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GITTIN: CHAPTER 4

Gittin: 42

Freeing a Half-Slave, Half-Freeman

Part of Gittin: chapter 4 · 56:39

A Gittin sugya debating whether a slave freed by only one of two partners can function in his free half, the Mishnah's dispute over whether the remaining master can be compelled to complete the freedom, and the halachos governing a half-slave's marriage options.

Audio Transcript
Opening: Shiur on Gittin Daf 42 Introduction

Jewish audio on Chabad.org. Today's shiur will be ืžืกื›ืช Gittin ื“ืฃ ืž"ื‘ starting with the last word of the first line from ืขืžื•ื“ ื'. The Gemara here is still in the middle of the sugya where it discusses the machloket between Rabbi and the Rabbanan. And that is concerning whether a person is able to free half of his slave. Rabbi holds that he is able to, and the Rabbanan hold that a person cannot free half of his slave. The Gemara starts, ืืžืจ ืจื‘ื, Rava said, machloket, this argument between Rabbi and the Rabbanan is only ื‘ืฉืฉื—ืจืจ ื—ืฆื™ื• ื•ื”ื ื™ื— ื—ืฆื™ื•, if he freed half of the slave and left the other half for himself. ืื‘ืœ ืฉื—ืจืจ ื—ืฆื™ื• ื•ืžื›ืจ ื—ืฆื™ื•, but if he freed half of the slave and sold the other half to somebody else, ืื• ื ืชืŸ ื‘ืžืชื ื” ื—ืฆื™ื•, or he gave the other half away as a present to somebody. So here, ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ื ืคืง ืžื™ื ื™ื” ื›ื•ืœื™ื”, since the eved left the master completely, ื“ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ืœ ืงื ื”, everyone agrees that the freedom that the master gave him takes effect and he is half free. And the reason for that is because the whole sevara of the Rabbanan that a person cannot free half of the slave is only because a person could only drop his whole connection to the slave, but if he leaves half of the connection, then that is not valid. In this case, since he gives away his whole connection, he doesn't free him completely, but he gives away his whole connection, he freed him partially, and the other part he gave it away to somebody else or sold to somebody else, in a case like this, the shichrur does take effect. But it is self-understood, as Rashi explains, that this is only if he first sold the other half to somebody, or gave that half away as a present to somebody, and then he freed the other half. But if he first freed the half, and then he gave away the other half as a present or sold the other half, then definitely this would not take effect, because when he freed half, the other half still didn't leave his master, and the Rabbanan hold that when you free only a half, it doesn't take effect. But if his other half was sold first, so then when he frees the half, by doing that, he leaves his master completely, so then his freedom takes effect.

Abaye Challenges Rava on Full Freedom

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืื‘ื™ื™, Abaye said to ืจื‘ื, ื•ื‘ื›ื•ืœื• ืœื ืคืœื™ื’ื™? Now you're telling me that if the whole eved leaves his master, there is no machloket, even the Rabbanan agree that his freedom does take effect? ื•ื”ืชื ื™ ื—ื“ื, but didn't we learn in one beraita: ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœืฉื ื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™ื•, if someone writes away all his possessions to two of his slaves, he writes two shtarot, two documents. In one document, it says that he is giving away all his possessions to one slave. In the other document, it says that he is giving away all his possessions to the other slave. And then he takes both documents, and he gives it to a third party that that person should be zocheh these shtarot for his avadim. So since the two shtarot were given together, so not one of the slaves is able to say that his shtar came first, so he acquired the ownership over the possessions of his master first, so what do we say? We say that it goes half to one and half to the other, since he gave away together all his possessions to both. So the din is that kanu, they are koneh, each one is koneh half of the possessions, and since the avadim themselves are part of the possessions, so each one is koneh half of the avadim, that means that each one is koneh half of himself, and the other half of each one belongs to the other one. So what do they do? ื•ืžืฉื—ืจืจื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืืช ื–ื”, so they free each other. Since each one is now half free and half an eved of the other one, so each one frees each other, so therefore they are completely free now. That's the way it says in one beraita.

Beraita Claiming Slaves Not Koneh Themselves

ื•ืชื ื™ื ืื™ื“ืš, but we learned in another beraita: ื”ืื•ืžืจ, if someone says, ื›ืœ ื ื›ืกื™ื™ ื ืชื•ื ื™ืŸ ืœืคืœื•ื ื™ ื•ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™ื™, that all my possessions should be given away to so and so and so and so my slaves, so the din is, ืืฃ ืขืฆืžืŸ ืœื ืงื ื•, they are not even koneh themselves, not only are they not koneh all other possessions, they are not even koneh themselves. So the question is, this seems to be a similar case to the previous beraita, and in the previous beraita, it says that they are koneh, and then each one becomes a half an eved and half a ben chorin, and then each one frees the other, that's how they become complete bnei chorin, and in this beraita, it says that this whole thing is not valid and they're not koneh themselves. So ืžืื™ ืœืื•, wouldn't you think, ื”ื ืจื‘ื™ ื”ื ืจื‘ื ืŸ, in order to answer this contradiction, we would say that one beraita goes according to Rabbi, and one beraita goes according to the rabbanan? The beraita that says that it they are koneh goes according to Rabbi, Because Rabbi holds that you could free half of an eved. The other beraita that says that they are not koneh goes according to the rabbanan that holds that you cannot free a half an eved. But if we're gonna say so, it seems that the rabbanan argue even in the case where the eved leaves his master completely. Because in this case where he gave away all his possessions to both of his avadim, so even though each one would become only half ben chorin and half he would remain an eved, but nevertheless he left his master, because when he remains half of an eved, he is now the eved of the other eved. So if we're gonna say to answer the two beraitot that one goes according to Rabbi and one goes according to the rabbanan, so this would prove that the rabbanan also argue on Rabbi in the case where they leave their master completely. So this is a kashya on

Kashya on Ravaโ€™s View of Complete Release

Rava who said that in the case where the master gives them up completely, he frees half and he sells the other half, or gives away the other half, the Rabbanan admit that it is valid and they become half-free. The Gemara answers, ืœื, no, the emes is the Rabbanan admit in such a case. And let's not answer the ืกืชื™ืจื” in the two beraitot that one is Rabbi and one is Rabbanan, but let's say ืื™ื“ื™ ื•ืื™ื“ื™ ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ. You could say that both beraitot go according to the Rabbanan. And the question is why does it say in one beraita that they are ืงื•ื ื” and the other beraita it says not? Because ื”ื ื“ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื™, ื”ื ื“ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™. The first beraita where it says that they are ืงื•ื ื”, it is speaking in a case where he wrote in each ืฉื˜ืจ that he's giving away all his possessions to the ืขื‘ื“. And since he wrote that in both ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช for both ืขื‘ื“ื™ื, and then he gave both ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช at the same time to a third party to be ื–ื•ื›ื” for them, so it comes out that at the same time he gave away half of the possessions to the first, and half of the possessions to the second. So at the same moment when he gave away half of his possessions to the first, which means that he is ืงื•ื ื” himself half, at the same moment he gave the other half away of this ืขื‘ื“ to the other person. And the same applies to the other ืขื‘ื“, that the other ืขื‘ื“ at the same moment when he gave him half of the possessions, which includes half of himself, at the same moment he gave the other half away to somebody else. And as we said before, according to the Rabbanan, they admit in a case like that where while he frees half, at the same time the other half is given to somebody else, the ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is valid. And therefore the beraita says that in a case like this, the ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is valid, and everyone becomes a half an ืขื‘ื“ and half a ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, and the ืขืฆื” is that they free each other later on. But the second beraita where it says that if he gives away all his possessions to both of his ืขื‘ื“ื™ื, they are not ืงื•ื ื”, is speaking in a case where he wrote two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช, and in each ืฉื˜ืจ it said, "I give away half of my possessions to you," and the other ืฉื˜ืจ it said, "Half of the possessions to him." And in a case like that, the ืฉื˜ืจ is not valid. And the reason for that is, because there are two possibilities really here. If the case happened to be that he gave one ืฉื˜ืจ to one ืขื‘ื“ first and the other ืฉื˜ืจ to the other ืขื‘ื“ later, definitely it doesn't take effect, because when he gave the ืฉื˜ืจ to the first ืขื‘ื“ first, where it said, "Half of my possessions go to you," which includes himself too, so half of himself he freed, but since at that time the other half was not given away to somebody else yet, so this is a case where he freed half without giving away the other half, and we said before the ืจื‘ื ืŸ hold in a case like that the ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is not valid. So therefore the first ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is not valid, and the same would apply to the second one. Even if the case happened to be that he gave both ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช to a third party at the same time, but nevertheless, since in the ืฉื˜ืจ it said that he's giving away half of the possessions to the ืขื‘ื“, and both ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช said the same thing, so it is very possible that what he meant was that he's giving away the same half to both ืขื‘ื“ื™ื, and he cannot give away the same half to two people, and therefore the whole ืฉื˜ืจ is not valid. And that's why the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื says that in a case like that, they are not ืงื•ื ื” any possessions, and they are not even ืงื•ื ื” themselves. Then the Gemara asks, how could you say that the second ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื is speaking in a case where he wrote in each ืฉื˜ืจ he's only giving away half, ื•ืžื“ืงืชื ื™ ืกื™ืคื, since in the end of that second ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื it says clearly, ื•ืื ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, that if he said half-half, ืœื ืงื ื•, they are not ืงื•ื ื”. The beginning of the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื said as we said before, that he says all my ื ื›ืกื™ื should be given to ืคืœื•ื ื™ ื•ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™, then it says they are not ืงื•ื ื” themselves. The end of the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื says, but if he said half-half, they are not ืงื•ื ื”. And the Gemara at this point assumes that the pshat in the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื is that the second part of the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื, the ืกื™ืคื, is telling us that if he said half-half, he's also not ืงื•ื ื”, it's like a continuation to the beginning. In the beginning it says that if he said all my ื ื›ืกื™ื should be given given to ืคืœื•ื ื™ ืคืœื•ื ื™ my ืขื‘ื“ื™ื, they're not ืงื•ื ื”, and also if he said half-half, they're not ืงื•ื ื”. But since in the ืกื™ืคื it says that if he said half-half, they're not ืงื•ื ื”, ืžื›ืœืœ is a ืจืื™ื” ื“ืจื™ืฉื that the first part of the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื is not in a case where he said half-half, but ื“ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื•, he said at the same time, let all my possessions be to both of my ืขื‘ื“ื™ื. And still the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื says that they are not ืงื•ื ื”. So how can you tell me that that ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื where it says they are not koneh is speaking in a case where they said half-half, he wrote two shtarot, one said half and the other one said half, when from here we see that the seifa is speaking about half-half, so obviously the reisha is speaking where he said the whole thing is to my avadim. And the Gemara answers: No, ืคื™ืจื•ืฉื ืงืžืคืจืฉ. The braisa in the seifa is just explaining the reisha. It's not another case, it's just an explanation. And this is the pshat in the braisa: ืืฃ ืขืฆืžื• ืœื ืงื ื•, if he said all my nechasim should be given away to my avadim, they are not koneh themselves. ื›ื™ืฆื“? How is that? ื›ื’ื•ืŸ, for instance, ื“ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, that he said half-half. So in the seifa, where it said that if he said half-half, they're not koneh, this is the pshat of the reisha. The braisa is explaining why is the din that he is not they are not koneh themselves, because it is in a case where he said half-half. And the Gemara continues: ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืžืกืชื‘ืจื. The sevara tells us that this is the pshat in the braisa, that the seifa is not a separate case, but an explanation to the reisha. Because ืื™ ืกืœืงื ื“ืขืชืš ืจื™ืฉื ื“ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื•, if you didn't tell me that this is not an explanation to the reisha, but the reisha is speaking in a case where he said all my possessions should go to my avadim, he is they are not koneh, so if so, ื”ืฉืชื ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื• ืœื ืงื ื”, if in a case where he said lechatchila all my possessions should go to my avadim, still they're not koneh, so ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™ ืžื‘ืขื™ื? So certainly if he said half-half. Because when he said all my possessions should go to the avadim, there is more reason they should be koneh, more than if they said half-half. And still the din is that they are not koneh, so certainly if he said half-half. So why does the braisa have to continue and say that if he said half-half they're not koneh? That's self-understood. So that proves that the second part of the baraisa is not another din, because if it would be another din, the baraisa wouldn't have to tell us that. It is only an explanation to the reisha. The Gemara says: ืื™ ืžืฉื•ื ื”ื ืœื ืื™ืจื™ื. If this is going to be your proof, it is not enough. Because we could say: ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ืœื’ืœื•ื™ ืจื™ืฉื. Be'emet the seifa is not the same case as the reisha. The seifa is really another case, the case of ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™. The reisha is the case of kulo, and the seifa is ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™. Ah, you ask, why does the baraisa have to tell us the din of ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, wouldn't it be self-understood from the reisha? So I could tell you that ืชื ื ืกื™ืคื ืœื’ืœื•ื™ ืจื™ืฉื. It says the din of the seifa to give us to understand, to reveal what is the real pshat in the reisha. ืฉืœื ืชืืžืจ, you shouldn't say, if we wouldn't have the case of the seifa, we could have said that ืจื™ืฉื ื“ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, that the reisha

Final Analysis of the Nonโ€‘Koneh Cases

where it says that they are not koneh is the case of ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, and I would think that ืื‘ืœ ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื•, but if he said kulo, if he gave them both away all his possessions, kano, they are koneh. Therefore, ืชื ื™ ืกื™ืคื, so therefore the seifa tells us, ื“ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, that there is a case where he said ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™ and he is not koneh. Michlal, so from that we understand, ื“ืจื™ืฉื ื“ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื•, that the reisha is the case of kulo. Because if the reisha would be the case of ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, then why does it say the ืกื™ืคื ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™? Since the ืกื™ืคื says the din of ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, is a ืจืื™ื” that the ืจื™ืฉื is the case of ื›ื•ืœื•, ื•ืืคื™ืœื• ื”ื›ื™ ืœื ืงื ื•, and still he's not ืงื•ื ื”. So the reason the ืกื™ืคื tells us a din that would be self-understood from the ืจื™ืฉื is only we should understand what is the real peshat in the ืจื™ืฉื, that we should know that the ืจื™ืฉื where it says ืœื ืงื ื• is in the case of ื›ื•ืœื•. And how do we know that? Since the ืกื™ืคื says clearly ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, so we understand the ืจื™ืฉื is not ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, the ืจื™ืฉื is ื›ื•ืœื•, and we know the din is that ืœื ืงื ื•. Then the Gemara says: ื•ืื™ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื, but if you want, I can give you another ืชื™ืจื•ืฅ to answer the contradiction between the two ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื•ืช.

One Document vs Two Documents Discussion

ืœื ืงืฉื™ื, it's no kushya. ื›ืืŸ ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ืื—ื“, ื›ืืŸ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช. The ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื where it says that they are not ืงื•ื ื” is speaking in a case where he wrote one ืฉื˜ืจ for both. In one document he wrote that all my possessions should belong to this ืขื‘ื“ and to this ืขื‘ื“. In a case like that, they are not ืงื•ื ื”. Because the din is that just like by a ื’ื˜, you cannot use one ื’ื˜ to divorce two wives, the same way by a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, you cannot use one ืฉื˜ืจ to free two ืขื‘ื“ื™ื. Because concerning a ื’ื˜ it says: ื•ื›ืชื‘ ืœื” ืกืคืจ ื›ืจื™ืชื•ืช, he should write for her a ืกืคืจ ื›ืจื™ืชื•ืช, a ื’ื˜. And the Gemara learns out from the word ืœื”, that he should write for her, it means ืœื” ื•ืœื ืœื—ื‘ืจืชื”, for her and not for her friend. That means that you cannot write one get for one and for her friend, meaning for two women. And since we have a ื’ื–ื™ืจื” ืฉื•ื”, ืœื” ืœื”, ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ we learn out from ื’ื˜ ืืฉื”, so the same din applies to a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, that you cannot write one ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ for two avadim. And therefore, the case where it says that they are not koneh is because which way will they become free? Through this document that he wrote that he gives away all his possessions to the avadim, and this automatically includes themselves, and that's how they will come free. But since you cannot write one ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ for two avadim, so therefore that ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is not valid. But the other beraita, where it says that if he gives away all his possessions to two avadim, they are koneh themselves, that is where he wrote two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช. And in the case of two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช, each one is koneh half of the possessions, which means half of himself, so each one becomes half eved and half ben chorin, and then they are meshacherer each other. And then the Gemara asks: ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ืื—ื“, if the beraita where it says they are not koneh is speaking by one ืฉื˜ืจ, ืžืื™ ืื™ืจื™ื ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™? Why does the beraita say that if he wrote half-half that's when they are not koneh? ืืคื™ืœื• ืืžืจ ื›ื•ืœื™ ื ืžื™ ืœื ืงื ื•, even if he said that he gives away all his possessions to both, they should also not be koneh! Before we said that the seifa of that beraita, where it says ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, is really an explanation of the reisha. They are not two cases, but it's an explanation. So according to that, the whole beraita is speaking only in a case of ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™. But if we just said now that the beraita is speaking ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ืื—ื“, and the reason why they are not koneh is because you cannot use one ืฉื˜ืจ to free two avadim, so why does the beraita say only you are not koneh if he wrote ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, half-half, the same din would have been if he would have written ื›ื•ืœื™, he would have written that he gives away all his possessions to the ืขื‘ื“ื™ื? And the Gemara answers: ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืงืืžืจ, this is really what it means. We're not learning the way we learned before, that the ืกื™ืคื is an explanation to the ืจื™ืฉื, but the ืคืฉื˜ is different, that the ืคืฉื˜ is ืืฃ ืขืฆืžื• ืœื ืงื ื”. First the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื says that if he wrote all his possessions to these and these ืขื‘ื“ื™ื, they are not ืงื•ื ื” themselves. And then we're supposed to put in some words: ื‘ืžื” ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืืžื•ืจื™ื, when was this said? ื‘ืฉื˜ืจ ืื—ื“, only if he wrote one ืฉื˜ืจ for both. ืื‘ืœ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช ืงื ื•, but if he wrote it in two separate ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช, they are ืงื•ื ื”. ื•ืื ืืžืจ ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™, but if he says half-half, ืืฃ ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช ื ืžื™ ืœื ืงื ื•, even if it was written in two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช, they are also not ืงื•ื ื”. So according to this ืคืฉื˜, the ืกื™ืคื is not an explanation of the ืจื™ืฉื, the ืกื™ืคื is another case, in the case of two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช, that ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™ is not ืงื•ื ื” even if it's in two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช. Because as we said before, if he writes half-half, so we're afraid maybe he means to both of them the same half, and therefore they are not ืงื•ื ื”. And the Gemara says: ื•ืื™ ื‘ืขื™ืช ืื™ืžื, if you want, I can give you another answer. ืœื ืงืฉื™ื, it's not a ืงืฉื™ื, I can explain the contradiction between the two ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื•ืช in a different way: ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื‘ืช ืื—ืช, ื›ืืŸ ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื”. That really both ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื•ืช are speaking in a case where he gave them two ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช. And in both ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื•ืช we're speaking in a case where he wrote in the ืฉื˜ืจ, "I give away all my possessions to this ืขื‘ื“ and to that ืขื‘ื“," and not ื—ืฆื™ ื—ืฆื™. But the difference is that one ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื is the case where he gave both ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช at the same time, and one ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื where he gave both ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช one after another. The ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื where it says they are koneh is the case where he gave both shtaros to a third party at the same time. So then, they are both koneh equally. So right away, each one is koneh half of the possessions, so that means that he becomes half belonging to himself, so he's half-free, and at the same time the other half belongs to the other eved. And according to the Rabbanan, as we said before, in a case like this, it is koneh. But the other beraita where it says that they are not koneh is where it's ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื”, where he gave the shtaros one after another. So in a case like that, we cannot say that each one is koneh half, because how could the second one be koneh anything after he gave away everything already to the first one? But the Gemara asks: ื‘ืฉืœืžื ื‘ืชืจื, ืžื™ืœื the second one ืœื ืงื ื™, cannot be koneh himself, cannot be koneh anything, ื“ื”ื ืงื ื” ืœื™ื” ืงืžื, because the first one was koneh. Since he wrote in the shtar he's giving away all his possessions to his eved, and he gave the first eved that shtar, so automatically that eved is koneh everything, he's koneh himself and he's koneh all other possessions. So then, when afterwards he gives the other shtar to the other eved, the other eved cannot be koneh anything. ืืœื ืงืžื, but the first ืขื‘ื“, ืœื™ืงื ื™ ื ืคืฉื™ื”, let him be koneh himself, ื•ืœื™ืงื ื™ ืœื—ื‘ืจื™ื”, and also let him be koneh the friend, let him be koneh the other eved. Since he wrote in the shtar he gives away all his possessions to the eved, So the first eved, as soon as he gets that shtar, that itself should make that he should be koneh himself, because he is part of the possessions, and he also should be koneh his friend, that that eved now belongs to him. But the beraita says that they are both not koneh at

Better tirutz and earlier answer analysis

all anything. ืืœื ืžื—ื•ื•ืจืชื, therefore the better tirutz is ื›ื“ื™ืฉื ื™ื ืŸ ืžืขื™ืงืจื, as we answered before. In other words, the Gemara takeh disproves this last answer, this cannot be a proper answer. ืจื‘ ืืฉื™ ืืžืจ, Rav Ashi said, "No, we could stick to this last answer. So the case where it says that they are both not koneh is where he gave the ืฉื˜ืจื•ืช ื‘ื–ื” ืื—ืจ ื–ื”, one after another." ืื™, the question you ask, "Why isn't the first one koneh himself, and koneh also the other eved?" ืฉืื ื™ ื”ืชื, there it's different, ื“ืงื ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื” ืขื‘ื“ื™, because when he wrote in the shtar, "I give away all my possessions to my avadim," so he calls them in the shtar "my avadim," "my slaves." Since he refers to them in the shtar as slaves, obviously he didn't mean to free them. So what he probably meant was he thought that he is able to give away a present to his slaves while they remain slaves. And that is not true, a person cannot give anything to an eved because ื›ืœ ืžื” ืฉืงื ื” ืขื‘ื“ ืงื ื” ืจื‘ื•, whatever an eved acquires belongs to his master, so his master cannot give anything away to him. So therefore, the beraita says he is not koneh because he really didn't mean to free him, because in the shtar itself he called them avadim.

Rav Amram challenges Rav Ashi's reasoning

ืืžืจ ืœื™ื” ืจื‘ ืขืžืจื ืœืจื‘ ืืฉื™, so Rav Amram said to Rav Ashi, ื•ื“ื™ืœืžื, maybe ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืฉื”ื™ื• ื›ื‘ืจ, when he referred to them in the shtar as avadim, he didn't mean that they should remain avadim, but he meant that "You were previously my avadim, I give away my possessions to those who were previously my avadim," and that's why he refers to them as avadim. ืžื™ ืœื ืชื ืŸ, didn't we learn in the ืžืฉื ื”, ื”ื›ื•ืชื‘ ื›ืœ ื ื›ืกื™ื• ืœืขื‘ื“ื•, if someone writes all his possessions away to his ืขื‘ื“, ื™ืฆื ืœื—ืจื•ืช, automatically he goes out free, because since he is one of his possessions, and he gave him away all his possessions, including the eved himself, so that is a form of freeing the eved. ืฉื™ื™ืจ ืงืจืงืข ื›ืœ ืฉื”ื•ื, but if he writes in the shtar that "I'm giving away all my possessions to my eved except a little bit of land," and he didn't write which land he meant, ืœื ื™ืฆื ืœื—ืจื•ืช, that eved is not free. Why? Because since he didn't write which land he's excluding from the shtar, so every little bit of land we could say that is the land he meant, and therefore he cannot acquire any land. And since he wrote in the shtar that he is giving him away all his possessions, which means all the land plus the eved himself, and since concerning the land we say that the ืฉื˜ืจ is not valid because he cannot acquire any land, so automatically he also cannot acquire himself either, because this ืชื ื holds that we do not say ืคืœื’ื™ื ืŸ ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจื, which means we do not divide a person's words. If we would hold ืคืœื’ื™ื ืŸ ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจื, that means we separate a person's words, when a person says something, that part of what he said could be valid and part not, so we say whatever cannot be valid is not valid, whatever could be valid is accepted. But if you do not hold ืคืœื’ื™ื ืŸ ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจื, that means that if the rest of the statement cannot be valid, so then the other part of the statement is not valid either. And here too, since he said that he's giving away all his possessions, which includes all the land and himself, and since concerning the land we say that he doesn't get any of the land, so automatically the other part of the statement, which is concerning the ืขื‘ื“ himself, is also not valid, and therefore the ืขื‘ื“ does not go out free.

Rabbi Shimonโ€™s view on freeing the slave

Rabbi Shimon omer, Rabbi Shimon says, ืœืขื•ืœื ื”ื•ื ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, that in a case like that really he does go out free, because Rabbi Shimon does hold of ืคืœื’ื™ื ืŸ ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจื, he does say that we divide his words, whatever cannot be accepted is not accepted, and whatever is accepted is accepted, and therefore the part of the ืขื‘ื“ could be accepted, the ืขื‘ื“ goes out free. ืขื“ ืฉื™ืืžืจ, unless he says, ื›ืœ ื ื›ืกื™ื™ ื ืชื•ื ื™ื ืœืคืœื•ื ื™ ืขื‘ื“ื™, that "All my possessions should be given over to my ืขื‘ื“ so-and-so, ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื—ื“ ืžืจื™ื‘ื•ื ืฉื‘ื”ื, except even one of 10,000s of it." Which means that when he excluded a certain part of the possessions, he didn't say that he's excluding land, he just said he's excluding one little bit of his possessions. And since he didn't say which part of his possessions he's excluding, so we think maybe he's excluding the ืขื‘ื“ himself. The ืขื‘ื“ is part of his possessions, maybe that is what he meant that he's excluding from his present to the ืขื‘ื“. So therefore, the ืขื‘ื“ doesn't go out free, because maybe he meant that he is not giving the ืขื‘ื“ away to himself. So we see there, ื˜ืขืžื ื“ืืžืจ ื—ื•ืฅ ืžืื—ื“ ืžืจื™ื‘ื•ื ืฉื‘ื”ื, the reason why we don't accept his words and he doesn't go out free is because he used the expression that he excludes one of 10,000s of the possessions. ื”ื ืœื ืืžืจ ื”ื›ื™, but if he wouldn't have said that, ืงื ื™, the ืขื‘ื“ would be ืงื•ื ื” himself. ืืžืื™, but the question is why? ื•ื”ื ืขื‘ื“ ืงื ืงืจื™ ืœื™ื”, He's calling him ืขื‘ื“. He said, "I give away my possessions to my ืขื‘ื“." So he's referring to him as an ืขื‘ื“ even in this case, and we said before that since he refers to him as an ืขื‘ื“, he probably doesn't mean to free him, so how could we say here that he does become free? And the only reason he doesn't is because he excluded part of the possessions, but if not for that, he would go out free, even though he referred to him as an ืขื‘ื“. ืืœื what must we say? When he said my ืขื‘ื“, he meant ืขื‘ื“ื™ ืฉื”ื™ื” ื›ื‘ืจ, my ืขื‘ื“ that was before, my previous ืขื‘ื“. ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™, the same thing here too. In our case, when he said that I'm giving away my possessions to my ืขื‘ื“ื™ื, when he said ืขื‘ื“ื™ื™ it means ืขื‘ื“ื™ื™ ืฉื”ื™ื• ื›ื‘ืจ, that the ืขื‘ื“ื™ื that were before. So this disproves what Rav Ashi said before, that the reason why they are not ืงื•ื ื” themselves in the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื is because he referred to them as ืขื‘ื“ื™ื in the ืฉื˜ืจ, because we see here that when you refer to the ืขื‘ื“ as an ืขื‘ื“ in the ืฉื˜ืจ, doesn't mean that you're not freeing him. What you mean is that he was your ืขื‘ื“ before. And now the Gemara goes back to the Mishnah. In the

Halakhah of a halfโ€‘slave, halfโ€‘free individual

Mishnah we had a case of a ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, a person who was half ืขื‘ื“ and half ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, and we had a machloket between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Beit Hillel said that since he is half-free and half ืขื‘ื“, so one day he works for his master, and one day he works for himself. And Beit Shammai said that this only was good for the master, but what about himself? Since he cannot marry, not a ืฉืคื—ื” and not a ื‘ืช ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, so therefore they said that you have to force the master and he frees him. And the Gemara says later on, Beit Hillel changed their mind and they agreed to Beit Shammai. Now the Gemara says, ื ื’ื—ื• ืฉื•ืจ, if an ox gored this person who was half ืขื‘ื“, half ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, so if it happened ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื•, if it happened on the day that he worked for his master, ืœืจื‘ื•. So the money that he gets for the ื ื–ืง, for the damage that is done to him, because the ื“ื™ืŸ is that if a ืฉื•ืจ, an ox, gores a person, the owner of the ox must pay for the damages, so the damages that is paid goes to his master, because it happened on the day that he worked for his master. ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ืขืฆืžื•, if it happened on the day that he worked for himself, ืœืขืฆืžื•, the money for the ื ื–ืง goes to himself. And Tosafot explains that this Gemara only goes according to the way Beit Hillel learned before, before they admitted to Beit Shammai, because after they admitted to Beit Shammai that we force the master to free him, the Gemara says later on that in a case like that we do not say that he works one day for his master, one day for himself. Whatever he works, whatever he earns goes to himself constantly, because he is almost like not an ืขื‘ื“ of his master anymore, since his master is going to be forced to free him. So this Gemara, where the Gemara makes a difference between the day that he works for his master and the day that he works for himself, obviously is going according to the ืžืฉื ื” ืจืืฉื•ื ื”, which means according to the way Beit Hillel's opinion was in the beginning, that he works one day for his master and one day for himself. So that's where the Gemara says that the money he gets for the damage, if it happened on the day that he works for his master goes to his master, if it happened on the day that he works for himself, goes to himself. Then the Gemara asks,

Marriage options depending on masterโ€™s or own day

ืืœื ืžืขืชื”, if so, ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื• ื™ืฉื ืฉืคื—ื”, the day that he works for his master, let him marry a slave, a female slave. ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ืขืฆืžื•, the day that he works for himself, ื™ืฉื ื‘ืช ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, he should be able to marry a free Jewish woman. Since you're dividing this, that it depends on which day it is concerning who gets the money for the damage, why can't we say the same thing concerning his marriage? On the day he works for his master, he is a slave, so that day he could marry a ืฉืคื—ื”. The day that he works for himself, he is a ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, so that day let him marry a ื‘ืช ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ. And the Gemara answers, ืื™ืกื•ืจื ืœื ืงืืžืจื™ื ืŸ. Concerning ืื™ืกื•ืจ, not ืžืžื•ืŸ, we weren't talking about. When we said before that depends on which day it happened, that's only concerning monetary things, but when it comes concerning ืื™ืกื•ืจ, whether he's allowed to marry a ืฉืคื—ื” or is he allowed to marry a ื‘ืช ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, concerning that we were not talking about. Concerning ืื™ืกื•ืจ he remains one unit of a ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, and therefore he cannot marry, not a ืฉืคื—ื” and not a ื‘ืช ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ. Then the Gemara says, ืชื ืฉืžืข, come here, I'll ask you a kushya. We learn in the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื, ื”ืžื™ืช ืžื™ ืฉื—ืฆื™ื• ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ื• ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, if a ืฉื•ืจ, an ox, killed a person who was half ืขื‘ื“, half ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, because the ื“ื™ืŸ is that when an ox kills a person, a regular person, so he has to pay to the ื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื of the person who died the value of the person who died, and that is referred to in the Torah as ื›ื•ืคืจ. On the other hand, if an ox kills an ืขื‘ื“, then there is a fixed amount that the Torah says that the owner of the ox must give to the master of the slave, and that is ืฉืœื•ืฉื™ื ืฉืงืœื™ื, thirty ืฉืงืœื™ื, whether the ืขื‘ื“ was ืฉืงืœื™ื, thirty ืฉืงืœื™ื, whether the ืขื‘ื“ was worth more or he was worth less. And this is referred to in the Torah as ืงื ืก, as a fine that is put on the owner of the ox to pay to the master of the slave. Here the case is if the ox killed a person who was half ืขื‘ื“ and half ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, so ื ื•ืชืŸ ื—ืฆื™ ืงื ืก ืœืจื‘ื•, so he pays half of the ืงื ืก, half of the thirty ืฉืงืœื™ื to his master, ื•ื—ืฆื™ ื›ื•ืคืจ ืœื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื•, and half of the ื›ื•ืคืจ, which means half of the value of the person who died, to his ื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื. And the Gemara later on will explain how is it possible for an ืขื‘ื“ to have ื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื, to have people to inherit him. But anyway, what do we see here? ื“ืืžืื™, why is the ื“ื™ืŸ that he pays half a ืงื ืก to the master and half of a ื›ื•ืคืจ to the ื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื? ื”ื›ื ื ืžื™ ืœื™ืžื, let us say here too that if it happened on ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ืจื‘ื•, if he was killed on the day that he worked for his master, ืœืจื‘ื•, so then the owner of the ox should have to pay the ืงื ืก to his master. If it happened on ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ืขืฆืžื•, on the day that he worked for himself and on that day he is considered like a free person, ืœืขืฆืžื•, then all that should be paid is the ื›ื•ืคืจ, the money that he was worth, to the ื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื of this ืขื‘ื“. And the Gemara answers, ืฉืื ื™ ื”ื›ื, here it's different, ื“ืงื ื›ืœื™ื ืงืจื ื. Here the principal is damaged. In other words, here there is a permanent loss. So the division of the days cannot apply here because this is a loss that is going to stay constantly. Since the ืขื‘ื“ died, so this is a permanent loss, so the division of the days make no difference because the loss is there constantly, not only for one day. When did... When we said before that it depends on which day it happened, that's in a case where there was no permanent loss. So there it is only because it happened on a certain day and for that you pay, so it depends on which day it happened. But if it's a permanent loss, so the loss is not only for the day it happened, it's a loss that is going to happen later on for all days, so over there we say that we divide it in half. Half is paid as an ืขื‘ื“, and that would be half of the ืงื ืก to his master, and half is paid as a ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, and that is half of the ื›ื•ืคืจ to his ื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื. Then the Gemara asks, ื•ืืœื ื”ื™ื›ื™ ื“ืžื™ ื“ืœื ืงื ื›ืœื™ื ืงืจื ื? How is it possible that the damage should not be permanent, it shouldn't be a loss to the principal? And we said that when we made the division before between the days, that is in a case where there was no permanent loss, how is that possible? And the Gemara answers, ื›ื’ื•ืŸ, for instance, ืฉื”ื›ื”ื• ืขืœ ื™ื“ื•, the ox hit him on his hand, ื•ืฆืžืชื” ื™ื“ื•, and it caused his hand to shrivel, ื•ืกื•ืคื• ืœื—ื–ื•ืจ, but eventually the end will be that it will heal. So that is not a permanent loss. And that's where the ื“ื™ืŸ is that it depends on which day it happened. Then the Gemara asks, ื”ื ื ื™ื—ื ืœืื‘ื™ื™ ื“ืืžืจ ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ืฉื‘ืช ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื•ืฉื‘ืช ืงื˜ื ื”, ืฉืคื™ืจ. We find in Bava Kamma ื“ืฃ ืคืดื• a machloket between Abaye and Rava. And this is concerning if a person hit another person and he caused his hand to shrivel, but eventually it's going to heal and it'll go back to the way it was before. So there's a machloket between Abaye and Rava how much money he has to pay him. Abaye says you have to pay ืฉื‘ืช ื’ื“ื•ืœื” and ืฉื‘ืช ืงื˜ื ื”, big ืฉื‘ืช and small ืฉื‘ืช. Really, the word ืฉื‘ืช means that you have to pay for the money that he lost because he couldn't work. What ืฉื‘ืช ื’ื“ื•ืœื” means that because he couldn't work, therefore he is devaluated in value. Usually, you estimate the value of a person by seeing how much money you could get for him if you want to sell him as a slave in the market. If you would sell this person with this sick hand as a slave, people would pay for him less than if he would not have this sickness. So even though this is a sickness that is only temporary and eventually it'll heal, nevertheless at this moment he was devaluated. And therefore, the first thing that he has to pay is the devaluation, he has to pay the loss that he has in his value. And the Gemara refers to this as ืฉื‘ืช, even though this is really ื ื–ืง, that is what ื ื–ืง is, meaning how much damage you cause the person that now he is worth less than he was worth before. But still it's referred to as ืฉื‘ืช because the reason in this case why he is worth less is because of his inability to work. And also you have to pay ืฉื‘ืช ืงื˜ื ื”. ืฉื‘ืช ืงื˜ื ื” means that when he is sick, he cannot work the same way as when he was a hundred percent healed. Then he could do hard work. While he is sick, his hand is still sick, he cannot do any hard work, he could only do light work. For instance, he could be a guard by a cucumber field, for instance. While he has pain, he can't even do that. So what you have to pay here is while he has the pain, for those days, you have to pay him for the loss of money that he could have gotten if he would have worked the light work, being a guard in a cucumber field. But Rava says that's not how you judge the money that he's supposed to pay him. You judge it day by day. Those days that he cannot work at all because he has pain, so you pay him the loss of money that he could could have gotten if he would have worked his regular work. Those days that he could work light work, but you don't earn as much as if he would have worked his regular work, so you pay him the difference. The Gemara says here that according to Abaye who says that you give ืฉื‘ืช ื’ื“ื•ืœื” and ืฉื‘ืช ืงื˜ื ื”, which means that you pay ื ื–ืง and you also pay for his loss of work, ืฉืคื™ืจ, we understand. ืืœื ืœืจื‘ื, but according to ืจื‘ื ื“ืืžืจ that he says, ืื™ื ื• ื ื•ืชืŸ ืœื• ืืœื ืฉื‘ืช ืฉื‘ื›ืœ ื™ื•ื ื•ื™ื•ื, that you only give him the ืฉื‘ืช, the loss of money from his work day by day, and all this is in a case where a person damaged another person. But in this case, ื”ืื™ ืฉื•ืจ ื”ื•ื. In this case, we're talking about a case where the ืฉื•ืจ, an ox damaged him, and ืฉื•ืจ ืื™ื ื• ืžืฉืœื ืืœื ื ื–ืง, the ื“ื™ืŸ by a ืฉื•ืจ is that he only pays ื ื–ืง. When a ืฉื•ืจ, an ox, damages a person, so the owner of the ox only has to pay for the damage. When we know that there are five things that you pay for if there is a damage caused to a person, and the five things are ื ื–ืง, ืฆืขืจ, ืจื™ืคื•ื™, ืฉื‘ืช, and ื‘ื•ืฉืช, that you don't only pay for the damage, but you also pay for the loss of time and work, etc., that only applies if a person hurt another person. But if an ox hurt a person, so the owner of the ox only pays ื ื–ืง. Now here we see the ืžื—ืœื•ืงืช between Abaye and Rava, in the case where a person hurt another person in such a such a case, whether he pays ื ื–ืง and ืฉื‘ืช, that is according to Abaye, and according to Rava, he only pays ืฉื‘ืช and there is no ื ื–ืง paid whatsoever. In our case, where we're talking about a ืฉื•ืจ damaging the person, so there is nothing but ื ื–ืง anyway. So according to Abaye who says that in a case where a person did it, you pay ื ื–ืง and ืฉื‘ืช, in the case where the ox did it, you only pay ื ื–ืง. But according to Rava, where he says that in the case where a person did it, you only pay ืฉื‘ืช, so if an ox did it, you shouldn't have to pay anything, because an ox doesn't pay ืฉื‘ืช. So the question is how can you tell me that when we said before that if an ox hurt the ืขื‘ื“, ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, so depends on which day it happened, and we just said that it is speaking in a case where he hurt him on his hand and his hand shriveled, and the end is it'll heal, so according to Abaye who says that you pay nezek and sheves for this, so in this case we understand why he has to pay for this. And if it happened on the day of his master, he pays to the master, if it happened on his own day, you pay to him. But according to Rava who holds that if this happened by an ืื“ื, you only pay sheves, so in this case where it happened through a ืฉื•ืจ, you shouldn't pay anything. So how could the Gemara say before that if a ืฉื•ืจ hit a ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, you pay money depending on which day it happened, whether it's his own day or the day of his master, you shouldn't have to pay anything, because if a person did it, you only pay sheves, so if a ืฉื•ืจ did it, and a ืฉื•ืจ doesn't pay sheves, you shouldn't have to pay anything. And the Gemara answers: Iba'is eima, if you want, I could answer you, ื›ืฉื”ื™ื›ื”ื• ืื“ื, that that Gemara where it said before that it depends on which day it is, but you definitely have to pay, is takeh not if a ox caused this damage, but if a person caused this damage. And it's obvious that according to that, you will have to change the words of that Gemara, because the Gemara used the ืœืฉื•ืŸ before ื ื’ื—ื• ืฉื•ืจ, that if a ืฉื•ืจ gored him. So according to this pshat, we'll have to change it and say that if a damage was caused to this ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, then it depends on which day it happened. Iba'is eima, and if you want, I can answer you, ืžื™ืžืจื ื”ื™ื, that is not a Mishnah, not a Beraisa. This ื“ื™ืŸ that if a ืฉื•ืจ gored a ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, you definitely pay, but it just depends to whom to pay, that is not a Mishnah, not a Beraisa, it wasn't written by Tannaim, it is a ืžื™ืžืจื, a saying of Amoraim. ื•ืžื™ืžืจื ืœืจื‘ื ืœื ืกื‘ื™ืจื ืœื™ื”. Rava doesn't hold of that ืžื™ืžืจื. Rava who is an Amora cannot argue on the Tannaim, he cannot argue on a Mishnah or on a Beraisa, but on a ืžื™ืžืจื of other Amoraim, he could argue. So ein hachi nami, that mimra does not fit according to Rava, but it doesn't matter, because Rava argues on that mimra, because Rava is an amora and he could argue on a mimra of amoraim. Then the Gemara continues: Iba'aya lehu, there was a question asked in the ื™ืฉื™ื‘ื”: ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, if an ืขื‘ื“ who is really free, he's just awaiting to get his ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, for instance, we learned before that according to one opinion, if the master is ืžืคืงื™ืจ the ืขื‘ื“, gives up ownership of the ืขื‘ื“, or if the master is ืžืงื“ื™ืฉ the ืขื‘ื“, makes the ืขื‘ื“ into ื”ืงื“ืฉ, so then the ื“ื™ืŸ is he goes out free, but he still needs to get ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. Or the case of our Mishnah of half ืขื‘ื“ half ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, that the ื“ื™ืŸ is that you force his master to give him a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ and to free him. So before he gets his ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, he really is free, because that is the ื“ื™ืŸ that he's supposed to free him. But still he needs a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. And this is the ืฉืืœื” in the Gemara that if one of these ืขื‘ื“ื™ื that are awaiting a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, ื™ืฉ ืœื• ืงื ืก ืื• ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืงื ืก? If an ox will gore him, and the ื“ื™ืŸ is as we said before, if an ox gores an ืขื‘ื“ and kills him, he has to pay

Thirty Shekels Fine for a Halfโ€‘Slave Missing a Get

ืงื ืก, the 30 shekalim to the master of the ืขื‘ื“. So the question is is, if it happened to one of these ืขื‘ื“ื™ื that really are free, they're just missing the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, ื™ืฉ ืœื• ืงื ืก ืื• ืื™ืŸ ืœื• ืงื ืก, does the owner of the ox have to pay the ืงื ืก, the thirty shekalim to the master of this ืขื‘ื“ or not? ื›ืกืฃ ืฉืœืฉื™ื ืฉืงืœื™ื ื™ืชืŸ ืœืื“ื•ื ื™ื• ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื, the Torah says you should give thirty shekalim to his master, ื•ื”ืื™ ืœืื• ืื“ื•ื ื™ื• ื”ื•ื, and in this case he's not really his master because they're really free. ืื• ื“ื™ืœืžื, or maybe, ื›ื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืžื—ื•ืกืจ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, since they're still missing the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, ืื“ื•ื ื™ื• ืงืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื™ื”, we still could call him the master, and therefore the pasuk that says that thirty shekalim have to be given to the master does apply here too, and therefore they do have to pay the thirty shekalim to the master. And the Gemara says ืชื ืฉืžืข, come here, I'll answer your question. We learn in a ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื, ื”ืžื™ืช ืžื™ ืฉื—ืฆื™ื• ืขื‘ื“ ื•ื—ืฆื™ื• ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, that if a ืฉื•ืจ killed a ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, ื ื•ืชืŸ ื—ืฆื™ ืงื ืก ืœืจื‘ื• ื•ื—ืฆื™ ื›ื•ืคืจ ืœื™ื•ืจืฉื™ื•, so he gives half of the kenas, half of the thirty shekalim to his master, and half of the ื›ื•ืคืจ, half of the value of the person who died to his yorshim, to his heirs. So we see here clearly that you do have to pay kenas for this person who is a ื—ืฆื™ ืขื‘ื“ ื—ืฆื™ ื‘ืŸ ื—ื•ืจื™ืŸ, even though the din is that you have to force the master to free him, so he is considered only missing a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, and still here we see that you do pay the kenas to his master. And the

Mishnah Debate: Forcing the Master to Free the Slave

Gemara says ืžืื™ ืœืื•, don't you think, ื›ื™ ืžืฉื ื” ืื—ืจื•ื ื”, that this braisa also goes according to the ืžืฉื ื” ืื—ืจื•ื ื”, to the second Mishnah? This refers to the opinion that Beit Hillel, after they changed their mind and they agreed to Beit Shammai, that you force the master to free him. So if you say that this braisa goes also according to that opinion, so this braisa is speaking by a person who is a ืžื—ื•ืกืจ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, who is just missing a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, and still the braisa says that you do give half of the kenas to his master, so we see from here that a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, somebody who is just awaiting a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, you do pay kenas if the the ืฉื•ืจ will gore him. And the Gemara says ืœื, no, ื›ื™ ืžืฉื ื” ืจืืฉื•ื ื”, this only goes according to the ืžืฉื ื” ืจืืฉื•ื ื”, the first Mishnah, which means according to the way Beit Hillel held in the beginning that you do not force his master to free him, but he works one day for himself and one day for his master. So according to that, he is not considered a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, he is not free at all because we will not force his master to free him. So according to that, we say that there is a din of kenas and it goes to his master. But according to the ืžืฉื ื” ืื—ืจื•ื ื” that says that you force his master to free him and he is considered a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, maybe according to that there is no ืงื ืก. So we have no ืจืื™ื” and no answer to the question that we asked before. Then the Gemara continues, ืชื ืฉืžืข, come here, I'll answer it to you from a different place. We

Tooth or Eye Damage Frees a Slave โ€“ Beraita

learn in a Beraita: ื”ืคื™ืœ ืืช ืฉื™ื ื• ื•ืกื™ืžื ืืช ืขื™ื ื•, if a master knocked out the tooth of his ืขื‘ื“ and then blinded his eye, the ื“ื™ืŸ is that if a master knocks out a tooth of his ืขื‘ื“ or blinds his eye, automatically the ืขื‘ื“ goes out free. And really the ื—ื›ืžื™ื learn out that this is not only by these two ืื‘ืจื™ื, these two limbs, but also there are twenty-four ืจืืฉื™ ืื‘ืจื™ื, twenty-four different parts of the body, that if the master damages one of those twenty-four parts, then the ืขื‘ื“ automatically goes out free. But here is a case where he first knocked out his tooth, and then he blinded his eye. So the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื says: ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ืฉื™ื ื• ื•ื ื•ืชืŸ ื“ืžื™ ืขื™ื ื•. He goes out free for the first act, since he knocked out his tooth he's automatically free. Then when he blinded his eye, he blinded an eye of a free person, so he has to pay him for the damage of the eye. And at this point the Gemara feels that when the ื“ื™ืŸ is that if you knock out the eye or the tooth of an ืขื‘ื“ he goes out free, he still needs a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ afterwards. So according to that the Gemara asks, ื•ืื™ ืืžืจืช ื™ืฉ ืœื• ืงื ืก, if you're going to say that a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, somebody who is really free, he's just awaiting the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, still there is a ื“ื™ืŸ of ืงื ืก, and if a a ืฉื•ืจ will gore him and kill him there will be still the ื“ื™ืŸ of thirty ืฉืงืœื™ื ื•ืงื ืก ืœืจื‘ื•, and those thirty ืฉืงืœื™ื would go to his master because he's still considered his master, ื”ืฉืชื ื“ื—ื‘ืœื• ื‘ื™ื” ืื—ืจื™ื ื™ ื™ื”ื‘ื™ ืœื™ื” ืœืจื‘ื™ื”, so if others would do some harm, damage to him, they would have to pay the money for the damage to his master, ื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ื™ื” ืจื‘ื™ื” ื’ื•ืคื™ื” ื™ื”ื™ื‘ ืœื™ื” ืœื“ื™ื“ื™ื”? If his master himself did the damage to him, has to give him the money? If the ื“ื™ืŸ is that any damage done to an ืขื‘ื“ after he is free before he gets the ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, the money for the damage goes to the master, so if the master himself damaged that ืขื‘ื“ in that status, certainly he would not have to pay him any money. So in this case, why does the ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื say that after he knocked out his tooth, he blinded his eye, he has to pay him for his eye? Since when he knocked out his tooth, even though he goes out free, he's still considered a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, still awaiting the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, and in a case like that, if the ื“ื™ืŸ is that the ืงื ืก goes to the master, so certainly his master does not have to pay him for any damage done to him. So that seems to prove that by ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ there is no ื“ื™ืŸ of ืงื ืก, and if a ืฉื•ืจ would kill this ืขื‘ื“, then he would not have to pay ืงื ืก to his master. Then the Gemara says, ื“ื™ืœืžื maybe ื›ืžืืŸ ื“ืืžืจ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš. Maybe this Beraisa goes according to the one that holds that if you knock out the tooth of your ืขื‘ื“, you don't have to give him a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. So therefore this ืขื‘ื“ is not considered a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, and that is the reason why afterwards if he knocked out his eye, he has to pay him. But we have no proof what would be the ื“ื™ืŸ of a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. ื“ืชื ื™ื, we learn in a ื‘ืจื™ื™ืชื, ื‘ื›ื•ืœืŸ, by all of these parts of the body that if they're damaged by the master, the ืขื‘ื“ goes out free, the ื“ื™ืŸ is that ืขื‘ื“ ื™ื•ืฆื ื‘ื”ื ืœื—ื™ืจื•ืช, the ืขื‘ื“ goes out for them free, ื•ืฆืจื™ืš ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ ืžืจื‘ื•, but he still needs a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ from his master. ื“ื‘ืจื™

Opinions of Rabbi Yishmael, Meir, Elazar, Tarfon, Akiva

ืจื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืžืขืืœ, that is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. ืจื‘ื™ ืžืื™ืจ ืื•ืžืจ, Rabbi Meir says ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš, he does not need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ from his master. ืจื‘ื™ ืืœืขื–ืจ ืื•ืžืจ ืฆืจื™ืš, Rabbi Elazar says he does need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. ืจื‘ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ืื•ืžืจ ืื™ื ื• ืฆืจื™ืš, Rav Tarfon says he does not need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื ืื•ืžืจ ืฆืจื™ืš, Rabbi Akiva says he does need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. ื•ื”ืžื›ืจื™ืขื™ื ืœืคื ื™ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ืื•ืžืจื™ื, but those that were sitting in front of the Chachamim to determine the ื”ืœื›ื”, they said ื ืจืื™ืŸ ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ ื˜ืจืคื•ืŸ ื‘ืฉืŸ ื•ืขื™ืŸ. The opinion of Rav Tarfon seems to be right only in the case of ืฉืŸ ื•ืขื™ืŸ, only if the master knocked out a tooth or knocked out the eye of his slave, so then the ื“ื™ืŸ is that he does not need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืชื•ืจื” ื–ื™ื›ืชื” ืœื•, because the Torah said that he is ื–ื•ื›ื” himself, that he becomes free. ื•ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืจื‘ื™ ืขืงื™ื‘ื, the opinion of Rabbi Akiva seems to be right, that he does need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ ื‘ืฉืืจ ืื™ื‘ืจื™ื, if the ืขื‘ื“ would be going out free by the damage of any other of the 24 different parts of the body, ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืงื ืก ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื”ื•ื, since that is only a fine that the ื—ื›ืžื™ื made. The reason that the ืขื‘ื“ goes out free if that happens by the other 24 ืื™ื‘ืจื™ื is only a fine of the ื—ื›ืžื™ื. So since it's only a ื“ื™ืŸ ืžื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ, therefore, he would still need a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. So the Gemara asks, ืงื ืก ื”ื•ื, how could you refer to it as ืงื ืก, as a fine of the ืจื‘ื ืŸ? ืงืจืื™ ืงื ื“ืจืฉื™ื ื”ื•, they learn it out from ืคืกื•ืงื™ื. The ื—ื›ืžื™ื learned it out from the ื“ื™ืŸ of ื ื’ืขื™ื. The ื“ื™ืŸ by a ื ื’ืข is, if someone has leprosy, so the Torah says that you have to go to the ื›ื”ืŸ, and he's supposed to look at it, and say whether it's ื˜ื”ื•ืจ or ื˜ืžื. And the Torah uses a ืœืฉื•ืŸ ืœื›ืœ ืžืจืื” ืขื™ื ื™ ื”ื›ื”ืŸ, that it has to be in front of the eyes of the ื›ื”ืŸ. So we learn out that it has to be in a place that the ื›ื”ืŸ could see it all together at the same time. But if it's on the tip of certain parts of the body that it cannot be seen all together because it's curvy, so those ื ื’ืขื™ื are not ื˜ืžื. And we learn out the ื“ื™ืŸ of ืขื‘ื“ from the ื“ื™ืŸ of ื ื’ืขื™ื, that if the master damaged his ืขื‘ื“ in any of those ืื™ื‘ืจื™ื that by ื ื’ืขื™ื it would be ื˜ื”ื•ืจ, so the ืขื‘ื“ goes out free from that damage. So this is not a ืงื ืก of the ื—ื›ืžื™ื, this is a ื“ืจืฉ that is learned out from different ืคืกื•ืงื™ื. So that's what the Gemara asks, how can the Gemara say that the reason in this case you need a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, because it is a ืงื ืก of the ื—ื›ืžื™ื, when really it's not a ืงื ืก of the ื—ื›ืžื™ื, it is a ื“ืจืฉ that the ื—ื›ืžื™ื learn out from the Torah? So the Gemara says, Ela eima, but say differently: ื”ื•ืื™ืœ ื•ืžื“ืจืฉ ื—ื›ืžื™ื ื”ื•ื. That since it's a derash of the chachamim, so therefore in this case you need a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. By the case of ืฉืŸ ื•ืขื™ืŸ, since it's written clearly in the Torah, so there the ื“ื™ืŸ is that he goes out free right away, and he does not need a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. But the case of the other ืื™ื‘ืจื™ื that the ืขื‘ื“ goes out free, since it's only a derash that the chachamim learn out from the Torah, that it's not outright clearly in the Torah, so there the ื“ื™ืŸ is that he needs a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. And the reason for that is, as Tosafot explains, that since it's not written clearly in the Torah, not everyone knows that ื“ื™ืŸ that an ืขื‘ื“ goes out free by those ืจืืฉื™ ืื‘ืจื™ื. And it's possible his master will not know that ื“ื™ืŸ either. So his master could meet him in the street later and say, "You know, you're still my ืขื‘ื“." And even though he'll tell him, "I was freed because of the damage you caused to one of my ืื™ื‘ืจื™ื," he'll say that that is not enough to make you free. And therefore he needs a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, so if he'll have a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ he'll be able to show that he is definitely a free person. But by the case of ืฉืŸ ื•ืขื™ืŸ, since it's clearly in the Torah that an ืขื‘ื“ goes out free if his master knocked out his tooth or knocked out his eye, so here we are not afraid that his master will say he's still an ืขื‘ื“, and therefore in a case like that, there is no need for a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. Then the Gemara continues, Iba'aya lehu, there was a question asked in the ื™ืฉื™ื‘ื”: ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ ืื•ื›ืœ ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื” ืื• ืื™ื ื• ืื•ื›ืœ? That if an ืขื‘ื“ who still needs a ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, he was really freed, but he's still missing the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, and he was an ืขื‘ื“ of a ื›ื”ืŸ, can he eat terumah or not? Because the ื“ื™ืŸ is that an ืขื‘ื“ that belongs to a ื›ื”ืŸ could eat terumah, because the Torah says that anybody who is ืงื ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื•, who is the property of a ื›ื”ืŸ, is allowed to eat ืชืจื•ืžื” just like the ื›ื”ืŸ himself. So the ืฉืืœื” here is, this ืขื‘ื“ that belonged to a ื›ื”ืŸ, but now he is in a position that he is free, but still needs the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, does that mean that he is still the ืขื‘ื“ of the ื›ื”ืŸ, and he still could eat ืชืจื•ืžื”, or is he considered a free person, and he cannot eat ืชืจื•ืžื”? And the Gemara explains the question: ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื• ืืžืจ ืจื—ืžื ื, the Torah says that who could eat ืชืจื•ืžื”? If he is ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื•, he is his possession, he belongs to him, he is his money, his property. ื•ื”ืื™ ืœืื• ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื™ื” ื”ื•ื, but this one is not really his property, because he was freed already, he is not the ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื•, the property of the ื›ื”ืŸ. ืื• ื“ื™ืœืžื, or maybe, ื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ื“ืžื—ื•ืกืจ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, since he is still missing the ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื• ืงืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื™ื”, we still could call him ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื•? He still is considered as if he belongs to his master the ื›ื”ืŸ? And the Gemara says, ืชื ืฉืžืข, come here, I will answer you. ื“ืืžืจ Rav Mesharshiya, ืจื‘ ืžืฉืจืฉื™ื saidโ€”and really what Rav Mesharshiya is going to say is a clear Mishnah in Yevamot. And here on the ื’ื™ืœื™ื•ืŸ of the Gemara, he takeh asks the ืงืฉื™ื: how come the Gemara here quotes it in the name of Rav Mesharshiya and the Gemara doesn't quote it directly from the Mishnah in Yevamot? But whatever it is, we learned: ื”ื›ื”ื ืช ืฉื ืชืขืจื‘ ื•ืœื“ื” ื‘ื•ืœื“ ืฉืคื—ืชื”, a ื›ื”ื ืช, a woman who was married to a ื›ื”ืŸ and had a child, so her child is a ื›ื”ืŸ, but her child got mixed with the child of her ืฉืคื—ื”. Her ืฉืคื—ื” also gave birth to a child, and the two children were mixed up, and we do not know which child is the ื›ื”ืŸ and which child is the ืขื‘ื“, which child is the son of the ื›ื”ื ืช and which child is the son of the ืฉืคื—ื”. So the din is: ื”ืจื™ ืืœื• ืื•ื›ืœื™ืŸ ื‘ืชืจื•ืžื”, both of them could eat terumah. Because one of them is a kohen, the son of the ื›ื”ื ืช is a kohen, the son of the ืฉืคื—ื” is an eved of a kohen because his mother belongs to the kohen, so the child, the eved, is an eved of a kohen, and an eved of a kohen could also eat terumah, so mima nafshach both could eat terumah, even though we don't know which one is a kohen or which one is the eved, but an eved of a kohen could eat terumah and a kohen could eat terumah, so both of them could eat terumah. ื•ื—ื•ืœืงื™ืŸ ื—ืœืง ืื—ื“ ืขืœ ื”ื’ื•ืจืŸ, and they both collect one share at the threshing floor where they give out the terumah. You can't give each one a separate share, because one of them is the eved of a kohen, and the eved of a kohen could eat terumah, but he himself cannot get a share of terumah. He can only eat from the terumah of his master. So therefore, since one of them is a kohen, so there is one share that is supposed to be given to them. So they get one share, and then they both take part in that one share. But as Rashi says, they could only be given that share if they both come together, because if only one of them will come, maybe he is the eved of a kohen, and the din is that you do not give terumah to the eved of a kohen. Even if the eved of a kohen comes to collect the share of his master, you do not give him terumah, because this Mishnah holds that if you see a person collecting terumah, this is enough evidence to consider him a kohen. So if we're going to allow an eved of a kohen to collect terumah, other people are going to think that he's a kohen himself. So therefore an eved of a kohen is not allowed to collect terumah. So in this case none of them are allowed to collect terumah, because each one is a safek, maybe he is the eved of a kohen. But if they both together come to collect terumah, so then they could get one share, because we know that one of them is a kohen, so then people will know that they are not going to be considered definitely both as kohanim. Then the Mishnah continues: ื”ื’ื“ื™ืœื• ื”ืชืขืจื•ื‘ื•ืช, if this mixture grew up, meaning when these two children grow up, ืžืฉื—ืจืจื™ืŸ ื–ื” ืืช ื–ื”, so one frees the other. Since one of them is the eved, and the other one is the kohen who's automatically the master of the eved because his father was the master of this eved, and eventually the child becomes the master himself. So since we don't know which one it is, so each one gives the other a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, so automatically the eved is free. And from here the Gemara wants to answer the question we had before. Our question was that if an eved who was freed, but he was just missing a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, does he eat terumah from his master or not? So here we see that he does, because the Gemara considers both of these children as ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. Since the din will be eventually that one will free the other, so before it happened, they are considered ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. They are really going to be free, all they're missing is the ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, so they are considered ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, and nevertheless we see in the Mishnah that they do eat terumah. So we see from here, the Gemara wants to say, that a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is allowed to eat terumah. And the Gemara answers: hakhi hashta, what kind of comparison is it? ื”ืชื, in the case of that ืžืฉื ื”, ืื ื™ื‘ื•ื ืืœื™ื”ื• ื•ื™ืืžืจ, if ืืœื™ื”ื• will come and he will say ื“ื—ื“ ืžื™ื ื™ื™ื”ื•, on one of them, ืขื‘ื“ื ื”ื•ื, that he is the eved, if Eliyahu Hanavi, who is the one that will answer all the questions, will come and verify and say that one of these is the ืขื‘ื“, and will point out on which one is the ืขื‘ื“, so ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื• ืงืจื™ื ืŸ ื‘ื™ื”, so he will be considered ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื•. He will be considered the property of the other one, and he will be able to eat terumah anyway. So mima nafshach he's able to eat terumah, because even if he would verify that he is the ืขื‘ื“, he could eat terumah as an ืขื‘ื“ of a kohen. But ื”ื›ื, but here in the case where he's a regular ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, he was freed from his master the kohen, the only thing that he is missing is the ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ. So here ืœืื• ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื• ื”ื•ื ื›ืœืœ, here could be he is not considered ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื•. Over there in the Mishnah, even though eventually he's going to get a ืฉื˜ืจ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, but at this point there is no reason why he shouldn't eat terumah, because even if he is definitely an ืขื‘ื“, he could eat terumah. But over there, in the case of a regular ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ, the she'elah is whether he is bikhlal considered ืงื ื™ื™ืŸ ื›ืกืคื• or not, and therefore we cannot prove from this Mishnah that a ืžืขื•ื›ื‘ ื’ื˜ ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ is allowed to eat terumah. Tosafos just asks a kashya on the din of the Mishnah itself: How could these two children eat terumah, if we don't know who is the kohen and who is the ืขื‘ื“? Since we have a din in Ketubos that a kohen who we don't know who his father is is not allowed to eat terumah, because he has to be a kohen that is ืžื™ื•ื—ืก to his father, but if he is not ืžื™ื•ื—ืก, he cannot eat terumah. And in this case, since we don't know which one is the kohen, so we don't know which one is ืžื™ื•ื—ืก to his father the kohen, so therefore both of them shouldn't be able to eat terumah. And Tosafot answers one tirutz, as the Gemara says in Yevamot, that this whole din that a kohen has to be ืžื™ื•ื—ืก to his father in order to eat terumah is only a ื“ื™ืŸ ื“ืจื‘ื ืŸ. So the ืจื‘ื ืŸ only said that din in the case of ื–ื ื•ืช, if the reason we don't know who his father is because his father was ืžื–ื ื” with somebody and we don't know who it was. But in the case of marriage and they just got mixed up, there is no such din that the only way he could eat terumah if he's ืžื™ื•ื—ืก. And another tirutz Tosafot gives, that here, they were born we knew who the father was, they got mixed up after birth. So since when they were born we knew that he was the kohen, so automatically he was allowed to eat terumah, now that they got mixed up, the din, the heter of eating terumah still remains.

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