look at the Beit Shmuel, the Beit Shmuel, look at the last few lines. ומזה נראה אם אמר על מנת שיש לי ביד פלוני he says לא מהני הודאת פלוני. The fact that the person admits doesn't help. כי אף על פי דמהני הודאה להתחייב את עצמי מכאן ולהבא. A person his הודאה helps that he is חייב from now on. וכל כך אין ידוע אם היה בשעת הודאה. But we don't know if before that, בשעת קידושין if he owes. That's So again, the Beit Shmuel holds, if he makes a condition that he owes me and the guy admits it's not a קידושין because we still don't know. הודאת בעל דין כמאתיים עדים Look what the Chelkat Mechokek says: אם איתא דטענו והודה לפנינו, נראה דההודאה הוי כעדים. It is like עדים. He just said, I don't know if the woman will rely on it. She wants to She wants cash למפרע. So he said, yeah, למפרע it goes, yeah. But that's a side thing, he says. יש לומר דאין אשה סומכת רק על עדים. She wouldn't She doesn't rely, she's afraid. But as far as the halacha is, this is good. Now, normally you learn that what is the machloket between the Beit Shmuel and the Chelkat Mechokek? The way real אחרוני אחרונים learn that it's a machloket between the Ketzot and the Netivot HaMishpat. That if you hold like a Netivot HaMishpat that it's a new חיוב, so when he gave her קידושין was before he was מודה. He's מודה tomorrow. So he just מחייב himself, but it doesn't mean that when he gave the קידושין he had. משא\\"כ the Chelkat Mechokek will learn like the Ketzot, that it's a ממון, that we believe. Once that we believe, so mimela we believe the מעשה that yesterday he owed money, because he says yesterday I borrowed, a month ago I borrowed. But I want to say it's לאו דווקא. Based on what we're saying here, you could say that they both go according to Ketzot. But the machloket is peshat in the Ketzot גופיה. Whether it's real ממון that we believe the מעשה happened, or like according to the Beit Shmuel, we believe that he owes the money, but we don't believe the מעשה happened. So from when do we know it? It's only מכאן ולהבא. Yeah, can you make קידושין on על מנת? No, we don't make קידושין על מנת. But if you did... Nowadays we don't. You give כסף: הרי את מקודשת לי על מנת. You give the כסף. Right, but if you make a condition, the condition has to be fulfilled, otherwise the קידושין is not חל. Our knowledge is now and in the future, but we know about something that occurred before. If you learn if you learn it's real ממון. That's how the Chelekas Mechokek will learn. So yes, you're dividing it, so it's before we don't know the מעשה happened or not. We don't know the מעשה. No, we don't know. Only לגבי the chiyuv to pay, but לגבי the chiyuv we don't know.
Based on this you could also say pshat in the Gemara in Bava Metzia. The Gemara in Bava Metzia says the whole thing that that the מימרא of דרבי חייא קמייתא. The din of Rabbi Chiya is We learned this in Bava Metzia, ו, דף ג. Rabbi Chiya says like this: We know a מודה במקצת, if someone admits to part, it's chayav a shvuah. למשל, Reuven says to Shimon, \\"You owe me a hundred dollars.\\" Shimon says, \\"I only owe you fifty.\\" Obviously the fifty that you owe, you have to pay, you admitted. And the other fifty, you have to swear. Comes Rabbi Chiya, mechadesh a chiddush, and Rabbi Chiya says, what happens if you come, Reuven says to Shimon, \\"You owe me a hundred dollars.\\" Shimon is a כופר הכל, says, \\"I don't owe you a penny.\\" But two עדים come and say that he owes fifty. They don't know about other fifty, but fifty we know he owes. So fifty he has to pay. The witnesses say you owe fifty. The other fifty you have to swear. Yeah. And he says, just like הודאת פיו, when you're מודה with your mouth, you're chayav a שבועה, העדת עדים is also a chayav a shvuah. And not only that, he says, \\"I have a kal vachomer.\\" And the Gemara goes through a whole sugya what is the kal vachomer. So one piece of the Gemara is like this, let's look at this Gemara here. First line: מאי קל וחומר? Here on the side here, Bava Metzia דף ג עמוד ב, ע\\"ב, כן? Yeah. מה פיו שאינו מחייבו ממון, מחייבו שבועה, מה דך, with your own mouth, which cannot make you pay, makes you swear. עדים שמחייבין ליה ממון, אינו דין שמחייבין ליה שבועה? Witnesses that do make you pay money, witnesses say you owe money, you have to pay, certainly they have the power to make you a שבועה. You understand what we said? The Gemara says, \\"That doesn't make any sense.\\" מה דך, your own mouth doesn't make you pay? What do you mean your own mouth doesn't make you pay? And if you're modeh you don't pay? The Gemara asks, \\"ופיו אינו מחייבו ממון? His own mouth doesn't make him? והודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי!\\" If a person admits, you have to pay like עדים. So the Gemara says, \\"No, מאי ממון? קנס.\\" If you admit yourself to anytime you have to pay a fine, מודה בקנס פטור. No, yeah, a קנס, למשל a person stole, he has to pay כפל, so the hundred that he stole, he owes, but the other hundred is כפל. So that's the kal vachomer: מה פיו שאינו מחייבו קנס, מחייבו שבועה, מה דך your mouth, if you admit, it's not מחייב you to pay a קנס, nevertheless has the power to make you a שבועה, עדים שמחייבין ליה קנס, אינו דין שמחייבין ליה שבועה? The Gemara shoots it up. What is the hava amina of the Gemara? Who doesn't know, which little kid doesn't know הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי? What was the הוה הוה אמינא of the Gemara that the Gemara thought that עדים, a thief, your own admit admission is not מחייב you on your ממון? What's the pshat? So, once I explained that you can learn that according to the Ketzos, the hava amina was like the Maggid Mishneh, and the maskana is the Ketzos, the hava amina was that even though you admit and you owe, not because your mouth is מחייב. You're You're mechayev yourself, but we don't It's not enough to make you pay because of the loan. That's what the Gemara meant, thief is not מחייב you ממון, it's מחייב you קדושה. And what does the Gemara אפשלאג? No, הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי, like עדים. Yeah. But that way, you could say different. You could say the hava amina is also like the Ketzos. The hava amina was that being that when you believe him, you don't believe him that he borrowed the money. You're חייב because of the נאמנות that you have that he owes the money, that he has to pay the money, not that he owes the money. While עדים, we know that he owes the money. And the maskana of the Gemara is, who cares? B'sof kol sof, by admitting, הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי, and you still have to pay. But you have a קנס. It's not That's why it changes, then in response to the kashya, the Gemara changes it to קנס, but the hava amina was not קנס. The hava amina was ממון. But if the if you want to say that, you want to say that the Ketzos, we're gonna use his theory even in the hava amina, and use that Right. then the fact that there's a that there's a maskana, doesn't it take away power from what the Ketzos says, or showing that it No, no. The שאלה is what is the maskana. If you're gonna say the way I just said now, the hava amina was that being that the נאמנות is not on the מעשה, we call it not מחייב ממון. And the Gemara's maskana is that even though it's not on the מעשה, you still call it מחייב ממון. So how how does that That's right, because it's still called חייב ממון, because I'll pay. My admission makes me pay. And mimela, the Gemara says it's not a kal vachomer. How could you say what does thief doesn't make you pay? It makes you pay. We thought it's a kal vachomer because, lechatchila, because it doesn't make you pay because we believe you on the on the loan. How could the Gemara use that language? How could it have said, \"we thought it doesn't make you pay\"? How could the Gemara didn't know that it does make you pay? The Gemara's language is, \"it doesn't make you pay when you say thief.\" Right. And we're saying in the It doesn't say it doesn't make you pay. The Gemara said אי מחייבי ממונא. You owe, but you don't have to pay. So the hava amina was, because you know you have to pay, but because we don't know if you owe We don't know it. So it's not מחייב ממונא. So it's not called מחייב ממונא because of that. Sof kol sof. And the maskana is, who cares? הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי, so that means you have to pay anyway. So it's not a kal vachomer. Is there a case that he can you can admit that you owe, but you don't have to pay? I can't. No, I can't. All right. Another thing, just while we're on just to get to at the end, we'll get back to the beginning. We have a machloket in the Gemara: מודה בשטר שכתבו, צריך לקיימו, אין צריך לקיימו. That means like this. If someone brings a שטר, now normally, if you bring a שטר, the guy could טענה, \"It's מזויף. It's forged.\" And the only way you could use the שטר is if you go find עדים to מקיים it. Now, the question of the Gemara is, what happens if a guy comes with a שטר that's not מקוים? Then the מלוה can claim The מלוה comes with a שטר that's not מקוים, and the לוה doesn't say the שטר is forged. He says, \"I paid. פרעתי.\" Now, by saying, \"I paid,\" he is certifying the שטר. Yeah, we spoke We spoke about it before, yeah. So, he is saying that the שטר is good. He בפירוש says this שטר is a good שטר, \"I'm not saying it's forged, but I paid already.\" Is he believed to say פרעתי or not? Now, on one hand, there is a sevara to say that because he verified the שטר, so now you have a שטר מקוים. Against a שטר מקוים, you cannot say פרעתי. You can't say פרעתי. If a guy comes with a שטר מקוים, you cannot say, \"I paid.\" Not believed. On the other hand, he could have טענה'd it's מזויף. He has a migo. A migo that we He could have ta'anah'd. Yeah, we spoke about it then. So, here we have a machloket whether מודה בשטר שכתבו צריך לקיימו or not, which means whether he is believed to say פרעתי. But the lashon Wouldn't that fall into the geder of הפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר? Yeah, that's that's a good she'eilah, is it a migo or is it a פה שאסר? We spoke about that last week, the the week before. We had a whole discussion on this thing, is it a פה שאסר or is it a a migo? I wanted to make a whole big difference what the geder of a shtar is, if it's a shtar without kiyum, and the kiyum is just an extra thing, whatever. Yeah, that's the But I want to say now, according to this, a different peshat. See, the lashon of the Gemara is: מודה בשטר שכתבו, if you modeh in the shtar that you wrote it, do you still have to mekayem it? That means that we still look at it as if it's not מקוים. And if we look at it that it's not מקוים, you're believed to say פרעתי. According to the Ketzos. Or you or the other lashon is, no, צריך לקיימו. No, if if צריך לקיימו means it's not מקוים yet, you still have to mekayem. אין צריך לקיימו means the shtar is מקוים, and against a שטר מקוים, you're not believed פרעתי. Now, why is that strange lashon? Do you still have to mekaymo it or not? It should have said מודה בשטר שכתבו נאמן לומר פרעתי or אינו נאמן לומר פרעתי. I want to say like this: The difference between a person who is modeh in a shtar that he wrote it versus if a person is mekayem the shtar is very pashut. When a person is mekayem the שטר normally, what's מקיים the שטר? Who's מקיים the שטר? Two עדים' signatures. Yeah, no, but who does it? Two עדים come or something, it's עדים. If he is מודה בשטר שכתבו, what kind of קיום is it? It's a קיום of הודאת בעל דין. It's a קיום of the שטר which is based on הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים דמי. Now if you learn הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים, if a person admits, he's mamash like a regular case of עדים because we believe him completely like we believe עדים, then this שטר is a שטר מקוים. Like two עדים or like just one? It's like a hundred. It's a hundred. כמאה עדים. So then in that case, this guy who who is מקיים the שטר who admits the שטר, it's a regular שטר, it's a regular שטר מקוים. If you learn that הודאת בעל דין never tells you that the מעשה actually happened, all it deals with is with the outcome. The ממונות is an outcome, so it comes out that when you are מודה a שטר is good, we still don't know בפועל the שטר is מקוים. It's only the result is that you owe the money. It's like the Ketzos. In the Ketzos גופא, we said in the Ketzos itself you have the two ways: you could learn you really believe him or you only believe him in the חיוב to pay, not in the התחייבות, not in the חוב. In this case, by a שטר, what would it mean? We still don't know if the שטר is good. That's why the Gemara uses the לשון: מודה בשטר שכתבו צריך לקיימו, it's still not מקוים. That's only like the second part of Because of the second way, because it's still not mekuyam. And there are more places, and you see it there's a case of the Rosh in Kesubos, and there's a Rashba in How does it come in now? Let's just finish off here. How does it come into our Gemara? So I want to say like this:
To answer the Meiri, let's we forgot already what we said, let's go back מענינא דסמיכא, what was the question of the Meiri? Here in our Gemara it says, עד ודיין אין מצטרפין. If an עד says, \"I signed the שטר,\" my the other one, דיין says, \"I signed the קיום,\" you can't combine them because he's speaking about the money, he's speaking about the שטר. Came the Meiri and asked a קשיא, how come if one עד says, \"I saw him borrow the money,\" and one says, \"I heard him admit it,\" we do מצטרפין? And the Meiri had answered that there's a difference over here, they're both talking about the money, but in that case of the דיין, the דיין is talking is not talking about the מעשה itself. And the question that I asked, what do you mean not talking Why over there is he talking about מעשה? The guy is talking about the מעשה. What's the מעשה? The מעשה he borrowed. The guy saw it testified he borrowed, he testified that he admitted. If you admit, you know he borrowed, just like over here. If you say that the שטר is mekuyam, you know he owes the money. It's the same thing. So I want to say like this: When a if you learn הודאת בעל דין is you don't believe him on the מעשה, הודאת בעל דין believes him on the חיוב that he is doing now according to the Nesivos even though we haven't touched it, but even according to the Ketzos I want to say you believe him on that he owes the that he has to pay the money, not that he owes. So it comes out like this: When a person borrows money and two עדים watch him borrow money, two things they see: they see the חוב and the חיוב. They see the חוב, they see pashut the loan, and they also see that there is what he has that he has to pay. When the guys say הודאת בעל דין, what's the guy saying? \"I heard the guy speaking about the fact that he owes the money.\" So that that he has to pay the money. So on the fact that he has to pay the money, you have two עדים. This guy said, \"I saw him borrow,\" so we're not talking about the fact that he borrowed. See, if you learn normally הודאת בעל דין, הודאת בעל דין is talking about the מעשה that happened. I believe him that the מעשה happened, but what the עדים see, they don't see the מעשה happen because they weren't there. But if we're saying הודאת בעל דין the חיוב is then, so what makes the הודאת בעל דין to be חייב? What he's saying now. See, normally you learn from what he says now, we know that he's חייב because he borrowed. So the עד that says, \"I saw him admit,\" so we know he owes the money because the עד says he admitted, which means he borrowed the money. So mimela then, what he and so he's not saying the same thing as the עד who saw him borrow. He said, \"I saw him admit.\" But if we're saying the admitting itself is what makes him pay, so the עד is talking about the גוף המעשה. He's talking about the גוף המעשה of what makes him pay. So the other עד says, \"I saw a גוף המעשה that makes him pay,\" he said, \"I saw a גוף המעשה.\" By the case of the דיין, there is no question that when the דיין says, \"I saw,\" he doesn't know anything about the money. He doesn't see anybody's חיוב either. All he says is, \"I know that the שטר is good.\" We know that when a שטר is good, automatically whatever it says, he owes. So he The guy who signed the שטר said, \"I saw him borrow.\" The דיין says that, \"I saw, I know the שטר is good,\" which in turn makes the guy חייב, but they're talking about two different things. But in the case of a הודאה, if you say הודאת בעל דין, that when he says the הודאה, when he admits, this makes him חייב, so he sees the גופא דמעשה! He sees the מעשה that makes him חייב. So both עדים are seeing גופא דמעשה, because the one that saw him borrow also sees the גופא דמעשה of, sorry, the borrowing, that the second עד doesn't see, but the גופא דמעשה of the of the חיוב, and he sees the חיוב, and when they are both together they're מחייב. But the דיין are not. The דיין has nothing to do with the money. It doesn't see the חיוב of the money either, he sees the שטר. It's the same anyways. You can't believe a broke. Bottom line. The outcome is the same either way. Reb Reb Yehuda says that that the the this the opinion that the you can't believe him. He says that, \"I owe some dollars, and I'm broke.\" Oh, that's Yishmael, yeah. So he's right. Yeah. So they should The outcome is the same. The question is, how did they What do you mean the outcome is the same? That both, they say one judge you don't believe, and the other one you do believe. No, but if you would learn, if you would learn הודאת בעל דין regular, then the קשיא immediately would be a קשיא. They both should be the same דין. Why is the דין different? Why is the case over there by the two עדים, we do believe him? One says, \"I saw him borrow,\" one says, \"I saw him admit,\" we believe him. Here, we say we don't. Why is it different? We wouldn't understand the difference. His answer is that over here the דיין is not talking about the מעשה, and over there he is talking about the מעשה. Over there, he's totally not talking about מעשה. No! That's what we're saying! That when you hear a person admit, that's a מעשה that causes him to pay! But in order to say that, you have to give a whole Right! Exactly! It's the whole I'm saying that, yeah! Exactly what I'm saying! That after all this, we see that when a person admits, this causes This is the מעשה of the חיוב. But he can give a separate answer is, just from plain sight, without making the whole kunts of why it's different, plain sight it's different, because one guy is talking about the actual money, the substance. In the in the second case, they're both talking about the substance. One's talking about, \"I saw him,\" one's talking about, \"I heard him.\" It's still the substance. In the first No! You're not modeh on the substance, how do you know? The guy's talking about the substance, the money. No! Who who is talking? The one that was modeh? Yeah. So he's talking about it, but I don't know if he's saying the truth! Yeah, but you're both And when I say on the שטר This the judge testifying. What's a שטר? There's two things we need to make any שטר good. You need the paper that it was written on and the story that it contains, the substance. All the judge is talking about is this paper is a good paper. Right. The witnesses come forward about the story. In the second case, they're both talking about the story. Also! No, the guy is saying, \"I heard him speak!\" That's part of the story! That's part of the מעשה! Here also, he doesn't know if the מעשה happened, but he heard the guy say it! And the the judge says, \"I know that this שטר is good. The שטר which says that he owes him $100 is good.\" Why is that different than that? He's talking about something else which automatically shows that you owe the money. In both cases, they show the same thing. But with the two edim, you don't even need the שטר. You can throw the שטר away, right? Because if he says that he saw once or he saw, and the other said he admitted, what do you need the שטר for? In that case, we're not talking about a שטר, right. In this case, that's not what happened. In this case, there's a שטר and one was an ed and one was a דיין. In that case, fine. So there was this idea of you owe, but you don't have to pay. Then he would Mention this. This is the Ulla who says that at the end by by the ענין of owing but not having to pay. What? There is a for for the money, you know, this situation where you can you can believe you can owe, but not have to pay. Right. Pashut he didn't have to. No, here is the opposite! Here, you have to pay, and you don't owe! Why? Here, if a guy is modeh, he has to pay, but he doesn't owe! Why? Because the בית דין is not saying you have to בית דין isn't saying that you owe. We don't know, but you have to pay! Because you you admit. Yeah, but so what does that mean? You don't admit that you owe. No, you admit that you borrowed! But we don't believe you. But you don't admit that you owe. No, say you owe, but we don't believe you in the part We don't know if you're saying the truth, the fact that you borrowed. Isn't there a חילוק between borrow and owe? \"I borrowed, but I don't owe.\" In other words, \"I have to pay you, but I don't owe you. But I did borrow.\" How does that work? I don't know, that's why I'm asking. That's what I'm saying. But there is such a thing as you borrowed, but I don't have to pay you. The word \"owe\", if I borrow, I owe, but I don't have to pay you. Yishar koach, yishar koach. Yishar koach. So how many דעות do we have? How many כיתות do we have? I didn't hear... That's three. Yeah, there are three כיתות. No, how about two peshtim in the... two peshtim? You want to do two peshtim in the... I won't take the money if you don't owe it to me, just because you say it. If this is chayav, I'm not taking money So according to דין on that, בכלל, what are you doing? Is this, you think, is a But בית דין will make pay anyway. The בית דין doesn't care what this guy says. בית דין can pay for this, we won't accept it. Accept this, trash can it, who cares. Still, you can think you can account for how halachah might overlap with Thanks for coming, Mendy. Have a good one, take one of these.