we're going to start Bava Kamma. This is the first Mishnah of Bava Kamma. The Mishnah says, ארבעה אבות נזיקין. There are four fathers, which means four categories of, four types of damages that the Torah says that a person is responsible to pay for. And that is השור והבור והמבעה וההבער. One is called ox, one is pit, מבעה, there is an argument in the Gemara later what מבעה means, according to one opinion it means a person, a person himself who damages, according to another opinion it means שן, if an animal of his eats up food that belonged to somebody else. And הבער is the fire. So these are four things that the Chumash talks about that they are types of damages that if a person, person's ox damaged in any of these ways or a person made a pit or he himself or a fire, he's responsible to pay for it. And then the Mishnah goes on and says, לא הרי השור כהרי המבעה, the Mishnah explains that if the Torah would have written just the ox, you might ask, we would have known already that the others are also. Why would the Torah have to write מבעה, which is another type of damage? The Torah would write one and says if your ox damages you're responsible to pay, then we know it's other things too. And it says no, we wouldn't know it, why? Because each one has different characteristics. And just to use as an example, according to one opinion, שור, when it says ox, it means a specific kind of damage done by the ox. Means if the ox damaged through his foot, through stepping on things. מבעה, as I said before, is the teeth, through eating. So if the Torah would just write the din that if your animal steps on something you're responsible to pay, we would not know that if your animal animal eats something you're also responsible to pay. Why? Because each one has different characteristics. You might say, you know, when an animal steps on something, the characteristic of that category, which is called רגל, is that הזיקו מצוי, its damage is common. Wherever it walks, an animal doesn't have שכל, so it walks on whatever is under its feet, it'll break. So that's a stronger reason that you have to pay, you have to be more careful. But maybe if the animal eats, you wouldn't have to pay. That's why the Torah also has to write separately that you're also chayav for שן. On the other hand, if the Torah would write שן, we would not know רגל. We would think you're only chayav for שן because there is a characteristic of שן is יש הנאה להיזקו, that when he ate he had pleasure, he gained from it. But by רגל he didn't gain anything, so maybe רגל you're patur. And that's why you have to write both. And the Gemara goes on, the Mishnah goes on to tell you different things, why it couldn't write two, could it have been two, why do we need the third? This is the basic point of the Mishnah here. Then the

Gemara starts off by saying, מדקתני אבות מכלל דאיכא תולדות. Since we call these avos, fathers, obviously there are children. You can't call someone a father if he doesn't have children. That means that these four have offshoots, have other types of damages which are part, come out as a result of these four categories. And the Gemara's question right away is, תולדותיהן כיוצא בהן או לאו כיוצא בהן. These תולדות that these have, will they have the same din as the fathers? If you have a תולדה which is an offshoot of, let's say שן, will the same din that applies to the animal eating, which is the category of שן, will those apply? Let's give an example. The Gemara says later, what's a תולדה of שן? The Gemara doesn't say it here, the Gemara says it later. We said the characteristic of שן is eating, which means it has pleasure. What happens if the animal damages also through having pleasure, but in a different way? Let's say, the Gemara gives an example, it scratched itself it scratched itself on a wall. It was itching and it scratched itself on a wall and knocked the wall down. It did damage through something it had pleasure from. That's called a תולדה of שן. What would be a תולדה of רגל, let's say? רגל is when it walks and it steps on on things. What happens if while it's walking with its body it knocked something down? It's the same idea as רגל, it's הזיקו מצוי. Because every one of these of these נזיקין of the Mishnah has a certain characteristic which classifies it as a separate category, and then there are other types of damages which belong to these different categories, and each one of these has different דינים. So the Gemara first asks, are the תולדות the same din as the אבות or not? And the Gemara continues to bring two examples where we also find אבות and תולדות, and there we see whether the תולדות have the same din. The

first example is of Shabbos. What? Well, because we find in two cases, we'll see. We see by Shabbos, Shabbos there are thirty-nine אבות אבות מלאכות, 39 מלאכות you're not allowed to do, which really are 39 categories. The Mishnah in Shabbos, בדף ע״ג, mentions all 49, but each one of these 49, 39, each of these 39 have many more. So really there are hundreds of מלאכות that you can't do מדאורייתא, but there are 39 categories. And the Mishnah, the Gemara says over there it's clear that it's כיוצא בהן, over there it's like it. If you do an אב, you're חייב מיתה. If you do a תולדה, you're חייב מיתה. It's the same din. But then the Gemara asks, \"So why do you call it אב and תולדה?\" So the Gemara answers, \"Because if you do an אב and its תולדה, you're חייב only one. If you do two separate אבות, you're חייב two. If you do, we talk about חטאת, killing you can't kill more than once, but if you did it בשוגג, and you have to bring a חטאת, so if you did two אבות, you're חייב two. If you bring an אב and its תולדה, you're only חייב one. But if you do the תולדה by itself, you are חייב for it. It's the same דין as the אב.\" Then the Gemara continues, \"And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that if you do an אב and a תולדה you're also חייב two, why is it called אב and תולדה?\" The Gemara answers, \"Well, all those that were in the משכן are called אב. How do we know 39 אבות מלאכות? You look at the things that were in the משכן. Those that were look in the משכן, done in the משכן, important things, are called אבות. Those that were not in the משכן, but they just learned out, those are called תולדות.\" And the meantime, we see that by Shabbos there are אבות and תולדות, the תולדות are כיוצא בהן, have the same דין. Then we

have a different category, that's by טומאה. We have אב הטומאה, certain level of טומאה. If a person touches a dead body, he is called an אב הטומאה. Something that he touches is called a תולדה. Now here the תולדות don't have the same דין as the אב. It's not כיוצא בהן. Where do we see? So the Gemara said says דאילו אב מטמא אדם וכלים, an אב could make another person טמא, could make vessels, כלים, טמא, but a תולדה could only make טמא food and drink, but not a person and כלים. So the Gemara says, \"Now since we find by Shabbos there are אבות and תולדות and the תולדות are similar to the אבות, by טומאה we find אבות and תולדות, they are not similar, הכא מאי? What's here?\" So the answer is אמר רב פפא, by here here there are both, some are כיוצא בהן, some are not. And the end of the Gemara is that most of them are, of the תולדות of these אבות נזיקין have the same דין as the אבות, except one תולדה of רגל, a certain תולדה of רגל which is not. That's the basic of the Gemara. Okay. But

I'm going to start now with a Tosafos, which is not noge'a to the whole Gemara, but it's going to be noge'a later, that's why I brought out the whole Gemara. Tosafos comes out, this Tosafos בד״ה וכולהי, at the end of the Tosafos, Tosafos says like this: from our Mishnah, it seems to show that אין עונשין ממון מן הדין, which means like this, I'll go to the background: We have a rule, אין עונשין מן הדין, you cannot learn out a punishment of a הלכה based on a kal vachomer. I'll give you the classical example. It says in Chumash that you're not allowed to have relations with your sister from one father, or if she's your sister from one mother. The Torah says this din twice. The Gemara asks, \"Why does the Torah have to tell you twice?\" So it says, \"Because it wants to teach you that if it's your sister from your father and your mother, it's also asur.\" And the question is: Why do you need a pasuk for that? If she's your sister only from your father, you're chayav, she's your sister only from your mother, you're chayav, so certainly both. But no, אין עונשין, you can't learn out a punishment from a kal vachomer. You can't learn out an isur from a kal vachomer. So whatever it says, it says, a kal vachomer doesn't count. So the the rule is, that's called אין עונשין מן הדין. Another example: It says in the תורה, נותן מזרעו למולך. If someone gives over from his children to the מולך, מולך was a certain avodah zarah that you would pass your children through a fire and you would give it over to the priests. So it says if you do it, you do מזרעו, some of your children, למולך, then you're chayav mitah, it's avodah zarah. The Gemara says it's only if you do with some of your children. If you do it with all of your children, you're patur. And does it make any sense? מה דאך if you do with some of your children, you're chayav, all of your children? The answer is: אין עונשין מן הדין. You can't make a kal vachomer. Another example: It says by עדים זוממין, if you come if two עדים come and testify someone did something and he's chayav mitah, and they tried him and they sentenced him to die, two more witnesses come and say to the first ones, \"How could you testify that he did this and this and this and this? At that same time, you were with us someplace else.\" So the din is ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות, you do to the witnesses what they wanted to have done to him, and you would kill them. But the din is that when do you kill them? and if they wanted to kill the first guy, but if they had him killed already, then you don't kill them. Doesn't make sense. מה, דהא if they just wanted to have the guy, they just had him sentenced to death, then you find out that they were זוממין, we kill them. If they had him already killed, certainly! The answer is no. The Torah says, כאשר זמם, as they wanted, אין עונשין מן הדין. The question here is, is this Does this rule also apply to mamon? To money? Is this only a din by isurim, but not by mamon? There is a sevara to say that this applies by mamon also. That whenever the Torah tells you in a certain case you are chayav mamon, and we have a kal vachomer or a limud that in another case you should also be חייב ממון, can we can we make a person pay mamon in a certain case that the Torah doesn't say, but we learn it out from a kal vachomer? So Tosafot says, our Mishnah is mashma we could. Because our Mishnah we said before has a kashya: Why did the Torah have to write them both? Wouldn't the Torah write one and we'd know the other? What do you mean know the other? How would you know the other? You'd learn it out with a sevara! And we have to find a reason why you can't. So obviously, if not for that reason, you would! So obviously you could עונשין ממון מן הדין. But Tosafot brings that the Mechilta obviously learns אין עונשין ממון מן הדין, that you can't, even by money you can't. Because the Mechilta learns like this: There's a pasuk that says by בור, the מזיק בור it says כי יפתח איש בור או כי יכרה איש בור, if a person will open a pit or to dig a pit and not cover it, somebody's, an ox or a donkey will fall in, you have to pay. The

Mechilta asks: Why does it have to say if you open and dig? It should have said just if you open, we'll make a kal vachomer: מה דהא if you didn't even dig it, you just, it was covered and you uncovered it, you're chayav, if you made the pit, you're certainly chayav! Why did the Torah tell you? It says, אין עונשין מן הדין. Because you wouldn't know. If the Torah would just write open, we'd think only open, and you wouldn't know the din of digging. Ah, it's a kal vachomer, we can't learn out. So even though we're learning here about mamon, the Mechilta says clearly אין עונשין ממון מן הדין. So Tosafot says that there is an argument between our Gemara and the Mechilta. The Mechilta is equivalent of a Gemara, written by Tannaim. So there's an argument between our Mechilta and the Gemara. Our Mechilta holds, our Gemara I mean holds, that עונשין ממון מן הדין. When it comes to monetary questions, we could learn out a din of mamon, of chiyuv obligation of paying from a kal vachomer, and the Mekhilta holds you can't. Comes the Rashba, and the Rashba says differently. The Rashba says that the Mekhilta doesn't argue with the Gemara. The Mekhilta agrees that normally you could learn out. Only בור is an exception. By בור you can't, because the whole concept of בור is a chiddush. בור is an exceptional din because other nezikin, they're all yours, it's your ox that did it. The pit is not yours, you made a hole in the street. It's not yours. You're chayav for what you did, but it's not yours. So the Gemara says it's all a big chiddush, so since it's a chiddush, so we can't learn it out. That's what the Rashba says. So only by בור. So we have here a machloket between Tosafot and the Rashba. Tosafot says that the Mekhilta holds אין עונשין ממון מן הדין, and it argues against our Gemara. And the Rashba holds the Mekhilta does not argue on our Gemara. The Mekhilta also agrees it's just an exception. Now, there are many questions to ask here, but we'll skip them. But just one question: How could the Rashba say that the Mekhilta really holds עונשין ממון מן הדין, when there's another Mekhilta? He says, 'This is an exception, only by בור.' There's another Mekhilta! The Mekhilta says by טביחה ומכירה, the Rabbi Akiva Eiger here in Gilyon HaShas quotes it. In Parashat Mishpatim it says וטבחו או מכרו. If the person steals a sheep or a or a ox, so normally for stealing you have to pay double. If you shachat it or you sell it, then you have to pay four or five. For the ox you pay five times as much, and for the sheep you pay four times as much. So the Mekhilta asks: Why does it have to say if you shachat or sold it? If you're chayav for shechitah, for selling adrabah? And he answers: אין עונשין מן הדין. So we see that it's not not because bor is an exception. So we see that the Mekhilta holds According to Tosafot, it fits very good. That's the general shita of the מכילתא, אין עונשין מן הדין ממון. But the Rashba who says that the Mekhilta agrees to our Gemara, in this case it doesn't. And there are more questions, but another major question here is: The Gemara brought in here the halachah of Shabbos just to bring an example of a case where you have avos and toldos, and the toldos have the same din. That's what the Gemara did. We asked, what are the dinim of toldos here, כיוצא בהן or not? So Shabbos we find is the same דין, tumah it's not, what's here? So the whole idea of Shabbos is just to bring that point. Why did the Gemara have to go through the whole thing, why is it called a toldah? And we answer, it's called a toldah that because if you do the av and the toldah together, you're chayav one. And according to Rabbi' Elazar the Gemara asked, if you're chayav two, why is it called a toldah? And we answer, because it wasn't in the Mishkan. Why is that all It's not a Gemara Shabbos here. The Gemara should have just quoted one thing: that by Shabbos you have avos and toldos, and toldos is the same as the avos. Finished, that's all we want to know here. The whole idea why is that called a toldah, and it on, and maskana the end is because it was in the משכן, wasn't it, it's all nothing gained here. Also, why does the Gemara start the first question, is תולדות כיוצא בהן or not? Shouldn't the Gemara first they should ask said, what are toldot? Which are the toldot here? This is already a detail, what's the din. Anyway, to get to the point is like this. The Gemara's question here, what is the din of the toldot? is not just a question of halachah, it's a question concerning the whole concept of the avot and the toldot of נזיקין. Because just to use as an example, we find a lot of times when we have certain categories that we have one thing and then from that we learn out something else, or of all, it could be one of the two ways. It could be in the category of siman, or could be in the category of ta'am. Siman means it's a sign, and ta'am means it's a reason. The first and foremost place we find this is the the the Rogatchover talks about this in regard of the signs that Torah gives by a כשר בהמה. That if it chews its cud, and has split hooves, then it's kasher. Are these simanim that just are re'iyah, a proof which is kasher, or is this the reason why it's kasher? Is this And there's a נפקא מינה להלכה. The nafka minah would be, we once spoke about this, nafka minah would be, if you have an animal that doesn't have these simanim, but it's born from a kasher animal, if it just a sign, so this case it'd also be kasher. Cuz we have a different proof that it's kasher. But if it's that the reason this makes it kasher, if it doesn't have it, then it's not kasher. Same thing we find in other cases, that certain things are a siman or a ta'am. Now here also, these four categories that the Mishnah mentioned, we said each category has a certain characteristic, a certain quality. These qualities, and because we have these qualities in these four, that's how we get to the toldot. Lemashal, one of the avot, just to use another example a better example, is keren. We didn't mention it before, keren if an animal gores with the horn. That's called keren. What's the characteristic of keren? כוונתו להזיק. It does it with intentions of that damaging. So the Gemara says, what happens if an animal goes and bites something, not eats, bites? In which category would that come fall under? Shen or קרן? קרן, and it does it with teeth. If it comes and kicks something and breaks it, you might think it's רגל. Gemara says it's not, it's קרן because it's these characteristics. So even though so when we talk about קרן, שן, רגל, בור, אש, they all have different characteristics. Now the and because they have characteristics, that's how we get to the תולדות. Even though the Torah talks about קרן, Torah talks about the animal goring with his horn, but we say there are other things which fall under the same category. Why? How do we learn that? Because the characteristics. Well, how we know, that's already a different so where we know it from, but that that there is such a thing is true. What I'm saying, but how would you know the תולדות, is that what you're saying, אינן כיוצא בהן? No, no, so No, no, no, no, because we know with a sevara. That's not that's all it's not a din, it's not something else. It's within the same category, we say that all the things that have the same all types of damages that have the same quality are all in the same category and we'd have the same din. They're all following. So even though the Torah wrote one, Torah wrote קרן, and קרן has this quality of כוונתו להזיק. And this is not not punishment, this is just type to damages. And we learn out that anything that has that that quality is in the same category, even though the Torah didn't write it. The Torah just wrote קרן. Now my question the question is like this: is it a siman or is it a ta'am? Is this quality or this characteristic of קרן the reason why the din is so-and-so, and because of that anything else has the same thing also falls under the same category? Or is it the reason this makes it that category. This is the reason why is it chayav, because of this characteristics. Everything else that has the same characteristics are also chayav in the same way. In other words, when we compare the אב the אבות, or the אב like in קרן, to its תולדות, is the אב just a siman to the תולדות? Really, the תולדות are chayav because the Eibershter wanted you to be chayav for each one of these, but instead of giving you a list of all these, He said

one, made you understand the characteristics, and from that, we're going to see a sign which other things are chayav for the same din. But not that this is the reason why you're chayav. Or you could say no, this is the ta'am, the reason why you're chayav, and therefore everything else which falls, which has the same reason is obviously chayav the same way. There are two different ways of looking at it. No, they both could be true. The difference would be whether the תולדות have to have the same din as the אב. If it's a siman only, so could be this, but it doesn't have to be the same thing because this just shows you which other things are chayav, but maybe their chiyuv is different. If it's taam, then this is exactly like that. If the reason why you're chayav for קרן is because כוונתו להזיק, so the whole reason of קרן is only כוונתו להזיק, everything else which has כוונתו להזיק is exactly like קרן. But if כוונתו להזיק is not the reason for קרן, it's just a siman of making Torah wants to put categories, so the Torah said there's a כוונתו להזיק, anything has כוונתו להזיק is also chayav. But כוונתו להזיק is not the reason, it's only the siman. So, but in that case, would you say that if it accidentally hit something with its horn, then it would fall into that category, because the category is קרן? קרן is כוונתו להזיק. If it's not כוונתו להזיק, it's not קרן. It might do it with a horn, but it's not קרן. No, but that's what I'm saying is, but if you're saying it's just a sign of it, doesn't mean the עצם it has to be that, it's just No, no, the sign of it is that it does it with intention. That's the sign. Right, it says it does it with intention, you're chayav. Everything else that you do with intention is also chayav. This is the siman of what falls into this category, but this is not the reason why you're chayav. Anything that you that you did with intention, so that's that we know that that's a sign that it's That's a sign by קרן and that's a sign by of a תולדה is also. By the תולדה, right. So

you'll ask, in other words, will you say, why is the kicking chayav? Is it chayav because of קרן, or is it chayav on its own? How do you know it's chayav? It's through קרן. קרן is only a siman to tell you which things are chayav. So if it's only through קרן, well it doesn't have to have the same din. But if קרן is the reason you're chayav, so then then this is keren and it has to be the same din. So when the Gemara asks the question כיוצא בהן or not כיוצא בהן, the Gemara didn't mean to ask just, what is the halachah? This is a major question, that's why it's asked before you get yet to the details. What kind of toldot are there? And the Gemara wants to prove that we find some toldot, it's a siman, and some toldot, it's a ta'am. And the question is, what is it over here? A siman or a ta'am? And the Gemara brings in that by Shabbos, it's ta'am. No, not by In some cases, the toldot are a ta'am. The av the toldah, the av is a ta'am to the toldah. In some cases, a siman. By Shabbos, where we find it's the same din, and you know why it's the same din? Because over there the characteristic of each of the avot is a ta'am. By tumah, as I'll explain, it's a siman. And the question is, what's the din here? Now, to explain it, because if it's a siman, the din could be different. But if it would be ta'am, the din wouldn't be different. Also, so the Gemara is trying to show that we see by Shabbos the din is the same, and by Shabbos it's ta'am. And that shows that if it's ta'am, it has to be the same din. Where did How does the Gemara show that by Shabbos it's ta'am? By bringing in the whole idea of the משכן. We thought that the Gemara just wants to bring in the halachah of Shabbos. The משכן is a side question: why is it called an אב, why is it called a תולדה? And we ask, what's נוגע here? The whole proof that the Gemara brings that by the אבות of Shabbos it's a ta'am is by bringing the end that whatever was in the משכן is an אב, whatever was not is a תולדה. How? Let me explain that based on something else. The

Totsa'ot Chaim, which is Rav' Menachem Zemba, asks an interesting question. He says like this: The Rambam says by Shabbos that any תולדה of an אב which is very, very similar to that אב, doesn't have is not called a תולדה, it's called an אב. In other words, an example: The אב of planting in the Mishnah is זורע. זורע means you plant a seed. What happens if you're not זורע, but you're נוטע? נוטע is if you plant a branch. Is it an אב or a תולדה? It's definitely חייב. So the Rambam says it's an אב, because it's really the exact same thing, it's just what you use. Even though the אב in the Mishnah is זורע, but נוטע is also, because it's very similar. So he asks a kashya: if so, the Gemara says That הוצאה, the Mishnah's carrying out from רשות היחיד to רשות הרבים is an av. Carrying in from רשות הרבים to רשות היחיד is a toldah. So he says, why? It's the same thing. The Gemara says very clear: What's the difference carrying out, carrying in? It's changing the רשויות. Why is it called toldah? So, he says, I'll answer you the question. I'll answer the question based on a similar question and answer given by R'' Betzalel Ashkenazi, right?

Betzalel Ashkenazi asks the question: As we just said now, by Shabbos, the Rambam says that זריעה is the av, נטיעה is not a toldah, because it's so similar. כולו חדא היא. How come in הלכות שמיטה, where you're not allowed to plant, the din is that whatever the Torah says, that's the av. Whatever is not in the Torah is called a toldah. זריעה is an av and נטיעה is a toldah. What? Same logic. You're not allowed to do it, it's a melachah on Shemitah, and you're not allowed to do it. So, and we say that anything which is similar is only called a toldah. But by by the case of Shabbos we say that if it's very similar, it's an av. And R'' Betzalel Ashkenazi answers like this: He says, there's a difference between the av of Shabbos and the av of Shemitah. The av of Shabbos, how do you know that you're not allowed to plant? Did the Torah ever say don't plant on Shabbos? We learn it out. The only melachah it says, but it doesn't say don't plant. We learn it out from the Mishkan. How do you know you can't plant on Shemitah? We learned it out from the pasuk in the Torah. So, he says like this: Whatever is an av and it says in the Torah, then only what says is the av. Anything that's similar, as as close as it is, is called a toldah. In the Mishkan, anything that's not from the pasuk, that's from the Mishkan, not only what's in the Mishkan is an av, but anything that's similar is also an av. And therefore, by Shabbos, נטיעה is an av, by shemitah, נטיעה is a toldah. So, he says the same thing I'll answer here also. Why is הכנסה, carrying in, called a toldah when נטיעה is an av? He says, like, זריעה and the other melachot we know from the Mishkan. The

only one melachah besides הבערה, fire, but from the other melachot, the only one melachah which was in the which we learned from a pasuk is carrying. It's from a pasuk, it's not from the Mishkan. The pasuk says when they brought the the נדבות to the Mishkan, they said don't bring anymore. Rashi says it was because of Shabbos. Oh, so then it's similar to shemitah. And by shemitah we said because the av is from the pasuk, anything that's similar is still called a toldah. By carrying, it's the only exception that even if it's very close, it's called a toldah. What's the logic here? What difference does What is the Betzalel Ashkenazi logic? What difference does it make whether it's written in a pasuk or it's in the Mishkan? If the דין is the same... Yeah, here we know it's an av, here it's an av. So, because it's written in the Torah, and something it's very similar it can't be an av? They're both avot, they're both taken from the source. This is taken because the Torah says learn it from the Mishkan, so we learn it from the Mishkan. But since that's very, very close, it's also an אב. Here the Torah says, we learn What what's the logic behind it? I think the logic is this: What's the peshat we learn it from the Mishkan? The Torah says whatever was done in the Mishkan is a melachah. A million things were done in the Mishkan! They walked in the Mishkan, they looked in the Mishkan, they, you know, I mean ela mai? The חכמים looked into the Mishkan and they saw those things which have characteristics of a melachah. Right? Those things which are asur from the Torah, you don't have to look into the characteristics. The Torah says it, the Torah says. Which means like this: Those that were in the Mishkan, the characteristic is the reason for the melachah. If the whole reason for the melachah is characteristics, then anything that's similar, which has the same characteristic, should be the same thing. But if it's learned from the Torah, the characteristics are not what count. It's the Torah says. So whatever it says, it says. Something else which is not the same, might have the same characteristic, but that's called a toldah. So what comes out from here, from the fact that we learn out Shabbos from the Mishkan shows that it's ta'am. Because if it wouldn't be ta'am, you'd never know. If you won't look at the the sevara, the characteristic, you just look at what they did, you'd get have 55 100 1,000 melachot. So there must be, and that's exactly what the Gemara did here. The Gemara asked: What the toldot here, is it כיוצא בה or not? The question we meant to ask was, is it ta'am or is it siman? So we say like, by Shabbos we find the din is the same, and by Shabbos it's ta'am. How do you know by Shabbos it's ta'am? Look, it's learned out from the Mishkan! That makes the difference between an אב and a toldah. If it learned How do you learn it from the Mishkan? Obviously you use the sechel to see what's characteristic. So obviously it's a ta'am, and the din is כיוצא בה. By tumah, by tumah, obviously it's not a ta'am. Must be siman. Why? Because here by the other types of avot and toldot, the toldah is learned out from the avot. By tumah, what's a toldah? The toldah actually is a transformation from the av. Well, it makes sense that when you have a first level, a first degree, and it passes it down, the next degree is a lesser degree. So here, it takeh doesn't have a ta'am, ela mai, it's only a siman. It doesn't have the same ta'am. It doesn't have the same characteristics. The av touched a met. The other guy didn't touch a met, he touched him. Mimela here it's only a siman, and here it's לאו כיוצא בו. So the Gemara brings like this: By

Shabbos we find it's ta'am and the din is כיוצא בו. By tumah we it's not ta'am and it's not כיוצא בו. הכא מאי? What is the din here? And the maskana is: Some are like this, some are like that. Which means that because the majority is כיוצא בו, then obviously what is it? Ta'am. If it's the same thing, then it must be ta'am. So it comes out that by Shabbos, by by nezikin the avot the avot are ta'am. The characteristics of the avot are ta'am. That's the maskana. Now that it's ta'am, we could go to Tosafot and say like this: If the Mishnah says that if we only have one... I'm not sure if it's the Mechilta... Machloket if it's in the Mechilta. In the in the Rashba... Can you say what it was? Tosafot says there's a machloket between the Mechilta and our Gemara. And the Rashba says there is no machloket. So our Mishnah says that if the Torah would have just written שור, you wouldn't know מבעה. Why? In other words, the question is, let's say it's just שור and we would know מבעה. The answer is we wouldn't know because שור has different characteristics. The question is written before we understand these characteristics. If we don't understand these characteristics yet, and we're saying that it's ta'am, then what must be the ta'am of נזיקין? The mere fact that it's מזיק. And if the mere fact that it's מזיק, then the תולדה that's going to be learned out is not going to be a חידוש. I'll start the other direction, I see you're not getting it. We had a question here whether you עונשין ממונא מן הדין or not. I want to say like this: Everyone agrees, even according to Tosafot, there's no machloket. אין עונשין ממונא מן הדין. You can't learn it out. Whether you could learn that אין, אין meaning you can't, עונשין you could. I want to say that everyone agrees to this rule: If we're going to learn out whether you pay or not, everyone agrees you could learn out. If we're going to learn out a new category of things that you have to pay for, that we can't. And that's like איסור. Amount of money, that's ממון. To learn out a new דין, or we would call it a new גדר, that's איסור. And that everyone agrees. The question is, when we want to learn out one נזיקין from the other, is it considered learning a new category, or is it considered just extending and learning out that this case you also pay? What would it depend on? It would depend whether it's siman or ta'am. And if you learn it's ta'am, then it's not a new thing. If it's siman, then each time it's a new thing. So Tosafot says like this: That this is the machloket between the Mechilta and our Gemara. Our Gemara says עונשין ממונא מן הדין. Why? Because our Gemara holds it's טעם. And therefore we could learn it out. And as we said before, our Gemara learns like that. What does the Mechilta hold? The Mechilta holds it's סימן. If it's סימן, that means each each היזק that you're learning out, it's not the same reason. It's just a סימן that you're chayav here too. If it's סימן, then it's a new category. That's a new category, says you can't learn out. So the machloket is not whether עונשין ממונא מן הדין or not, machloket is what is the category of נזיקין. What does the Rashba learn? The

Rashba learns that even the Mechilta holds like our Gemara. Which means he holds that באמת Mechilta holds it's טעם, and therefore the Mechilta normally says עונשין ממונא מן הדין. בור is an exception, because בור is a חידוש. To learn out בור, that, since like he says it's a separate, special דין, there it's learning out a new category. Because since בור you wouldn't know, בור is a different type of היזק. It's a new category. Since it's a new category, that's what the Mechilta holds. So the machloket between Tosafot and the Rashba is, what does the Mechilta hold? Rashba... Tosafot holds the Mechilta holds it's סימן, therefore the Mechilta argues on our Gemara. The Rashba holds the Mechilta holds it's טעם, so therefore you could learn out ממונא מן הדין. בור is an exception, because the rule is if it's a new category, you can't. This is called a new category. five. בור is the only one that's a new category, because בור is a chiddush. And this answers the other kashya. There's another Mechilta which said by טביחה ומכירה, over there also it's a chiddush. The fact that you have to pay four or five is a chiddush. Only in a place where it's a חידוש דין, that's where the Mechilta holds אין עונשין מן הדין. But other places the Mechilta is modeh too, modeh to the Gemara. Where was the other place that you said? טביחה, where it says with the four or five. You shachat it, and you sell it. So you assess you're chayav for shachating, so you're chayav for selling. אין עונשין מן הדין. Chayav the four or five. So that is a new That's also a chiddush. Therefore this whole din of of knas is a chiddush. But go go and give an example of the of how of how it'll work, siman and taam, in this case. Take by שור. You know, in the in the שור and the rest with with all Okay, the characteristics בור I understand. You're saying who says a chiddush is because it says open, No, no, no, because it's Cause it's not even yours. because it's not even yours. It's not even yours that did Well, the בור of the Torah is not yours. It's in the street, a public, whatever it is. Okay, fine. But take by שור, when we say taam or siman, it would be like this, look. קרן, let's take קרן. קרן is כוונתו להזיק, okay? Is כוונתו להזיק the reason why you're chayav for קרן? Or is כוונתו להזיק just a sign to know which things you're chayav for, but you're not chayav because it's כוונתו להזיק? Okay, so example. Well, take take kicking, which is a toldah of קרן. Why? Because it has the same characteristic. So, do we say that the reason you're chayav for this is because this is קרן? It's the same as קרן. Or we say, why are you chayav for kicking? Because the Torah wants you chayav for kicking. How do we know you're chayav for kicking? The Torah gave you simanim. If it has this siman, you know you're chayav. But if the characteristic is not the taam for the chiyuv, then the chiyuv of horn and the chiyuv of kicking are two separate chiyuvin. They might be in the same category, but they're two separate chiyuvin, because why are you chayav for קרן? I don't know why you're chayav for קרן, not because כוונתו להזיק. The Torah just gave you a sign. I'll give you another example of siman and taam, which maybe might make it easier. So the sign is the כוונה, right? That this is כוונתו להזיק. No, you see it, he's going to gore. When he does things and he gives you a kick, he knows he wants to kick you. I'll give you another place which is a better example. By

Yom Tov, it says that you're not allowed to do any melacha on Yom Tov either, except for אוכל נפש, food. Does it mean that because you want it for food, that's why you're allowed to do these melachot? You're allowed to cook, because it's for cooking. What happens you want to cook not for food? You want to cook and other reasons. Would you be allowed? No. If if the taam why you're allowed is because And there's another way to say it: the Torah wanted to allow on Yom Tov the melacha of cooking. It gave you a siman. Instead of giving you a list of these ten melachot are mutar, Torah said gave you a siman that anything that's for food. So, we look into the category, oh, these ten melachot are melachot of cooking, of of connected to food. So, these melachot are mutar. If you're doing it not for food, are you allowed? Yes, according to this. It's just a siman. So, the machlokes Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel really, מתוך שהותרה לצורך הותרה שלא לצורך. These melachot, mi-derabbanan it's asur, whatever, it has to be צורך יום טוב. So, here you have an example. The reason the Torah gave is because of cooking, because of food, because of eating. The she'eilah is, is eating the reason, or is eating just a siman to show you which things are mutar? Same thing here. The Torah brought out that if it's כוונתו להזיק, you're chayav this and this type of chiyuv. Is this the reason this chiyuv comes about? Or is just as a siman that to the chiyuvin. So, anything that has this falls under the same siman, so you're also chayav. But the chiyuv are two separate chiyuvin. It's not because of that. Take by Shabbos. If it would be ta'am, if it would be if the av av would be a siman, not a ta'am, what would be the din? That if you do an av and its toldah, you should be chayav two. Because av and a toldah, the only way you know the toldah is through the siman of the av. But it's not the same melachah. And maybe it would be less, could be lokeh, wouldn't be less. But you would also be chayav if you do it together. Why are you not chayav if you do it together, if you do an av and a toldah? Because Because it's a ta'am. The ta'am is really the same thing. But if it's a siman, it's just a sign to something else. But it's But it's not the same thing. But if it's a ta'am, it's the same thing. But the reason we have this question was because of בור, right? That's why you asked this. No, not only בור. The question is bichlal, the toldot here, what kind of din? Okay, but I'm saying that By בור the question is why did it say כי יכרה? No, but I thought you said that that's why Yeah, no, because you said by by by שחיטה by שחיטה the by שחיטה a sheep or שחיטה an ox. There it's a chidush. That's what I'm saying. But so that's the whole thing. Well, it's a maskana, yeah, the conclusion to the Rashba, only by a case of a chidush we

say it's like a new geder, a new type of thing we're learning out. But they all of this is the teaching. Because otherwise we would say what? That it's since we learned If you learn it's ta'am, then it's not When you want to learn out one from the other and it's ta'am, you're not learning something new, because it has the same ta'am. So it's really the same thing. So four or five wouldn't make sense. But the four or five is a chidush. So, there, takeh, the Mechilta holds ein onshin. Because there's a ta'am, because what you you did know that it should be כפל, and that's what it should be. Right. Right. Right. Right. And if it were תם, it should be it should just be double. Right. Right. But if we say that it's a if we were Because it's a new thing, means it's it's like It's not דרך like סימן. What's the דין when it's it's learned out from a kal vachomer? Is it a what? The דין would be the same. not supposed to, you know what, in the cases that it's not supposed to No, not supposed to. By ממון is the question. We're talking that's talking about איסור. We're talking by ממון. But uh even by איסור no question. Is there a דין in it? No, we don't. But the דין is not. I mean just like you said before about uh uh the father in the in the מולך? In מולך, yeah. You're טאקע פטור. Really? I mean it just goes to that that extreme. That just because that can't, right, I mean Yeah, but the question is why?

There are three reasons given. Yeah. There are reasons. One reason is a גזירת הכתוב. Means it's not a reason. The Torah said. No, no, no, no, no. No. This fact that you cannot learn out a איסור from a kal vachomer, that דין is a גזירת הכתוב. That means there's no reason. The Torah said so and finished. But then there's another reason. Since a kal vachomer is a logical thing, it's used you make up yourself. The Chachamim thought and they came up with it and it's a logical thing. How do you know that there's not somebody who's smarter than you and could שלוג אפ the kal vachomer, could disprove the kal vachomer? How could you kill somebody based on your logic of a kal vachomer? Maybe someone else will shlug up and therefore you can't pun punish with a kal vachomer. No, but they made it a certain uh uh whatever uh uh מעשים, no? But They learned out certain מעשים, no? with a gezeirah shavah, with all kinds of other לימודים, because that they didn't make up. Kal vachomer, the Torah said you use yourself. So for this, you can't. What's the third one you said? There were three. Ah, well then, so Why does it have to be really different from Because it's seichel. Yeah, those are not seichel? No, gezeirah shavah is not seichel. כל דבר שהיה בכלל All the other sevarot are It's a type of seichel, no? I See, you have to use your seichel how to use the gezeirah shavah, but here the whole thing is seichel. Kal vachomer is just using your logic. מה דאך so and so, certainly so. But maybe someone else will show you that this is different. And the

third sevara is, because it's a kal vachomer, which means in this case, you certainly deserve the punishment, maybe the punishment is not strong enough. So, it won't accomplish anything, so why give it? למשל, the case of the It will accomplish anything. But why may the punishment is better than nothing? No, no. Like by the witnesses. Like by the, yeah. Maybe then, they had the guy killed already, this won't do anything, so why kill him? The whole purpose of killing them is a kaparah. Maybe this won't bring a kaparah. It's so so severe. Or by the Molech, you give only some of your children to Molech, so by killing you you get a kaparah. You give all your children, which is worse, maybe that won't give a kaparah, so what's the purpose? The whole idea of טעם and סימן you mentioned that we see it also by kosher animals, is that the whole discussion of טעם and סימן, is that something that you find in the Gemara or that's something that The late Acharonim. The Acharonim? How many And the also by um uh is it when we talk about is it a din in the the chafetzah or a din in the gavrah? That's by most things, it's in the Acharonim, but some things it's in the Gemara yet. Expressions. Uh-huh. And it's in the Gemara. I mean, they're those those kinds of logic. That That was the thing for the The כללים in Acharonim, but it's based on a certain Gemara. By the neder and shevuah, the Gemara says it's חילוק בין חפצא לבין גברא. And, but taam and siman you don't find in the Gemara? That's something that the Acharonim came up with? Well, לגבי יום טוב, the מלאכות יום טוב the uh Some want to bring that the Ramban seems to be saying that in Ramban על חומש. Okay, so go back and just uh because it's that's helpful to me. It's the very beginning. So, the question was, the

Mechilta seems to be saying something different Opposite to our Gemara. The Gemara said that if you have to say The Gemara's Mishnah said asked, why does it have to tell you both of us? Why can't it say one and we know the other? And it gives a reason, because each one has different categories, different characteristics and you wouldn't know. What does it come out from here? That if you wouldn't have those different characteristics, you would know. How would you know? With the logic of a kal vachomer. אי אין עונשין מן הדין, obviously you could. And the Mechilta says that אין עונשין ממון מן הדין. So, it's a machloket between Mechilta and our Gemara. But the Rashba says Mechilta, it means דווקא in the case of ד' וה'. Wait, wait, wait. The Mishnah says you have to be It has to be enumerated Mishnah said you can עונשין מן הדין. Yes. Because Because the Mishnah asks, learned it out, that we should have learned it out, and we give a reason why we couldn't. Why do we need a reason? I could answer you very simple: You know why you couldn't learn it out? Because אין עונשין מן הדין. Obviously עונשין מן הדין. So the Mishnah is משמע עונשין ממון מן הדין, cuz it's mamon.