Kesubos (Iyun)
Kesubos 9a — Iyun
A detailed Kesubos sugya on safek sfeika (a compounded doubt), applied to a kohen's wife and a minor's kiddushin, working through the Rambam and Rashba on when a weak doubt doesn't require stringency.
Kesubos 9a — Iyun
Continues the safek sfeika sugya -- the Tosafos/Tosafos Yeshanim machloket over whether the two doubts must be 'reversible' (mishaphech) to combine into genuine leniency.
Kesubos 3b — Iyun
A Kesubos sugya on the Mishnah's rule to marry a virgin on Wednesday, moving into the Rambam's principle of transgressing rather than dying for most mitzvos, and a close look at what the mitzvah of Kiddush Hashem actually requires according to the Sefer HaChinuch.
Kesubos 3a — Iyun
A Kesubos sugya on the Rabbanan's power to retroactively affect the validity of kiddushin, with a side discussion on melacha during Chol Hamoed and the halachic weight of tzaar on Yom Kippur.
Kesubos 5b — Iyun
A dense Kesubos sugya on whether a first bi'ah that draws blood on Shabbos counts as the melacha of chaburah when it's not the goal of the action, applying the Rabbi Yehuda-Rabbi Shimon machloket on unintended labor (pesik reisha).
Kesubos 5b–6a — Iyun
A Shabbos sugya defining what qualifies as a forbidden kesher (knot), and how psik reisha -- an inevitable side effect -- can turn an otherwise unintentional act into a full melacha, with Rashi and Tosafos debating the underlying reasoning.
Kesubos 21b — Iyun
A sugya on whether someone who testified as a witness can later serve as a judge in the same case, comparing the Gittin and Kiddushin discussions of a shaliach acting as both, and the Brisker Rav's analysis of an ongoing agency, pe'ulah nimsheches.
Kesubos 21b — Iyun
A Shevuos sugya on the oath of testimony (shevuas ha'eidus) and why a rabbinic disqualification from testifying applies only to the person himself, not to the testimony's underlying truth.
Kesubos 2a — Iyun
A Kesubos sugya on the support obligations owed during the twelve-month engagement period, whether the Mishnah's forbidden wedding day is a mere delay or genuine coercion, and the principle of ones rachmana patrei -- that circumstances beyond one's control don't change halachic status.
Kesubos 3a — Iyun
A detailed sugya on whether using money to betroth a woman is a Torah-level or rabbinic-level requirement, and how that question connects to the validity of a coerced marriage.
Kesubos 5b — Iyun
A difficult Shabbos sugya on an action that inevitably causes a forbidden result even without intending it, the Magid Mishnah's rule on an unintentional tikkun k'li, and Rav Shimon and Rav Yehuda's dispute over psik reisha.
Kesubos 5b–6a — Iyun
A Shabbos sugya defining what qualifies as a forbidden kesher (knot), and how psik reisha -- an inevitable side effect -- can turn an otherwise unintentional act into a full melacha, with Rashi raising his own question about the concept.
Kesubos 3b — Iyun
A Kesubos sugya on why weddings were moved off their usual day due to danger, the Rambam's principle of transgressing rather than dying, and the Tzemach Tzedek's story illustrating the boundless nature of Kiddush Hashem.
Kesubos 10a — Iyun
A Kesubos sugya on the chazakah that no one wastes a wedding feast, and the halachic dilemma when a husband claims to have found the door open (pesach pasuach) before the wedding.
Kesubos 10a — Iyun
A Kesubos sugya on the chazakah that no one wastes a wedding feast, and the halachic dilemma when a husband claims to have found the door open (pesach pasuach) before the wedding.
Kesubos 10a — Iyun
Continues the ketubah sugya on a husband's claim to void his obligation, illustrated with a 'Lexus versus Camry' analogy for a mistaken-identity marriage, and how believable such a claim really is.
Kesubos 10a — Iyun
Continues the ketubah sugya on a husband's claim to void his obligation, illustrated with a 'Lexus versus Camry' analogy for a mistaken-identity marriage, and the role of witnesses in such claims.
Kesubos 11a — Iyun
A detailed conversion sugya on informing a prospective convert of the mitzvos before accepting them, the Shulchan Aruch's requirement of three judges, and special complications when the convert is a minor.
Kesubos 11a — Iyun
A detailed conversion sugya on informing a prospective convert of the mitzvos before accepting them, the Rambam's view on the weight of this requirement, and the Ritva's question about informing a minor.
Kesubos 21b — Iyun
A wide-ranging Kesubos 21 shiur that opens with whether a witness and a judge can combine to verify a document, then pivots into the classic machloket between the Ketzos and the Maharival on hoda'as ba'al din -- does a person's own admission establish what actually happened, or only create a new obligation to pay? Brings in the Rebbe's chiddush on shemittah debts, a Bava Metzia case of theft from one of five people, and a Beit Shmuel-Chelkas Mechokek dispute on conditional kiddushin, before circling back to answer the Meiri's original question.
Kesubos 29a — Iyun
A Kesubos shiur (Perek Eilu Na'arot) built around a Tosafos Yeshanim question: why doesn't the Mishnah mention that a slave (eved kena'ani) who assaults or seduces a woman is also liable for the kenas, even though he can never marry her? The discussion widens into which mitzvos an eved is obligated in, weighing the Mishneh LaMelech against the Turei Even.
Kesubos 21a — Iyun
A Kesubos daf 21 shiur on the rabbinic requirement to verify (kiyum) a loan document's signatures before it can be collected on, and what the witnesses are really testifying to when they confirm their own signatures. Works through a chain of Rishonim -- Rashi, Tosafos, Rav Hai Gaon, Tosafos Rid -- on whether forgetting the loan itself changes the halacha, before tackling a related Bava Metzia case of two people found holding the same document.
Kesubos 29a — Iyun
Continuing the same Kesubos Perek Eilu Na'arot shiur series as 'Dw C0045,' this installment tackles a different sugya: the transition from na'arah to bogeret and what it means for a maidservant's release. A three-way chakirah over whether na'arot and bagrut are separate stages or one process leads into a parallel Likkutei Sichos analysis of the Rambam on kiddushin and nisuin before and after Matan Torah.
Kesubos 30a–30b — Iyun
A Kesubos 30 shiur on kam lei bidraba minei -- why a person liable for execution doesn't also pay for the same act -- that pivots into a deep analysis of what makes theft through one's courtyard (chatzer) actually theft. Weaves in the Rebbe's Likkutei Sichos explanation of why the Rambam requires a physical act before an object becomes forbidden as avodah zarah, using the concept of a courtyard as a halachic 'agent' to tie the two sugyos together.