Jewish audio on Chabad.org. Today's שיעור will be מסכת בבא קמא דף י"א. We will start from the last line on דף י' עמוד ב'. The גמרא had brought ראיות from פסוקים that if one's ox kills the ox of another person, and he is responsible to pay, we learn out from the פסוקים that the בעלים מטפלין בנבילה. That means that the owner of the ox that died, he keeps the נבילה, he keeps the dead body of the ox, and the person who has to pay for the damage just has to pay the difference between the dead ox and the live ox. And we don't say that the dead ox goes to the מזיק, and he has to pay the full price of the ox, but the דין is that the ניזק keeps the נבילה and the מזיק just pays the difference. And the גמרא had asked a קושיא that why do we need a פסוק for that? That would be understood by itself. Since we know that a person could pay for the damage with any type of שוה כסף he wants, with any type of thing that he wants, as long as he's going to pay things which are worth the amount of money that he owes. He could even pay with סובי, you could even give bran, as long as you give enough that it will make up the amount of money that you owe, then you could even pay with that. So why do we need a פסוק that the נבילה stays with the ניזק? It's self-understood. And even if he would have his own נבילות, if the מזיק would own many נבילות which add up to the price of the היזק, he is able to give those נבילות to the ניזק as payment of the היזק. So certainly that this נבילה itself stays with the ניזק and the מזיק only pays the difference. And the

גמרא answered that the reason we need the פסוק is for פחת נבילה. That means that if the נבילה lost some of its value between the time it was killed and the time they went to בית דין and the בית דין said that he has to pay the money, so that difference is on the חשבון of the ניזק, not on the חשבון of the מזיק. If the דין would be that the reason the ניזק keeps the נבילה is because the מזיק has a right to pay him with what he wants, so then the payment would start from the time the בית דין פסקנס that he has to pay, so we would have to evaluate the price of the נבילה at the time when he's obligated to pay. So if the נבילה lost some of its value from when the time it got killed till the time he's obligated to pay, so that would go on the חשבון of the מזיק. So the מזיק would have to pay the difference from the way it is worth now. But now that a פסוק tells us that the נבילה stays with the ניזק, so as soon as it got killed, we evaluate it and see how much it's worth, and the difference between that amount and how much the היזק was, that's how much he has to pay. And if it lost some of its value till they came to בית דין, that is the loss to the ניזק. Now the

גמרא says, לימא, let us say, פחת נבילה תנאי היא, that this דין concerning the loss of value of the נבילה and whose חשבון it goes, whether that loss goes on the חשבון of the ניזק or of the מזיק, is really an argument between תנאים. דתניא, because we learn in a ברייתא, it quotes the פסוק that says by a שומר שכר. A person took an animal to watch and was paid for it. And then when the owner came to ask for the animal back, he said that the animal got killed, it was נטרף. But the פסוק says, אם טרף יטרף, if it got torn to pieces, יביאהו עד, they should bring witnesses. So the פסוק means יביא עדים שנטרפה באונס, let him bring witnesses. The word עד means witnesses. He should bring witnesses that it got torn באונס, by force, ופטור, that he would be פטור, because the דין is that a שומר שכר is פטור from אונסין. If it was stolen or lost normally from the שומר שכר, then the דין is that a שומר שכר is חייב to pay, because a שומר שכר is חייב בגניבה ואבידה. But if it was lost through an אונס, if something happened to it by force, so then the דין is that the שומר שכר is פטור. So this is what the פסוק says, that if it was נטרף, if it was torn to pieces, which is an אונס, so all he has to do is bring witnesses that this is what happened, and then he is פטור. That's the תנא קמא's פשט. אבא שאול אומר, but אבא שאול says that what does the פסוק mean? יביאהו עד, יביא עדודה לבית דין. He says that the word עד comes from the word עדודה. עדודה means the נבילה, that he has to bring the נבילה itself to בית דין, the dead body of the animal that was torn to pieces, he has to bring that to בית דין, and בית דין will evaluate the price of that dead animal. That's what the פסוק means when it says יביאהו עד. That's the way רש״י is גורס, the way תוספות brings a גירסא, and that it should say not יביא עדודה לבית דין, but יביא ארורה לבית דין. ארורה means the cursed one, which really means the same thing, it refers to the נבילה, and the נבילה is called the ארורה, the cursed one. Or another גירסא that תוספות brings, that it should say יביא עדורה לבית דין. עדורה means the missing one, that the one that was missing, the one that got killed, that got lost, that's the one you're supposed to bring to בית דין. But according to all גירסאות, it means the same thing, that according to אבא שאול what the פסוק is telling us, that you should bring the נבילה to בית דין, and the בית דין will estimate to see how much it is worth. And the גמרא says מאי לאו, don't you think בהא קמיפלגי, that this is the מחלוקת, דמר סבר, one holds, אבא שאול holds, פחת נבילה דניזק, that the פחת נבילה, this amount that the נבילה became worth less from when it died till it was taken to בית דין, דניזק הוה, that is on the חשבון of the ניזק. ומר סבר, and the first תנא holds, דמזיק הוה, it's on the חשבון of the מזיק. Because we see here that there is a מחלוקת between the תנא קמא and אבא שאול, what the פשט in the פסוק is. At first glance, we could have thought that the מחלוקת is based on one thing: the תנא קמא would hold that after the שומר שכר brings witnesses that it happened באונס, he would be פטור, while אבא שאול will hold that even if he would bring witnesses that it happened באונס, he still would be חייב. And that's why אבא שאול cannot learn the פשט in the פסוק, יביאהו עד, that you bring עדים that it happened באונס and you're פטור, because אבא שאול holds that even if it happened באונס you're חייב. But that definitely couldn't be the פשט, because we know, everyone agrees that a שומר שכר is פטור from אונסין. So definitely אבא שאול would also agree that if he would bring witnesses that it happened באונס, he would be פטור. So what is the מחלוקת between the תנא קמא and אבא שאול? So there is another possibility in what the מחלוקת is: whether we bring the נבילה to בית דין, and בית דין evaluates how much it's worth, and the מזיק only pays the difference between that and the full price, or we don't do that. The תנא קמא would hold that we cannot learn the פשט in the פסוק that you bring the נבילה to בית דין, because according to the תנא קמא, you don't do that, according to the תנא קמא, the מזיק has to pay the full price. While according to אבא שאול, he doesn't pay the full price, he pays the difference between the worth of the נבילה and how much it was worth before. But that couldn't be either, because everyone has to agree that you do not have to pay the full price. As we said before, that since he is able to pay with any type of שוה כסף he wants, he's even able to pay him with many נבילות if he has, so certainly that this נבילה itself, the ניזק keeps, and the מזיק pays the difference. So again, we couldn't say that this is the מחלוקת between the תנא קמא and אבא שאול. So we're left only with one possibility: that according to אבא שאול, when you bring the נבילה to בית דין, and you evaluate how much the נבילה is worth, you evaluate how much it was worth at the time when it got killed, and he pays the difference between that amount and how much it was worth before. While according to the תנא קמא, you evaluate how much it's worth now, and that's the difference that he pays. And that's why the תנא קמא could not learn that this is what the פסוק comes to tell us, that you bring the נבילה to בית דין, and you evaluate how much it's worth now, and that's what he pays, because for that we don't need a פסוק. As we said before, that that we understand ourselves, since he could pay with any type of שוה כסף, certainly he is able to give him this נבילה. Therefore, the תנא קמא learns that the פסוק must mean something else. The פסוק must mean that he should bring witnesses that it was killed באונס, and he would be פטור. But אבא שאול learns that the פחת נבילה goes to the ניזק, which means that the מזיק pays the difference between how much it was worth before. Therefore he learns that this is what the פסוק is telling us, you have to bring it to בית דין, and בית דין will evaluate to see how much was it worth when it got killed, and that is how much he will have to pay, that difference. So it comes out here that this דין, whether פחת נבילה goes on the חשבון of the ניזק or on the חשבון of the מזיק, is really a מחלוקת between the תנא קמא and אבא שאול. And the גמרא says לא, no, באמת we could say דכולי עלמא, everyone holds דניזק, it's on the חשבון of the ניזק, and the מזיק will only pay the difference between how much it was worth when it died and how much it was worth before. And if there was a loss between the time it died and the time it came to בית דין, that loss is for the ניזק, the מזיק doesn't have to pay for that. But what is the מחלוקת between the תנא קמא and אבא שאול? דהכא, and here, בטורח נבילה קמיפלגי. The מחלוקת is who has to bother himself with taking the נבילה out of the place where it died. And אבא שאול, when he says the פשט in the פסוק is bring the נבילה to בית דין, what the פסוק is saying, that he, the מזיק, has to bring the נבילה to בית דין. The מזיק has to get the נבילה away from where it was, and let's say it fell into a hole, he has to take it out of the hole, it's his job, and he has to bring it up. While according to the תנא קמא that doesn't דרשן the פסוק that way, the תנא קמא says the פסוק means something else, that you bring עדים that it happened באונס and you are פטור, he holds that you cannot learn the פשט in the פסוק like אבא שאול, because he learns that it's not the מזיק who has to bother himself in bringing the נבילה, but it is the ניזק that has to bother himself in bringing the נבילה. And the גמרא continues, והתניא, as we actually learned, that אחרים אומרים, some say, others say, מנין שעל בעל הבור להעלות שורו מבורו, how do we know that it's the person that made the pit, that he is obligated to take out the ox from the pit? If a person made a pit and an ox fell in and died, so how do we know that the one that is responsible, the one that made the pit, it's his obligation to get that ox out of the pit? תלמוד לומר, as the פסוק says, כסף ישיב לבעליו והמת. The פשט in the פסוק is, it says, כסף ישיב לבעליו, he has to pay money to the owner, והמת יהיה לו, and the dead body of the ox stays his. But the גמרא here דרשנ'ס the word והמת together with the word לבעליו, as if the תורה would say כסף ישיב לבעליו והמת, that the money he should return to its owner and the dead body. That tells us that the one that made the בור, the one that's responsible, he is the one that is supposed to see that והמת, the dead body of the ox, gets out of the בור and is returned to the owner. אמר ליה אביי לרבא, so אביי said to רבא, האי טורח נבילה היכי דמי? When we say that there is a דין that the בעל הבור, the one that made the pit, he has to bother himself with the נבילה, what kind of case is it? אילימא, if you will tell me, דבבירא שוויא זוזא, that while this dead body is in the pit, it's worth a זוז, ובאגודא, and outside of the pit, שוויא ארבעה, it is worth four. That's how it usually would be, because it is a big bother to take it out, so you probably would have to pay some money for somebody to take it out. So therefore, when it's in the pit, it's only worth one, because in order to get it out, you still have to pay three more to get it out. So no one will pay more than one, knowing that it will cost him three more to get it out. So inside the pit it's only worth one, after it's taken out of the pit, it's worth four. So if that is the case, כי טרח בדינפשיה קא טרח. So when the מזיק is מטריח himself, bothers himself to get it out, we don't need a פסוק to tell us that he is supposed to do it, because he's doing it for his own benefit. If he won't bother himself to get it out, the מת is only worth one זוז, so he will have to pay the difference between one זוז and how much the damage was. While if he's going to bother himself to take it out, then that מת is worth four זוז, so he will have to pay less, because the מת itself is worth four, so he'll only have to pay the difference between four and how much it was worth before. So we wouldn't need a פסוק to tell us that the מזיק is the one that's supposed to bother to take it out. So the question is, why do we need the פסוק? אמר ליה, he said to him, לא צריכא, you don't even have to mention that it's in a case דבבירא שוויא זוזא, that inside the pit it's worth one זוז, ובאגודא נמי שוויא זוזא, and on the border of the pit, outside of the pit, it's also worth one זוז. So in a case like that, we would think that the one that's supposed to take it out is the ניזק, and the מזיק could say, I don't mind if it stays there, so the פסוק tells us no, that it is the job, the obligation of the מזיק to take out the שור from the pit. But then the

גמרא asks, ומי איכא כי האי גוונא? Is there such a thing that even though you still have to pay money to get it out from where it is, you still would pay the same price for it while it's in the pit and when it's out of the pit? So the גמרא says, אין, yes, דהא אמרי אינשי, as people say, there is an expression amongst people, כשורה, a beam, במתא בזוזא, in the city it's worth a זוז, כשורה, a beam, בדברא, in the desert, בזוזא, it's also worth a זוז. Even though the one that will buy the beam in the desert would still have to spend money or have to bother himself to bring it into the city, nevertheless, this is the price of a beam. Wherever you buy the beam, it is worth a זוז, and the same could apply to the נבילה, that the נבילה, when it's in the pit, it could be worth a זוז, and when it's outside of the pit, it still could be worth a זוז. And that's why the פסוק has to tell us that the טירחא of the נבילה, the obligation to bother himself to take the נבילה out, is upon the מזיק. Then the גמרא continues, אמר שמואל, שמואל said, אין שמין שמין, לא לגנב ולא לגזלן אלא לנזקין. The custom used to be among the דיינים, among the judges, that they would not estimate, they would not make an assessment, not concerning a גנב, and not concerning a גזלן, only for נזקין, only for damages. It means that when somebody stole something, and the object he stole lost some of its value later, so when they made him pay, they didn't say, "You give back the object the way it is, and you just pay the difference." But what they used to do is, they used to make him pay the full price for the object. And that they would do concerning a גנב, that not by a גנב would they make an estimation of how much it's worth, they would just say, "You pay the full price." And the same thing with a גזלן. The difference between a גנב and a גזלן is, a גנב steals in a hidden way, and a גזלן makes a holdup, he steals openly. So in both of these cases, שמואל said the custom of the דיינים used to be that they would not estimate it, they would not look how much it's worth now. If it lost some of its value, they would automatically make him pay the full price or give a new complete object, but they wouldn't say, "Give back the object the way it is and just pay the difference." The only place they would do it is by נזקין, because, as we said before, there is a פסוק that tells us that when you pay for damage, the נבילה stays with the ניזק, and you only pay the difference. But by other things they wouldn't do it. ואני אומר, שמואל said, and I say, אף לשואל, that the same דין applies to a borrower, that when someone borrowed and then the object he borrowed lost some of its value, the same דין would apply. ואבא מודה לי, and אבא, which refers to רב, he also admits to me. ואיבעיא להו, so they asked the question: What did שמואל mean when he said that the שואל, a borrower, also has the same דין? הכא קאמר, does he mean this, that אף לשואל שמין? That a שואל, if someone borrows, he has the same דין like נזקין, because שמואל mentioned two things: that by גנב and גזלן they wouldn't estimate, they would make him pay the full thing, by נזקין they would estimate and not make him pay the full thing. And then שמואל said, "I hold that a שואל, a borrower, has the same דין." Did he mean has the same דין as נזקין, that just like by נזקין you do estimate and all he pays is the difference, so a borrower would have the same דין, ואבא מודה לי, and that's what רב admits to? או דילמא, or maybe הכא קאמר, this is what he meant: ואני אומר, I say, אף לשואל אין שמין, that the דין by a borrower is similar to a גנב and a גזלן, that you don't estimate and he has to pay the full object, not like נזקין, ואבא מודה לי, and that's what רב is מודה to? That's what רב admits to. The

גמרא says, תא שמע, come and hear, I'll answer you your question, because בההוא גברא, there was this person, דשאיל נרגא מחבריה, he borrowed an axe from his friend, תברה, and he broke it. אתא לקמיה דרב, he came to רב. אמר ליה, he said to him, זיל שלים ליה נרגא מעליא, go pay him a new, complete axe. שמע מינה, so from here we see, אין שמין, that what he meant by a borrower was that you do not estimate and you pay the difference, but you have to give a new thing. Since he said that רב admits to me, and here we see a story that רב said you have to pay a new axe, and he didn't say, "Pay the difference between the broken one and the new one," so that shows that what he meant was that a borrower has to pay the complete thing and we do not estimate the value of the broken object. The גמרא asks, אדרבה, just the opposite! מי לא אמר ליה רב כהנא ורב אסי לרב, since רב כהנא and רב אסי asked רב, after רב had פסקנט that דין that he should pay him a new axe, so רב כהנא and רב אסי asked רב, דינא הכי, is this really the דין? Does he have to pay him a new axe? Can't he just pay him the difference? ושתיק, and רב was quiet and admitted to their question, שמע מינה, that proves that what does really רב hold? שמין, that you do estimate, that by a שואל, if someone borrows something and it loses its value, you do estimate how much it's worth now and you just pay the difference. And since שמואל said that רב holds like him, so that proves that when שמואל said that "I hold the same דין applies to שואל," he meant that by שואל, too, שמין, you do estimate, just like by נזקין. Then the גמרא says, איתמר, we learned, אמר עולא אמר רבי אלעזר, עולא said in the name of רבי אלעזר, שמין לגנב ולגזלן, that by a גנב and a גזלן you also estimate, which is not like we learned before, that שמואל said that the custom was that by a גנב and a גזלן you do not estimate, but you have to pay a new thing. So עולא said in the name of רבי אלעזר that even by a גנב and a גזלן you also estimate. רב פפא אמר, רב פפא said, אין שמין, you do not estimate by a גנב and a גזלן. והלכתא, the הלכה is, אין שמין, that you do not es- estimate, לא לגנב ולא לגזלן, not by a גנב and not by a גזלן. אבל לשואל, but by a borrower, שמין, you do estimate, and all you do is pay the difference. כדריס קהנה ורב אסי, like רב כהנא and רב אסי asked רב, that is the דין so? In other words, they claim that the דין is by a שואל, by a borrower, that you do estimate. That is the הלכה. And תוספות explains, what should be the reason why אין שמין by a גנב and a גזלן? Why by a גנב and a גזלן do you have to pay a new object or money, and you cannot just pay the difference between how much the object is worth now and how much it was worth originally? Why is that different than נזקין, since the תורה says that you could pay with שוה כסף, even with סובין? So why can't a גנב and a גזלן too give that broken object back to the person, and that will be part of the payment, and the difference, that's what he's going to add? So

תוספות says, because by a גנב and a גזלן, the תורה says that you have to return the גזלה אשר גזל, the object that you stole. So from the word אשר גזל, we learn out that it has to be כעין שגזל, the same way as it was when it was stolen. So therefore, if the object is worth less than it was worth before, then you have to return a new object which is worth the same as it was when it was stolen, and you cannot return the broken piece because of this פסוק. And then the תוספות quotes a ירושלמי. And ירושלמי says the same דין. The ירושלמי brings a פסוק that it says by a גנב. A גנב, the דין is, when he steals, he has to pay כפל. He has to pay double. And the פסוק says, חיים שנים ישלם, that you have to return two live animals. So, the ירושלמי says that you will return two live animals, ולא מתים, not dead animals. That shows that the dead animal that's left over doesn't go back to the one that was stolen from, but the גנב has to pay two new animals. But this is a פסוק by גנב. How do we know that the same applies to a גזלן? So, the ירושלמי brings the פסוק that was quoted by תוספות before, that the תורה says by a גזלן, אשר גזל, you return the גזלה that you stole. And we learn out, כאשר גזל, the same as it was when you stole it. But these are just פסוקים that prove the דין. What is the reason behind the דין? So, תוספות gives a reason, too. תוספות says, when a גנב and a גזלן steal, so automatically they are now responsible to pay. When the object is damaged later on, it's damaged in their possession. So, they are obligated to pay as it was when they stole it, because that's when the obligation was put upon them to pay. When they stole it, it was a complete object. So therefore, they have to return a complete object. But by a מזיק, the responsibility to pay comes when he causes the damage. So therefore, he only pays the difference between how much it's worth now and how much it was worth before. And

what about a שואל? According to the סברא that the גמרא says, that a שואל also has to pay a complete object. What should be the reason there? So, תוספות says, since a שואל is חייב באונסין, the דין is that even if something happened to it באונס, by force, he is still responsible to pay. That comes out, that as soon as he takes it from the owner, when he borrows it, automatically he has a responsibility to pay, as we see that whatever happens to it, he has to pay. So, therefore, we say the responsibility comes as soon as he takes it. And when he took it, it was a complete object. Therefore, he is responsible to give back a complete object, and can't just pay the difference. Then the גמרא continues, ואמר עולא, אמר רבי אלעזר. Also did עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר say, and the גמרא is now going to bring a few דינים which have nothing to do with the דינים בבא קמא, but since we mentioned a statement of עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר, the גמרא already mentions some more statements, some more דינים that were said by עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר. עולא said in the name of רבי אלעזר, שליא שיצא מקצתה, a placenta that went out partially ביום ראשון, on the first day, ומקצתה, and the other part ביום שני, on the second day, מונין לה מן הראשון, we count from the first day. The דין is that when a woman gives birth, she has to count certain days. If she gives birth to a boy, then the first seven days from when she gave birth she is טמא. Whether she saw blood, or she didn't see blood, she has a דין of a נדה for the first seven days. After that, if she goes to the מקוה, so for the next 33 days she is clean. And again, whether she sees blood, or she doesn't, even if she does, she is still clean. Those are called ימי טוהר, days of cleanliness. If she gives birth to a נקבה, to a girl, so then the דין is that for the first 14 days, whether she sees דם or she doesn't, she is טמא like a נדה. After that, for the next 66 days, she is טהור. Whether she sees blood or not, even if she does, she is טהור. Those are called the ימי טוהר of 44 days. Now, there's another דין, that if she gave birth just to a placenta placenta and there was no child there, we still say she has the same דין of a יולדת, of a woman that gave birth, being that we have a כלל, אין שליא בלא ולד, that there is no possibility for a placenta to be without a child. So even if we don't see the child, we have to assume definitely that there was a child, it just got messed up and we can't see the child, it got rotten and it got lost within the body, but definitely there was a child there. So when a woman gives birth just to a placenta, she has the דין of a יולדת. Now, since we don't know whether that child was a boy or a girl, so we have to be מחמיר, so we have to be strict and give upon her all the חומרות. And therefore, for the first 14 days, she would be טמאה as if it was a girl. On the other hand, she doesn't have 66 days of טהרה, because we don't know, maybe it was a boy, and by a boy there are only 33 days of טהרה, plus the 33 days start after the seven. So this woman would have 14 days of טומאה, and then 26 more days of טהרה. Because maybe it's a boy, so then the טהרה, the days of טהרה finish after the 40 days from the beginning. So she has to finish her טהרה by 40 days after the beginning because maybe it's a boy. On the other hand, she cannot start her טהרה till after 14 days because maybe it was a girl. So this is the דין of this woman: she would start the טומאה right away, for 14 days she would be טמאה, and then for 26 days she would be טהור. This would be if there was a complete birth of the placenta. Now here the case is that a מקצת שליא went out on one day, part of the placenta, not the whole thing and not even the majority, but part of the placenta went out on one day, and then the other part went out on the second day. Now the

question is: from when do we start counting her days of טומאה? From the first day, after the placenta went out a little bit, or from the second day, when it went out the rest? So עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר said that the דין is that מונין לה מן הראשון, we count the days of טומאה from the beginning, from the first day on. אמר ליה רבא, so רבא said, מאי דעתך? What is your reasoning? Why do you say that you start counting from the first day? Because לחומרא, you want to go לחומרא. Since it's possible that the child that was there together with the placenta went out on the first day, when part of the placenta went out, maybe that's when the child was born, and therefore she is considered a יולדת from that day on, so you want to be מחמיר just in case this happened, so you say let her start counting from the first day. But if so, חומרא דאתי לידי קולא הוא, it's a חומרא that will lead to a קולא. Because if you start counting the 14 days from the first day, then the 14th day is finished 14 days from the first, but maybe really the child wasn't born on the first day, maybe the child was born on the second day when the other part of the placenta came out. So the 14 days are not up till after 14 days from the second day. So by you saying that you start counting from the first day, so at this point it's a חומרא, but it will lead us to a קולא, that on the 15th day from this day you will say she is טהור, because the 14 days are up, and maybe really she should be טמאה. Maybe it started from the second day, and the 15th day is really the 14th day and she still should be טמאה. וקא מטהרת לה מן הראשון, you will make her טהור at the end of the 14 days based on the חשבון from the first. אלא אמר רבא, so therefore רבא said that what he meant was לחוש חששה, that we have to suspect and be מחמיר on the first day to make her טמאה too, but מימנא לא מימניא, to count, she doesn't start counting the 14 days from the first, she starts counting from the second. And the 15th day from the first, which is really the 14th day from the second, she is still טמאה, and the 16th day from the first, which is the 15th from the second, that's when she becomes טהור. Then the גמרא asks, מאי קא משמע לן? What did עולא want to tell us with this דין? He wanted to tell us, obviously, דאין מקצת שליא בלא ולד, that there is no such thing as a מקצת שליא, as part of the placenta to come out without a little bit of the child in it. That's what he wants to tell us. Because if the דין would be that when a מקצת שליא comes out, when a little bit of the placenta comes out, maybe there was no part of the child there at all, then עולא would not have said that she has to be מחמיר and she should be considered טמאה on the first day when only part of the placenta came out, because then it would be as a יולדת only if the majority of the child comes out. So maybe the majority of the child did not come out on the first day, so there is a double ספק. The first ספק is maybe no part of the child came out on the first day. Even if part did come out, maybe it wasn't רוב. In a case of a ספק ספיקא, we would not have been מחמיר. The only time we are מחמיר is if there is one ספק, but if there is a double ספק we are not מחמיר. By עולא saying that we are מחמיר on the first day, we must say that it's not a ספק ספיקא, it is one ספק. Now,

how is it one ספק on the first day? The only way it could be one ספק is if we assume that it's impossible for the שליא to come out a little bit without having any part of the child in it. So that is for sure that part of the child was definitely there. So that first ספק falls off. So there's only one ספק left: whether the majority of the child came out, or just a little bit of the child came out. So since it's only one ספק, therefore we have to be מחמיר, and we say that she is טמא from the first day on. So it comes out that by עולא telling us this דין, that she has to be חושש, she has to become טמא from the first day on, from the day when part of the placenta came out, it means that עולא is trying to tell us that we know for sure that it's impossible for a מקצת שליא, for part of the שליא to come out without a child, and that's why it's only one ספק. But if that's what עולא is trying to tell us, תנינא, that we already learned in a different place, and עולא wouldn't have to tell us that, because we learned in חולין, שליא שיצתה מקצתה, this is concerning a בהמה, an animal. The דין is that when you שחט an animal, anything that's found inside you could eat, because the שחיטה of the animal is מתיר everything inside. Even if you would find a ולד, a child inside, a live calf inside the mother, and you שחט the mother, that child that's found inside could be eaten without שחיטה. So here the שאלה is, if a

שליא, a placenta, that came out a little bit from the animal, and you שחט the mother, אסורה, you're not allowed to eat that placenta. Since we say that a placenta has definitely a calf, so there was definitely something there that is considered a child, and since it came out it's considered born, and after it's born the שחיטה of the mother will not be מתיר that child to be eaten. And therefore, when the שליא came out a little bit, you're not allowed to eat that שליא. Not only the part that came out, but you cannot eat the whole שליא. Why? Because we are afraid maybe in that little bit that came out the majority of the child was there, so the whole placenta is considered that it was born, and the שחיטה of the mother will not be מתיר it. Because we say, סימן ולד באשה סימן ולד בבהמה. The same סימן, the same sign that shows there is a child by a woman, that same דין applies to a בהמה. That just like by a woman we say if a placenta came out we know for sure there was a child there, the same applies to a בהמה. So here we see that even though only part of the placenta came out, nevertheless, we're not allowed to eat the whole placenta. Now the

question is: why? We must say because אין מקצת שליא בלא ולד, that when the מקצת שליא came out, part of the placenta came out, definitely there was part of a ולד there. Because if the דין would be that there's a possibility for part of the placenta to come out without having any part of the child in it, then the דין would be that you would be able to eat it, because it would be the same ספק ספיקא: first of all, when that little bit of the placenta came out, how do we know there was any part of the ולד there? Even if there was a part of the ולד there, maybe it was only a little bit, not the majority? So then why shouldn't we be able to eat that part of the placenta that was inside? Since the דין is that you cannot eat the part that's inside either, that shows that there is only one ספק. Now, how can there be only one ספק? If we assume that that is for sure that part of the child was there in the part of the placenta. The only ספק is whether was it the majority or not, and since it's one ספק, we're not allowed to eat it. So the question is: why did עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר have to tell us this דין, which teaches us that אין מקצת שליא בלא ולד, that we cannot have part of a שליא without any part of a child? We learned that already concerning the דין of a בהמה. And the גמרא answers, אי ממתניתין, if it would be from that משנה, הוה אמינא, I would think, דיש מקצת שליא בלא ולד, that really there is a possibility to have part of the placenta come out without any part of the child. And the question is then: why would it be אסור באכילה? Why shouldn't we be able to eat the part that's inside? Because of גזירה, מקצתה אטו כולה. The חכמים made a גזירה that when part of it went out, you shouldn't be able to eat it, because if the חכמים would allow you to eat it then, then people might make a mistake and come to eat also when it went out completely. And that is definitely אסור. And if this would be the פשט, then we wouldn't know that the same דין applied to the case of a woman, because by the case of the בהמה, where people could make such a mistake, and as רש״י explains, the mistake really would be if it went out completely and went back in, then people would think that if you שחט the mother, you're allowed to eat that placenta. If the placenta went out and stayed out, everyone would know that you can't eat it because it was born already. But if it went out and went back in, people would think that this is not considered a ולד, not considered a child. So therefore you should be able to eat it after you שחט the mother. And because of that גזירה, people shouldn't make that mistake, that's why the חכמים said even if only a little bit went out you still shouldn't eat it. But that cannot apply to a woman. By a woman, people can't make a mistake because they know that after the placenta goes out completely, the דין is definitely that she's טמאה. So why should people make a mistake and think that just like she would not be טמאה if a little bit went out, so too she will not be טמאה when the whole thing went out. So since by a woman we cannot make such a mistake, so by a woman there is no reason to make the גזירה. So we would not know that by a woman we are also מחמיר that she becomes טמאה from the first day on. קא משמע לן, so therefore עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר had to tell us that it's not because of a גזירה. But the reason is that there is no ספק ספיקא. The reason is because it's really one ספק, because one thing is for sure that אין מקצת שליא בלא ולד. When part of the שליא came out, we know for sure there was part of the child. There's only a ספק whether it was the majority or not. So since it's one ספק, so we have to be מחמיר על פי דין. Then the גמרא continues, ואמר

עולא אמר רבי אלעזר, another thing that עולא said in the name of רבי אלעזר, בכור שנטרף, and the way רש״י learns it means a בכור, a firstborn child that got killed בתוך ל׳ יום within the first thirty days from his birth, אין פודין אותו, you do not redeem him. Like this there is a דין that a firstborn child must be redeemed, and that is the מצוה of פדיון הבן. The father has to give five שקלים to the כהן. But this has to be done only after the child is thirty days old. If the child was killed before thirty days, you do not have to redeem him. And רש״י explains that if the child died by itself during those thirty days, he wouldn't have to tell us that you don't have to redeem him, because the תורה says בפירוש, ופדויו מבן חדש תפדה, that you have to redeem the child after the child is a month old. But now that the child did not die, the child only got killed during these thirty days, so maybe if this wouldn't happen, the accident wouldn't happen, then he would have lived more than thirty days, so maybe you do have to redeem him, so that's why he tells us that you do not have to redeem him. וכן תני רמי בר חמא, so did רמי בר חמא learn, מתוך שנאמר, since it says פדה תפדה that you should redeem the child, the full פסוק is אך פדה תפדה את בכור האדם, that you should redeem any בכור from amongst people. So since the פסוק says you should redeem him, יכול, I would think, אפילו נטרף בתוך ל׳ יום, even if the child got killed within the thirty days, תלמוד לומר, so therefore we learn now from the פסוק, אך חלק, אך comes to divide it. The פסוק starts off by saying אך פדה תפדה את בכור האדם, and whenever the תורה says אך, 'but', it comes to divide, comes to exclude something. So this פסוק comes to exclude that if the child was killed within the thirty days, then the child does not have to be redeemed. This is the way רש״י learns the פשט in this גמרא. But תוספות learns the פשט differently.

תוספות asks a קושיא that how can we say that the פסוק is speaking about a child that was killed within the thirty days? For that we also don't need a פסוק, because as long as the child did not reach thirty days, the child is not obligated to have a פדיון הבן, even if we don't know maybe the child would have lived. Because תוספות says that the reason why you have to wait for thirty days is not just because we don't know whether the child will live or not. There is a דין that a child doesn't have to get a פדיון הבן till after the child is thirty days old. And it's not because till thirty days we don't know, the child might be a נפל, the child might live. And therefore the דין is that even if we know for sure that the child is going to live for more than thirty days, for instance, if the mother was pregnant with the child for full nine months, if we know that, so then we have to assume that the child is not a נפל, and still the דין is that you must wait thirty days till you perform the פדיון הבן. So according to that, what would be the הוה אמינא that if the child was killed within the thirty days you should have to perform פדיון הבן? So therefore תוספות learns that בכור שנטרף doesn't mean that. בכור שנטרף means that בכור became טרפה. טרפה is a term used concerning a person who is sick and will die from that sickness. So what the גמרא says is that בכור that became טרפה within the thirty days, so here we might think that you should have to redeem the child because the child child, בפועל, lives till after thirty days. So we would think since he lived more than thirty days you have to redeem him, but that's where we learn out from the פסוק that since we know for sure he's going to die later, there is no obligation to perform the מצוה of פדיון הבן. Then the גמרא continues, ואמר

עולא אמר רבי אלעזר, another דין that עולא said in the name of רבי אלעזר: בהמה גסה, a big animal, נקנית במשיכה. When a person wants to acquire ownership over a בהמה גסה, the way to do it is through משיכה, through pulling it to yourself, that's the way you acquire it. And the גמרא asks: והנן תנן, didn't we learn in the משנה במסירה, that the way to do it is by giving over, when the original owner gives over the handle that you pull the בהמה with to the second person, that's how the second person is קונה this בהמה גסה, this big בהמה. So how could he say that you do it through משיכה? And the גמרא answers: הוא דאמר, he says, כי האי תנא, like the other תנא. דתניא, because we learn in a ברייתא: וחכמים אומרים, that the חכמים say, זו וזו במשיכה, that whether it's a בהמה גסה or a בהמה דקה, a big animal or a small animal, the way to acquire ownership is through משיכה, through pulling it. ורבי שמעון אומר, and רבי שמעון says, זו וזו בהגבהה, both of them, the big one and the small one, you acquire through picking it up. Now how can you pick up a big animal? So רש״י says you would put things down on the floor and you would have the animal walk upon it, that would be a form of picking up the animal. So here we see that there is a מאן דאמר that says that you are קונה a בהמה גסה through משיכה, so according to that מאן דאמר, עולא in the name of רבי אלעזר פסקנ׳ט, and that's why he said a בהמה גסה you are קונה through משיכה. Then the

גמרא continues, ואמר עולא אמר רבי אלעזר, עולא said in the name of רבי אלעזר: האחים שחלקו, when brothers divide the inheritance, מה שעליהן שמין, what they are wearing upon themselves you estimate. When you divide it and you look in everything that's left over from the possessions of the father, you also take in consideration the clothes that they are wearing that they took from the father's money. ומה שעל בניהם ובנותיהם, but what their sons and daughters are wearing, אין שמין, that we do not estimate, that we do not take in consideration. As רש״י and תוספות explain, because it is a בזיון, an embarrassment, to bring the children to בית דין, and therefore we forget about that and we don't take that into the חשבון. אמר רב פפא, as רב פפא said: פעמים, sometimes, אף מה שעליהן אין שמין, that even what they themselves are wearing we also wouldn't estimate. משכחת לה, that is in the case, בגדול אחי, if it's an older brother and he is the one that takes care of the business affairs, so דניחא להו דנשתמען מיליה, that the other brothers are happy that his words should be heard. Since he runs the business, so the other brothers want that he should be respectful, so they want him to wear nice clothes, so they are מוחל that the clothes he wears should stay his because it is for their benefit, too. So in a case like that, you also wouldn't estimate the clothes that he wears.

ואמר עולא אמר רבי אלעזר, also did עולא say in the name of רבי אלעזר: שומר שמסר לשומר, if one watchman gives over the object he was given to watch to another watchman, פטור, he is פטור. If something happened to it while it was in the possession of the second watchman, something that if the same thing would have happened by the first watchman he would have been פטור, so he is פטור in this case, too. And he explains: לא מיבעיא, that is certain, that if it was a שומר חנם שמסר לשומר שכר, that the first watchman was one that wasn't paid, he gave it over to somebody else whom he did pay, so here, certainly that the first one is פטור, because דעלויי עליה לשמירתו, he made his watching even stronger. He could say that "my, my giving it over to the second person cannot be considered negligence, that I didn't watch it properly, because I gave it over even to a better watchman. I was only a שומר חנם. A שומר חנם who doesn't get paid doesn't watch it that strong. The one I gave it to I paid, so he is a שומר שכר, he watches it even better. So certainly it is not considered a פשיעה by giving it over to him." אלא אפילו שומר שכר שמסר לשומר חנם, but even if it would be just the opposite, that the one that was given first, he was a שומר שכר, he was paid for it, he gave it to somebody else whom he didn't pay, who was a שומר חנם, so here, דהשתא גרועי גרעה לשמירתו, here he made his שמירה worse. So here we might think that the person could say to him that "you should be חייב because you neglected it by giving it over to somebody who didn't watch it as strong as you would have watched it." But still he says: נמי פטור, you are also פטור, שהרי מסר לבן דעת, because after all he gave it over to a normal person who is able to watch it, so therefore it is not considered a פשיעה, negligence, and he would be פטור.

רבא אמר, but רבא says, that שומר ש... מסר לשומר חייב, that if one watchman gave it over to another watchman to watch, and then something happened to it, so if it would have happened in the possession of the first watchman, he would have been פטור, but if it happened while it was by the second, he is חייב. And the reason is because it is called a פשיעה, it is called that he neglected it, and therefore he is חייב. And he explains: לא מיבעיא, this is certain, that if it was by a שומר שכר שמסר לשומר חנם, that if the first one was a paid watchman, and he gave it over to somebody who was a שומר חנם who was not paid, here certainly he has to pay, he's חייב. דגרועי גרעה לשמירתו, he made his watching worse, so certainly it's called a פשיעה. אלא אפילו שומר חנם שמסר לשומר שכר, but even if a שומר חנם gave it to a שומר שכר, the first one was not paid for his watching, and he gave it over to the second one whom he did pay, so here he made his שמירה better, here he made his watching even better. So here there should be a סברא that he should not be חייב, still he says חייב, the דין is he's חייב. What is the reason? דאמר ליה, because the owner could say to him, את מהימנת לי בשבועה, you are trusted to me with a שבועה if you would swear. האי לא מהימן לי בשבועה, he is not believed to me with a שבועה. Because the דין is that even a שומר חנם, when he is פטור, for גנבה ואבדה for instance, if it was stolen or lost, the only way he is פטור is if he swears that this is what happened. And the same applies to a שומר שכר. When we say a שומר שכר is פטור from אונסין, if it got lost through an אונס, by force, he is פטור only if he swears. So that's why the owner says to him, that even though you are a שומר חנם and he was a שומר שכר, so you made your שמירה even stronger, nevertheless you are חייב. Because you I would have trusted when you swear, but he I don't, him I don't trust, and therefore I want you to pay. And therefore רבא holds that he is חייב, that the first שומר has to pay to the owner. Now

תוספות makes it clear that according to the one that holds that a שומר שמסר לשומר is פטור, and the case where the first one was a שומר חנם, and he gave it over to a שומר שכר, and a שומר שכר is חייב for גנבה ואבדה, he's חייב if it was lost or stolen, and a שומר חנם is פטור. So let's say what would be if by the שומר שכר it got lost or it got stolen? So the שומר חנם, the first one, he is פטור, as we said, according to the מאן דאמר that שומר שמסר לשומר is פטור. The second שומר would have to pay because he is a שומר שכר, and he's חייב for גנבה ואבדה. So whom would the שומר שכר pay to? So תוספות says that the שומר שכר would have to pay to the owner. We wouldn't say that the שומר שכר has to pay to the שומר חנם, because he took it from the שומר חנם, and he is obligated to pay for גנבה ואבדה, so he pays to the שומר חנם. On the other hand, the שומר חנם should not have to pay to the owner because he is a שומר חנם who is פטור from גנבה ואבדה, and he is פטור from paying. So תוספות says that according to this, it would come out that the middleman, the first שומר, would be making profit on the חשבון of someone else's animal. תוספות says that the גמרא says in בבא מציעא דף ל״ו that we פסקן like רבי יוסי who says over there that אין הלה עושה סחורה בפרתו של חבירו, that we don't allow this person, this middleman, to make profit on the חשבון of someone else's cow. And therefore here too, if it happened so that the second one was a שומר שכר, and it got lost or got stolen, so then the second one would have to pay to the בעלים, to the original owner. Another thing that תוספות says is, that here the reason רבא gives why he holds that שומר שמסר לשומר is חייב, even if the שומר חנם gave it to a שומר שכר, is because the owner could say to him, "You I would trust with a שבועה, but the other fellow I don't trust with a שבועה." But תוספות says that in המפקיד, in בבא מציעא, the גמרא gives another reason for the one that holds that שומר שמסר לשומר is חייב. The reason is because the owner could say to him, אין רצוני שיהא פקדוני ביד אחר. "I don't want that my object, my פקדון, should be in the hands of someone else. I gave it to you, I want you to watch it, I want you to hold it. I don't want my פקדון to enter someone else's hands, and because you gave it to him, that is called a פשיעה, and you are חייב." And תוספות says that there would be a נפקא מינה להלכה, a difference in הלכה, which reason we would accept. For instance, let's say if the second person was a person that was more trusted than the first, everyone knew that he was a trustworthy person. So if you give the reason why חייב is because the owner says, "You I trust with a שבועה, and him I don't trust with a שבועה," so in a case where the second one is more trusted, he couldn't say that. And since he couldn't say that, the דין would be that פטור. But if we accept the reason that a person is able to say that, "I don't want my פקדון to be in the hands of somebody else," so even if the second person is more trusted, but still, he's able to say, "I don't want my פיקדון to be in his hands," and even if the second one would be more trusted, the דין would be that he is חייב.

Concerning the דין of עולא אמר רבי אלעזר that we learned before, that he said that if a מקצת שיליא, part of the placenta went out the first day, and part went out the second day, the דין is that we start counting from the first day, that we start counting the ימי טומאה from the first day. And רבא asked him the question, "The reason you're saying you start counting from the first day because you want to be מחמיר. But this is a חומרא that will lead you to a קולא, because if you start counting the days of טומאה from the first day, you will have to finish the 14 days of טומאה also on the חשבון from the first day. That means that on the 15th day from the first day, she will already be טהור, but maybe the child went out on the second day. So the 15th day from the first is really the 14th day from the birth, because the child came out on the second day. So really she still should be טמאה, and by counting from the first day, we will make her טהור. So it's a חומרא in the beginning, but it's a קולא at the end." And that's why the גמרא explained that what he meant was that you are חושש on the first day, you make her טמאה on the first day too, but you don't count till the second, and therefore, she would be טמאה on the 15th day of the first because we would consider it the 14th day from the second. So

תוספות asks a קשיא, when he said that it's going to be a קולא, that you're going to make her טהור on the last day, on the 15th day from the first, which really might be the 14th day from the birth if the child came out on the second day, so תוספות asks, why shouldn't she be טהור on that day? לכאורה there is a ספק ספיקא. So as a double ספק. One ספק is maybe the majority of the child came out on the first day. Even if we're going to say that the majority of the child did not come out on the first day, maybe that child was a זכר, the child was a male, and by a זכר the דין is that there are only seven days of טומאה. So on the 15th day, certainly she should be טהור. Or she should be טהור because it is the 15th day already even if it was a girl, plus she should be טהור because maybe it wasn't a girl, maybe it was a boy, so she should be טהור definitely because by a boy there are only seven days of טומאה. And תוספות answers that we cannot say such a ספק ספיקא, because this is a ספק ספיקא that is going to end up eventually to be a contradiction. Because if we're going to make her טהור on the 15th day based on this ספק ספיקא, we should also make her טהור on the 41st day based on a similar ספק ספיקא, but it will be a contradiction. When the 41st day comes, we say that she is טמאה, because maybe it was a זכר, and by a זכר we only have seven days of טומאה and 33 days of טהרה, and after the 40 days, she is טמאה. And since we don't know, maybe it was a זכר, therefore, as we said before, the דין is on the 41st day, she is already טמאה. Now the question is, why should she be טמאה on the 41st day? She should be טהור on the 41st day because of a ספק ספיקא. First of all, maybe the child came out, the majority, on the second day, so the 41st day is really the 40th, and on the 40th she is still טהור. Even if we're going to say that the child came out on the first day, most of the child came out on the first day, so it is the 41st day, but maybe the child was a girl. And if it was a girl, we have 66 days of טהרה. So she should be טהור on the 41st day because of this ספק ספיקא. So it will come out that we're going to make her טהור on the on the 41st day because maybe it was a girl, we'll make her טהור on the 15th day because maybe it was a boy. So we're going to be using two opposite סברות, and in both cases we're going to make her טהור. So since we cannot make a ספק ספיקא which is a contradiction and use them both, so therefore we don't use any ספק ספיקא. So on the 41st day, she remains טמאה because we do not say maybe it was a girl, and we also don't say she is טהור on the 15th day saying maybe it was a boy, because if we say that, we'll have to make her טהור on the 41st, and therefore it remains that she is טמאה on both days.

תוספות also asks another קשיא: The גמרא gives the reason why is she טמאה on the first day, because on the first day it's not a ספק ספיקא, it's only one ספק. If the דין would be that there is a possibility for a part of the שיליא to come out without any part of the child, then she would be טהור on the first day. It would be a ספק ספיקא. The ספק ספיקא would be: maybe no child came out at all on that day, so definitely she's טהור. Even if a little bit of the child came out, maybe it was just a little bit and not the majority, that's a second ספק, and then she's also טהור, so we would make her טהור on the first day. But since we hold that אין מקצת שיליא בלא ולד, it's impossible that part of the שיליא, of the placenta, should come out without any child, so that first ספק is not a ספק, it's ודאי, it's definite that part of the child came out, all that we're left with a ספק is: did it come out רוב or not? Did the majority come out or not? And since it's only one ספק, the גמרא says, we make it טמא. תוספות asks the קשיא: What is this case talking about? We have a כלל that by ספק טומאה, whenever we deal with טומאה, with something whether it is טמא or not and there is a doubt, the הלכה is that it depends where the ספק is. If it's a ספק טומאה ברשות היחיד, if the ספק occurs in a private domain, in a רשות היחיד, then it is always טמא, even if it's a ספק ספיקא, a double ספק, or even more than a double ספק, three ספיקות, four ספיקות. As long as there is a possibility for טומאה and it happened in the רשות היחיד, the דין is that it's טמא. On the other hand, if it happened in the רשות הרבים, if in the public domain, that's where the ספק occurred, then even if it's one ספק, it is also טהור, as we learn out from פסוקים by סוטה that if it's a ספק in רשות הרבים, the דין is that even one ספק is טהור. So תוספות asks the קשיא: We're talking here about the ספק whether she becomes a נדה or not, טמא as a נדה, טומאת יולדת or not, and the גמרא makes a חילוק between ספק ספיקא and one ספק that if it would be one ספק, she would be טמא. If it's a double ספק, she is טהור. Concerning טומאה and טהרה, there is no difference between one ספק or two ספיקות. Wherever one ספק is טמא, if it's a רשות היחיד, then two ספיקות are also טמא. Wherever two ספיקות are טהור, which is the רשות הרבים, one ספק is טהור too. And תוספות answers that our גמרא is not talking about the דין of טומאה, but we're talking about her becoming a נדה whether she is מותר to her husband or she is אסור to her husband. Because by a נדה we have two דינים: when a woman becomes a נדה, or a יולדת which has the same דין as a נדה, she becomes טמא, and anything she will touch will become טמא. Also, because she is a נדה, she is forbidden to have relations with her husband. So concerning the דין of טומאה, there is a difference whether it happened in the רשות היחיד or it happened in the רשות הרבים, but concerning becoming אסור to her husband, then there is no difference between רשות היחיד and רשות הרבים. It would depend whether it's one ספק or two ספיקות, like any other איסור. By a regular איסור, not by טומאה, that there's a difference between one ספק and two ספיקות, so concerning the איסור to her husband, it would depend whether it is one ספק or two ספיקות. And ר' יוסף ענגיל brings a ראיה from this תוספות that we see that the איסור for a woman who is a נדה to her husband has nothing to do with her טומאה. Because we could learn that the טומאה and the איסור come together, that why is a woman forbidden to her husband when she's a נדה? Because she is טמא, the טומאה brings about the איסור. But if that would be true, it would be impossible for a woman to be טמא as a נדה and be allowed to her husband, or be טהור as a נדה and be אסור to her husband, because the טומאה brings along the איסור. Since תוספות here says that there is a possibility for a woman to be טמא and nevertheless to be מותר for her husband. For instance, if it was a ספק ספיקא, and it was in the רשות היחיד, so concerning טומאה she still will be טמא, but since it was a ספק ספיקא, לגבי her husband she would be מותר, and it could be the opposite too, that if it was one ספק in the רשות הרבים, so concerning טומאה she will be טהור, but concerning the husband she will be אסור, so from here we see that the איסור of a נדה to her husband is not a reaction, a תוצאה, from her טומאה, but it is a separate דין.